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ary .eck*
This article addresses an issue critical to forty-one percent of
fathers in the United States: prenatal abandonment. Under prenatal
abandonment theory, fathers can lose their parental rights to non-
marital children if they do not provide prenatal support to the
mothers of their children. This is true even if the mothers have not
notified the fathers of the pregnancy and if the mothers or fathers are
unsure of the fathers’ paternity. While this result may seem counter-
intuitive, it is necessitated by demographic trends. Prenatal aban-
donment theory has been structured to protect mothers, fathers, and
fetuses in response to a number of social factors: the link between
pregnancy and increased rates of sexual assault, domestic violence,
and domestic homicide; the high non-marital birth rate; the com-
monality of casual sexual relationships; the likelihood that non-mar-
ital children will live in poverty; and poverty’s deleterious effects
upon children.
The 2013 United States Supreme Court’s decision in Adop-
tive Couple v. Baby Girl1 endorsed prenatal abandonment theory
and elevated the rights of pregnant women and fetuses while tying
an unwed father’s rights to the responsibilities he assumes from the
moment of conception. This Article analyzes relevant socio-
demographics and comprehensively reviews existing case law to con-
clude with recommendations for the structure of prenatal abandon-
ment theory as it now exists in various forms in thirty-four states.
* Emeritus Professor of Clinical Law. Professor Mary Beck taught in Schools of
Nursing and Medicine for thirteen years before joining the Missouri University law
faculty in 1993, as Director of the Family Violence Clinic. Her work includes
representing indigent domestic violence survivors and dying custodial parents in a
law school-based practice; consulting in adoption, assisted reproductive technology,
and surrogacy in a private law practice; serving as a faculty member and
administrator in schools of nursing and medicine; working as a certified family nurse
practitioner at the Columbia Free Clinic, at publicly funded walk in clinics, and at
Missouri University Hospital and Clinics; representing clemency clients; and
drafting multi-state and federal legislation involving birth parents’ rights, adoption
of children, stand-by guardianship, and domestic violence. She thanks her colleagues
Rigel Oliveri and Paul Litton and research assistant Ross Valore for their assistance in
developing this article.
1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Seuss was perhaps the first to recognize prenatal abandonment
theory, the concept that a biological father forfeits his parental rights to a
newborn by neglecting his parental responsibilities during the mother’s
pregnancy. In Seuss’s 1940 classic book, Horton Hatches the Egg, Mayzie the
bird pressures Horton the elephant to sit on her egg while she takes a brief
break that turns into an extended rest on Palm Beach.2 Horton steadfastly
sits upon the egg, enduring jeers, threats, ice storms, seasickness, and ridi-
cule.3 Just as the egg is hatching, Mayzie returns to claim her egg and to
exclude Horton.4 Horton’s heart is heavy and sad until the baby emerges as
a tiny elephant with wings.5 The book’s last page pictures a jubilant Horton
holding up his winged baby elephant; Mayzie is not seen.6
Prenatal abandonment is in a state of evolution. Just as 1950s child
support legislation dramatically altered fathers’ responsibilities to non-mari-
tal children,7 recent state and federal legislation, as well as case law, has
spurred a sea change in the rights and responsibilities of non-marital fathers.
Today, thirty-four states have adopted prenatal abandonment laws, a trend
the United States Supreme Court endorsed in 2013.
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,8 the Court extended its jurisprudence
regarding unwed fathers’ responsibilities to include the prenatal period.9
There, the Court withheld federal statutory protection for parental rights
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) from an unwed Native Ameri-
can father because he had prenatally abandoned his child and her mother by
failing to support them during the pregnancy or otherwise to assume
2. DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (3d ed. 1940). It is interesting that in this
popular culture reference to prenatal abandonment, it is the mother who prenatally
abandons her child, a biologically impossible feat for human birth mothers. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34756, NON-MARITAL
CHILDBEARING: TRENDS, REASONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY INTERVENTIONS 31-32
(2008); Brief for the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 7, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013)
(No. 12-399).
8. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2552.
9. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
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custody of the child after birth.10 After Adoptive Couple, non-support consti-
tutes prenatal abandonment.11 This is a crucial holding for pregnant women
and their fetuses.
This seminal case provides valuable protections for non-marital fa-
thers. If a man can forfeit his constitutional parental rights by ignoring his
parental duties even before birth, the rational conclusion is that a man can
secure parental rights under the Constitution by fulfilling his prenatal re-
sponsibilities. In so doing, a non-marital father preserves his right to con-
sent or withhold consent to the baby’s adoption after birth. Thus, properly
deployed, prenatal abandonment theory forms the basis of sound law that
protects each parent and the child.
However, social realities confound the application of prenatal aban-
donment theory, particularly when states are developing rules for its imple-
mentation. Forfeiture laws must span the full expanse of circumstances
leading to the waiver of parental rights while recognizing certain mitigating
factors.12 For example, when is a man on notice that he has or might have
parental responsibilities to an unborn fetus or child? Does the mother know
the identity of the father, due to the circumstances in which a child was
conceived? May the mother fear identification and notification of the father
due to sexual assault or domestic violence?
Forty-one percent of American children are born out of wedlock.13 For
these children, no father is presumed by law at birth, and it is difficult to
determine paternal responsibility to provide child support. Determining
10. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2552. The implications of prenatal abandonment on
the applicability of ICWA are beyond the scope of this Article. In summary, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) on involuntary
termination of parental rights did not apply to Father because he had never had
custody of Baby Girl. Id. at 2559–62. Next, the Court looked at 25 U.S.C. 1912(d),
finding that remedial efforts for parents did not apply to Father because he had
abandoned Baby Girl before birth and never exercised custody of her. Id. at 2565-64.
The Court then reasoned that 25 U.S.C. 1915(a) on adoptive preferences did not
apply because no other Indian family had formally petitioned to adopt Baby Girl. Id.
at 2574–77.
11. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2552. See also id. at 2574–77 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing) (restating the majority’s holding that where a father fails to support the child
financially or emotionally, the child will be considered abandoned, and the relation-
ship is discontinued). Sotomayor also notes in her dissent that the Court’s “discus-
sion focuses on Birth Father’s particular actions, but nothing in the majority’s
reasoning limits its manufactured class of semiprotected ICWA parents to biological
fathers who failed to support their child’s mother during pregnancy.” Id. at 2578.
12. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(B)(4) (Westlaw through 2016 Sess.); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 16-1504(2)(B)(III) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-43(3) (Westlaw through 2017).
13. Joyce Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2011, 62 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 9
(2013).
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when unwed fathers maintain their statutorily protected parental rights,
such that their consent to adoption should be required, is even more com-
plicated. This paper posits that public policy demands that men be obli-
gated to inquire of their sexual partners whether pregnancy resulted from
sexual intercourse and that women be simultaneously relieved of the obliga-
tion to notify men of pregnancy or paternity. The threat of domestic vio-
lence and homicide places too great a burden on mothers. And men have
too much to lose by relying upon women whose ability and willingness to
notify men of impending fatherhood vary greatly. Any legislation that re-
quires women to notify men of pregnancy or adoption refuses to recognize
the serious dangers that domestic violence and domestic homicide pose for
pregnant women and their fetuses. Moreover, any such legislation ignores
new social norms regarding female sexuality—namely, that casual en-
counters can lead to multiple potential fathers.
In light of these social realities, this Article takes up three important
questions regarding prenatal abandonment theory. First, what is the moral
justification for permitting prenatal abandonment when it extinguishes the
parental rights of a biological parent even before a baby is born? Second,
what is the current state of the law of prenatal abandonment theory and
how is it currently implemented throughout the country? Third, what
should such laws look like if they are to adequately protect the needs, inter-
ests, and rights of unwed mothers, fathers, and their children?
This Article begins with the justification for prenatal abandonment
theory, explaining the contemporary social and familial relationships that
demand it. While contemporary social realities necessitate prenatal aban-
donment theory, they also complicate its implementation. Part II reviews
the facts, holding, and opinions in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the seminal
Supreme Court case on this issue. Part III then provides a thorough account
of existing federal and state law, including precedent that might clarify the
conditions under which non-marital fathers’ parental rights are protected or
forfeited. A complete list of relevant state law is provided in the Appendix.
In light of the social demands outlined in Part I and the complicated tapes-
try of existing state and federal law surveyed in Parts II, III, and the Appen-
dix, Part IV concludes that all states should enact prenatal abandonment
laws with three specific features: a requirement that the non-marital father
inquire if sex led to pregnancy and self-identify as the father; a requirement
that the father pay prenatal support or waive parental prerogatives; and pro-
tection for the parental prerogatives of those non-marital fathers who do
provide prenatal support.
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PART I. SOCIETAL BACKGROUND: DEMOGRAPHICS OF CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY AND RELATIONSHIPS
The demographics of contemporary society necessitate prenatal aban-
donment law but also confound it. Pregnancy and parenthood can both
impoverish single women and endanger the physical safety of single
mothers, fetuses, and children. This necessitates the financial support of
non-marital fathers during pregnancy as well as after birth.14 However, the
rise of non-marital births is associated with reduced paternal involvement,
including emotional and financial support. Children suffer poorer develop-
mental outcomes as a result.15
Today, a father’s ability to receive notice of an adoption action is com-
plicated by the fact that parents are less likely to be married16 and less likely
to know the identity of the fetus’s father than in previous years.17 Further,
this Section documents the ways in which sexual assault, domestic abuse,
and domestic homicide drive women’s choices in responding to pregnancy,
childbirth, and the identification of fathers.18 The contours of prenatal
abandonment theory must incorporate recognition of these social realities
and dangers.
1.1 Establishing Genetic and Legal Paternity of Non-Marital Children
Non-marital children comprise forty-one percent of births in the
United States. The rate of non-marital births varies among demographic
groups—for example, seventy-two percent of non-Hispanic Black mothers
are unmarried, as are eighty-eight percent of teenage mothers.19 The Census
Bureau reports that Utah has the lowest non-marital birth rate, that Wash-
ington, D.C. has the highest, and that non-marital births have climbed
steadily since the 1940s.20 The trend has shown no signs of reversing. Data
shows that an unmarried mother is both most likely to be the custodial
parent of her child and most likely to relinquish a child to adoption.21
14. See infra Section 1.5.
15. See infra Section 1.6.
16. See infra Section 1.1.
17. See infra Section 1.2.
18. See infra Sections 1.3, 1.4.
19. Martin et al., supra note 13, at 41.
20. Steven Nelson, Census Bureau Links Poverty With Out-of-Wedlock Births, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (May 6, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/
2013/05/06/census-bureau-links-poverty-with-out-of-wedlock-births.
21. TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-240j, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND
FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT 2009, 1 (2011).
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In sum, the typical American family is no longer comprised of a mar-
ried mother and father living with their children, and this change is an
immutable reality for just under half of America’s children.22 The implica-
tion of the high non-marital birth rate is that forty-one percent of all chil-
dren may be born without the financial and developmental security
provided by two involved parents.
Identification of the father is a critical step in obtaining child support
and prenatal reimbursement after birth. Genetic paternity must be con-
firmed or agreed upon and legal paternity established before the state or a
parent can enforce child support payments or order custody and visitation.23
Yet fathers may resist establishment of paternity to avoid paying child sup-
port, at least until their genetic paternity is confirmed by DNA testing.
Non-invasive, at-home paternity kits are available for as little as $90 on the
Internet, and do not require the intervention of a physician.24 However,
genetic confirmation of paternity does not establish legal paternity, which
must be ascertained by paternity action or completion of a Voluntary Ac-
knowledgement of Paternity Affidavit (VAPA).25 VAPAs require witnessing
or notarization of both parents’ signatures as well as the mother’s husband’s
signature if she is married to someone other than the child’s father.26 These
forms are freely available and free to complete, and they may be completed
without legal counsel.27 Both confirmation of genetic paternity and legal
establishment of paternity can be affordably accomplished by the parties
themselves.
22. Natalie Angier, The Changing American Family, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013 at D1-
D8. Stating:
The nation’s birthrate is half of what is was in 1960, and last year it hit its
lowest point ever. As steep as the fertility decline has been, the marriage rate
has fallen more sharply, particularly among young women, who do most of
the nation’s childbearing. As a result, 41 percent of babies are now born out
of wedlock, a fourfold increase since 1970.
Id. at D2.
23. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 210.823 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); Jeffrey A.
Parness & Zachary Townsend, The Price of Pleasure: Children Hurt Too, 14 J. L. &
FAM. STUD. 245, 253 (2012) (“Every state is already obligated (as a condition to the
receipt of federal funds) to provide most unwed fathers with an opportunity to ac-
knowledge paternity at birth.”).
24. See About, HOMEDNA, https://homedna.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
25. VAPA forms are available online with instructions. See Acknowledgement of Paternity
for a Child Born to an Unmarried Woman, N.Y. CHILD SUPPORT ONLINE 2, https://
www.childsupport.ny.gov/dcse/pdfs/4418.pdf.
26. See MO. REV. STAT. § 193.215.1 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
27. See Affidavit Acknowledging Paternity, MO. DEP’T HEALTH & SENIOR SERVS., http://
www.selfrepresent.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43978 (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
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While obtaining post-birth child support is complicated, obtaining
prenatal support is much more complex. Prenatal DNA testing of a fetus for
paternity is expensive and invasive in early pregnancy, and less reliable,
though less invasive, in later pregnancy.28 Invasive procedures such as chori-
onic villous sampling pose a risk to mother and fetus, and must be done
with the costly intervention of a physician.29 Noninvasive prenatal paternity
testing on the mother’s blood sample may only be accomplished after ten
weeks of pregnancy.30 This test is a fairly recent development and is not
readily available in all laboratories, nor is it as reliable as testing samples
from amniocentesis or chorionic villous sampling.31
In summary, timely identification of fathers is complicated by the ge-
netic and legal requirements to determine paternity. While genetic and legal
determination may be completed affordably and efficiently after birth, the
process is more expensive and invasive during pregnancy. It must also be
noted that all of the paternity testing techniques depend on the cooperation
of the potential father(s) in order to obtain the required DNA sample.32
While no easy solutions exist, prenatal abandonment theory is a sensible
response to protect non-marital children, their mothers, and their fathers.
1.2 Identifying Fathers in an Era of Casual Sex
The casual nature of sexual relationships today contributes to the rate
of children born without identified fathers. For example, studies reveal that
thirty-six percent of college students engage in casual sexual relationships,
which may be labeled “friends with benefits,” “one night stands,” or some
variant.33 This social phenomenon complicates paternal identification in
several key ways.
28. See Blood (Non-Invasive) vs. Invasive Prenatal Paternity DNA Tests, PRENATAL GENET-
ICS CTR., http://www.prenatalgeneticscenter.com/comparing-prenatal-test/com-
parisontable/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
29. Frequently Asked Questions, PATERNITY TESTING CORP. (July 5, 2015), http://www
.ptclabs.com/faq; Tests and Procedures: Chorionic villus sampling, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/chorionic-villus-sampling/basics/risks/
prc-20013566 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
30. See PRENATAL GENETICS CTR., supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. See Paternity Testing, PATERNITY TESTING CORP. (July 5, 2015), http://www.ptclabs
.com/paternity. Paternity Testing Corporation does take pictures of those persons
from whom they take samples for DNA testing. Men who wish to establish paternity
should insist upon the test confirming the mother’s maternity in order to verify that
the testing was done on the correct woman/fetus. This may also make the process
less expensive. Frequently Asked Questions, PATERNITY TESTING CORP. (July 5,
2015), http://www.ptclabs.com/faq.
33. E.g., Melissa A. Bisson & Timothy R. Levine, Negotiating a Friends with Benefits
Relationship, 38 ARCH. SEX BEHAV. 66 (2009).
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Frequent and varied sexual partners around the time of conception
impair identification of a fetus’s father. Where several potential fathers exist,
a woman’s ability to identify the father of her fetus is also diminished by
difficulties in identifying possible dates of conception. These difficulties in-
clude poor recall of her last menstrual period, the irregularity of her men-
strual cycle, the wide variation in fertility during the menstrual cycle,
irregularities in oral contraceptive use, and possible vaginal bleeding follow-
ing conception.34
Additionally, half of all pregnancies are unintended, and nearly half
again end in abortion.35 That means that a quarter of children born in the
United States were not planned, so the need to identify a father may not
have been anticipated. Women are less likely to be tracking their ovulation
when conception occurs unintentionally, which is more likely in casual sex-
ual relationships. Untimed ovulation impairs identification of a father. And
both men and women may be misled in attempts to identify a fetus’s father
when they incorrectly assume that contraceptives are infallible. For example,
in 2014, the Centers for Disease Control reported that the failure rate of the
male condom was a full eighteen percent, largely due to incorrect usage.36
More recent data suggests condom failure rates of thirteen percent.37
Finally, problems identifying fathers not only arise from casual en-
counters, ignorance of reproductive physiology, failure to track menstrual
cycles, and contraceptive failures, but also from mothers’ legal privacy right
to withhold the name or possible names of their children’s fathers.38 This
privacy right has its roots in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence,39
and has been ratified by at least one state court in adoption cases where
fathers have not assumed prenatal responsibilities.40 When fathers have not
34. See Linda Hunter, Issues in Pregnancy Dating: Revisiting the Evidence, 54 J. MID-
WIFERY WOMEN’S HEALTH 184 (2009).
35. Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: Inci-
dence and Disparities, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 478 (2011).
36. Effectiveness of Family Planning Methods, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception/
unintendedpregnancy/pdf/contraceptive_methods_508.pdf. The CDC divides con-
traceptive failure rates into ‘perfect use’ and ‘typical use.’ Barrier contraceptives have
failure rates of up to 28%; male condoms 18%; and IUD’s, oral contraceptives,
implants, cervical rings, etc. have failure rates varying from .05-9%. Id.
37. Aparna Sundaram et al., Contraceptive Failure in the United States: Estimates from the
2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health
(Guttmacher Inst.), Mar. 2017, at 7. The overall rate of failure for reversible birth
control methods from 2006-2010 was ten percent, down from twelve percent in
2002. Id.
38. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
39. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248.
40. See, e.g., Evans v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 399 S.E.2d 156, 157 (S.C. 1990).
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established a relationship with their children or taken steps to legally assume
responsibility for them, mothers’ withholding of fathers’ identities may not
effectively thwart fathers’ attempts to assume responsibility.41 But when
mothers do thwart fathers, it imperils both fathers’ rights and children’s
chances of finding stability through adoption.
1.3 Sexual Assault Resulting in Pregnancy
The ability or desire of pregnant women to identify potential fathers is
further complicated in cases of sexual assault. A woman impregnated during
a sexual assault may be less likely to know the father’s identity, and may
therefore be ill-equipped to fulfill any duty to inform him of the pregnancy.
Even if the survivor knows the identity of her attacker, she may be reluctant
to notify him about the pregnancy because she is outraged at the violation
and because doing so may endanger her and the fetus.
While estimates vary, approximately eighteen percent of women in the
United States will be raped during their lifetime.42 Under certain circum-
stances, a woman may be unable to identify and notify potential fathers of
the resulting pregnancy.43 For example, drug-induced rape may inhibit the
survivor’s memory of the attack or attacker.44 In addition, fifteen percent of
41. See M.C. v. T.W., 136 S. Ct. 2490 (2016); In re Baby A, 363 P.3d 193 (Colo.
2015), cert. denied. “Thwart” is commonly used in case law to describe this situation.
Birth mother efforts to thwart birth fathers result in tort actions, disciplinary com-
plaints against attorneys and agencies, and actions for fraud. See, e.g., In re Krigel,
480 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Mo. 2016); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 809 (W.Va.
1998).
42. Raising Awareness About Sexual Abuse: Facts and Statistics, U.S. DEPT. JUST.
NSOPW, https://www.nsopw.gov/en-US/Education/FactsStatistics?AspxAutoDe
tectCookieSupport=1 (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
43. See Patricia Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 132-33. Stories from rape survivors confirm that survivors of
drug induced rapes may not recall the attack or the attacker:
She testified that she woke up the next morning naked, with male emissions
on her body, leading her to believe that someone had had sex with her that
evening. . . . Complainant’s son testified that he was awakened by the shak-
ing of the bed and saw a man he had never seen before in bed on top of his
mother. He said the man’s ‘private part’ was in his mom’s ‘private part.’ His
mother was naked and appeared to be asleep. She was not holding or kiss-
ing the man. . . . [S]he was dumped on the lawn in front of her home and
was found by her father in a disoriented state; . . . she had no memory of
the incident the night before. . . .
Id.
44. See id. at 132 (“He then penetrated her. When she was next conscious her underwear
had been replaced. The appellant remarked, ‘Do you remember that then? Don’t
worry you won’t . . . later.’”).
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survivors are raped by strangers.45 Considering that a survivor may have
little-to-no memory of the attack or the rapist(s), or may not know her
attacker(s), her ability to report the identity of her attacker(s) is limited.
As discussed in the next section, a woman who does know the identity
of her attacker may nonetheless be reluctant to notify him about the preg-
nancy, as doing so may endanger her and the child. Further, she may be
outraged, justifiably, by any suggestion that her attacker could have rights to
the resulting child. Under such circumstances, several states, including New
Jersey, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Oklahoma, have adopted provisions that
terminate the parental rights of the father, deny him custody or visitation
rights, or eliminate the notice requirement.46
1.4 Domestic Violence and Domestic Homicide
The threat of domestic violence and domestic homicide for pregnant
women and mothers cannot be overstated. Domestic violence is character-
ized by coercive control of a survivor through physical, sexual, psychologi-
cal, or financial abuse.47 While physical and sexual abuse are commonly
recognized forms of domestic violence, psychological and financial manipu-
lation are also legally cognizable forms of abuse.48 Indeed, less visible abuse,
such as putting a gun to a woman’s head or withholding child support that
finances rent and food, can control a woman as effectively as bruising blows.
45. THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT:
A RENEWED CALL TO ACTION 9 (2014).
46. Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 540 (Del. 2000). Stating:
New Jersey, Wisconsin, Nevada and Oklahoma are a few of the states that
have provisions either terminating the parental rights of the father who con-
ceived a child as a result of a sexual assault, denying custody or visitation to
the father, or eliminating the father’s right to notice of the impending
adoption of the child.
Id. See also In re Adoption of C.A.T., 47 Kan. App.2d 257 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012);
LeClair v. Reed ex rel. Reed, 182 Vt. 594 (Vt. 2007).
47. Off. on Violence Against Women, Domestic Violence, U.S. DEPT. JUST., http://www
.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
48. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897 (1992); ELIZABETH
M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 7 n.1 (2d ed. 2008). See also Economic Abuse Fact Sheet, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/files/EconomicAbuse.pdf. Stating:
Victims of domestic violence may be unable to leave an abusive partner or
may be forced to return to an abusive partner for economic reasons. Victims
of coerced debt may face massive barriers to economic self-sufficiency, in-
cluding struggling to find a job or even obtaining a place to live after leav-
ing an abuser due to debt and its detrimental effects on their personal credit
scores.
Id.
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The risk of injury and death to American pregnant women due to
domestic violence is not speculative. Conservative estimates suggest that one
in every four women will experience domestic violence in her lifetime.49
The FBI reports that thirty-seven percent of all women murdered in the
United States in 2013 were murdered by an intimate partner.50 Abuse is
exacerbated during pregnancy.51 Homicide is the second leading cause of
death for pregnant women.52 Overall, thirty-one percent of all deaths of
pregnant and postpartum women result from domestic violence.53
Pregnancy renders a woman uniquely vulnerable to physical, emo-
tional, and financial abuse, and an abusive father can de facto use the preg-
nancy as a vehicle to control the mother.54 A pregnant woman’s physical
state is altered by weight gain, displaced center of gravity, and increased
blood volume, workload on her heart and lungs, need for food, and fatiga-
bility.55 These physiological effects of pregnancy impede a mother’s ability
to support and protect herself and the fetus, who she is possibly more moti-
vated to protect than herself. The mother’s emotional state is vulnerable
because the demands of pregnancy make her reliant upon others for assis-
49. See U.S. DEP’T JUST., NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (2000); NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE NATIONAL STATISTICS (2015) (“1 in 3 women and 1 in 4
men have been physically abused by an intimate partner.”); Violence Against Women
Fact Sheet, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact-
sheets/fs239/en/ (“Almost one third (30%) of women . . . report that they have
experienced some form of . . . violence by their intimate partner in their lifetime.”).
50. U.S. DEP’T JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 (2014). The percentage of
women murdered by intimate partners has been estimated to be as high as fifty
percent by some studies. See, e.g., Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors
for Intimate Partner Homicide, 250 NIJ J. 14, 18 (2008).
51. Rebekah Kratochvil, Intimate Partner Violence During Pregnancy: Exploring the Effi-
cacy of a Mandatory Reporting Statute, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 63, 65
(2009).
52. Id.
53. Donna St. George, CDC Explores Pregnancy-Homicide Link, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,
2005, at A05; accord Kratochvil, supra note 49 (reporting that the first or second
leading cause of death for pregnant women is domestic homicide); see generally Casey,
505 U.S. at 889 (“The number of battering incidents is high during the pregnancy
and often the worst abuse can be associated with pregnancy.”); Deborah Tu-
erkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 670-
72 (2006) (noting between 3.9% and 20% of pregnant women are abused).
54. See Domestic Violence, OFF. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (defining
abuse in part as coercive control of a survivor.).
55. See Haywood L. Brown, M.D., Physical Changes During Pregnancy, MERCK MAN-
UAL, http://www.merckmanuals.com/home/womens_health_issues/normal_pregna
ncy/physical_changes_during_pregnancy.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
2017] PRENATAL  A B A N D O N M E N T 65
tance and support. Her financial state is vulnerable because of the monetary
demands of pregnancy, including lost wages from morning sickness, fatiga-
bility, frequent doctor visits and medical tests, doctor-ordered bed rest, hos-
pitalization for parturition, and six-to-eight weeks of unemployment during
postpartum recovery.56
The shocking rates of domestic and sexual abuse, combined with the
physiological effects of pregnancy, demonstrate that domestic and sexual
abuse and domestic homicide are inescapable terrors for pregnant women,
who render themselves uniquely vulnerable to violence due to the obliga-
tions they assume when they elect to continue pregnancies or seek to protect
fetuses and newborns. With pregnancy and identification of a father linked
to heightened risks of abuse and homicide, a woman may wish to avoid
both identifying the father and giving him actual notice of the pregnancy.
In light of this, Congress developed an exception to a mother’s obligation to
name the father of her child for government use in enforcing child support
in cases where danger to mother and child exists.57
1.5 Payment of Prenatal and Child Support: History and Demographics
As she plans for her future and the future of her children, a pregnant
woman may use the payment, or nonpayment, of prenatal support to fore-
cast whether a father will pay child support after the birth. Within the con-
ceptual structure of prenatal abandonment theory, the absence of prenatal
support may vest mothers with the power to relinquish children to adoption
without interference from fathers.
The payment of child support is intended to lift children out of pov-
erty and thus to avoid poverty’s deleterious effects.58 Single custodial parents
and their children are more likely to experience poverty, with twenty-eight
percent of such parents reporting below-poverty incomes.59 The financial
burden of parenthood disproportionately falls on the shoulders of single
women; single mothers comprise eighty-three percent of the single custodial
parents of non-marital children.60 Poverty harms the children of single par-
56. See Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647, 648 (2011).
57. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974);
SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 7, at 4; see also Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and
Good Cause: Greater Sanctions and the Failure to Account for Domestic Violence, 15
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367, 372-74 (2000) (tracing the legislative history of the good
cause exception enabling women not to name fathers in order to escape abuse).
58. A 1996 welfare theory posited that poor women could escape poverty by child sup-
port. See, e.g., Stacy Brustin, Child Support: Shifting the Financial Burden in Low-
Income Families, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1 (2012).
59. GRALL, supra note 21 at 1.
60. See id.
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ents, causing poorer developmental outcomes and lower educational
achievement.61 Specifically, the effects of poverty on children include poor
academic performance,62 higher school dropout rates,63 and increased inci-
dences of abuse/neglect,64 behavioral and socio-emotional problems,65 phys-
ical health problems, and developmental delays.66
Poverty’s effects on the children of single mothers are exacerbated by
the fact that non-marital fathers consistently fail to support their children.67
In 2009, census data indicated that only forty-one percent of custodial par-
ents received full child support.68 Similarly, 5.6 million mothers were due
child support in 2011, but only three-quarters received any portion of the
amount due.69 The census does not report the payment of prenatal support,
and full payment of prenatal support may be even rarer than full payment of
child support. Fathers have not been historically obliged to pay pregnancy
expenses or mothers’ prenatal support, so we may expect that fathers’ reluc-
tance to provide prenatal support mirrors fathers’ documented resistance to
providing child support.70
Per the dictates of biology, mothers are the parents who are pregnant
and present at birth. Thus, mothers’ names are automatically listed on birth
certificates, which are prepared at birth.71 Mothers are always responsible for
61. Nicholas Kristof, Modern Family Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at A27 (posit-
ing that society and politicians are reluctant to address the problem of single
parenthood for fear of being accused “of being moralists, racists, anti-woman, anti-
freedom, supporting government decisions into personal decisions”; that conserva-
tives are right to highlight family stability as critical to welfare of children; that
“liberals are often too politically correct to address the issue at all”; and that the
answers lie in family planning, undoing mass incarceration trends, and “outreach
efforts and job programs that give young people a lift and stake in the future”).
62. Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty on Children, 7 FU-
TURE CHILD. 55, 57–62 (1997).
63. Id. at 58.
64. Id. at 59.
65. Id. at 58.
66. Id.
67. See Enforcing Child Support Orders: Dealing With a Deadbeat Parent, DIVORCENET,
http://www.divorcenet.com/resources/child-support/enforcing-child-support/enforc-
ing-child-support-options-dealing-non-payment (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) (review-
ing the custodial parent’s options to get support); GRALL, supra note 21 at 9 (finding
that child support receipt rates are falling).
68. See GRALL, supra note 21, at 1 (“Custodial parents receiving the full amount of child
support due declined between 2007 and 2009, from 46.8 percent to 41.2 percent.”).
69. See GRALL, supra note 21, at 1.
70. See generally Motro, supra note 56, at 647.
71. In re M.M.M., 428 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. App. 2014) (holding that a mother listed on
the child’s birth certificate is the woman who gave birth to the child, upholding an
order adjudicating the mother as the parent, and concluding that under the Uniform
Parentage Act, a woman is a mother if she gives birth to the subject child).
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their own prenatal support, and are always liable for child support because
they are always identifiable on the birth certificate for child support enforce-
ment. Concomitantly, in many jurisdictions, non-marital mothers are in
sole control of children born out of wedlock, until and unless paternity is
legally established.72 Historically:
Men had no legal obligations to women with whom they con-
ceived out of wedlock. Today, the same rule holds in cases in
which the woman terminates an unintended pregnancy – the
man owes her nothing. . . . Most states require unwed fathers to
participate in the ‘reasonable expenses’ of pregnancy . . . which
are generally limited to expenses that directly benefit the subse-
quently born child.73
Today, a non-marital father continues to have no automatic legally-recog-
nized rights to or responsibilities for his born child.74 He is not a legally-
recognized father unless he, the mother, or the state’s Child Support En-
forcement Office legally establishes his paternity.75 However, even the father
whose paternity is not legally established maintains constitutional protec-
tion of his parental rights by the establishment of a significant financial,
custodial, and personal relationship with the fetus (via the mother) or
child.76
A man can legally establish paternity by filing a paternity action that
culminates in a judgment of paternity, or by completing a Voluntary Ac-
knowledgment of Paternity Affidavit (VAPA).77 VAPA forms are kept in
72. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 U.S. 2552, 2573 (2013).
73. Motro, supra note 56, at 651.
74. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 210.822 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
75. Cf. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.823 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (providing for
the voluntary acknowledgment of a paternity affidavit).
76. See Parness & Townsend, supra note 23, at 251 n.50 (2012) (citing Lehr v. Robert-
son, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983), where the court noted that for unwed sexual part-
ners who conceive, the mother is always a legal parent at birth while the father can
only become a parent under law by developing custodial, emotional or financial ties).
77. See MO. REV. STAT. § 210.823 (Westlaw through Nov. 4, 2014). Stating:
1. A signed acknowledgment of paternity form pursuant to section 193.215
shall be considered a legal finding of paternity subject to the right of either
signatory to rescind the acknowledgment, in writing, by filing such rescis-
sion with the bureau within the earlier of: (1) Sixty days from the date of
the last signature; or (2) The date of an administrative or judicial proceed-
ing to establish a support order in which the signatory is a party. The ac-
knowledgment may thereafter only be challenged in court on the basis of
fraud, duress or material mistake of fact with the burden of proof upon the
challenger. No judicial or administrative proceeding shall be required or
permitted to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity. 2. Except
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birthing hospitals and are often completed there by fathers attending the
births of their children.78 All fifty states must provide VAPA forms as a
condition of receiving federal funds.79 The forms are also commonly found
on the Internet.80 A father has two options to list his name on a birth certif-
icate: a paternity judgment or a completed VAPA. Inclusion on a birth cer-
tificate identifies the father for child support enforcement purposes.
However, a father may not attend his child’s birth, where it is convenient to
execute a VAPA, or he may not wish to execute a VAPA because of attend-
ant child support responsibilities. The failure to complete a VAPA compli-
cates and postpones the collection of child support and the identification of
men with parental rights.
Analysis indicates that federal and state programs to establish paternity
and collect child support have become increasingly aggressive.81 While this
may seem to bode well for the ability of single parents to support their
children, schemes such as criminal penalties for failure to pay support or the
conditioning of public benefits on a mother’s willingness to establish par-
entage have been shown to negatively impact both custodial and noncus-
todial parents.82 These efforts are negatively associated with the engagement
of fathers with their children, reducing father-child visitation.83
for good cause shown, the legal responsibilities of the parties, including
child support obligations, shall not be suspended during the pendency of
any action in which an attempt is made to revoke the signed acknowledg-
ment under this section. 3. The acknowledgment shall be filed with the
bureau. An acknowledgment effectuated under the law of any other state or
territory shall be given the same effect in this state as it has in the other state
or territory.
Id. VAPA forms were also discussed earlier in this Article. See supra Section 1.1.
78. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 193.087 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) (providing the
procedure for VAPA forms).
79. Parness & Townsend, supra note 23, at 253 (“Every state is already obligated (as a
condition to the receipt of federal funds) to provide most unwed fathers with an
opportunity to acknowledge paternity at birth”); See also id. at 253 n.64 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2006)).
80. See discussion infra Section 4.3 (“The majority of states have now legislated putative
father registries, where a man can register his intent to claim pater-
nity . . . Registration is cheap (the cost of a letter) and can be completed easily on
forms available online, in hospitals of birth, and . . . State Child Protective
Agencies”).
81. Laurie S. Kohn, Engaging Men as Fathers: The Courts, The Law, and Father-Absence in
Low-Income Families, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 531 (2013).
82. Cf. id. at 531-534.
83. See id. at 533. A number of experimental programs exist to address this negative
association, including “pass through” support payments not involving assignment of
payments to the government and in kind support payments. See id. at 531–562.
2017] PRENATAL  A B A N D O N M E N T 69
Regarding this trend with trepidation, some progressive analysts argue
that non-marital fathers are simply unable to meet their child support obli-
gations due to fundamental changes in the job market penalizing underedu-
cated men with very low pay.84 They cite scholarly studies showing that
men’s education or job training provides lasting solutions to child support.85
It is noteworthy that child support programs serve half of all children
in poor families,86 and that “Blacks and Hispanics . . . have poverty rates
that greatly exceed the overall average.”87 This means that child support
demands are greatest in poor families and that minorities are over-repre-
sented in poor families. Thus, child support obligations fall most heavily on
racial minorities.
Poor and undereducated single mothers face even more substantial
barriers to parenthood in the workforce than fathers do. Disparate pay is
factored into calculation of child support and potential prenatal tax deduc-
tions. Men’s earnings increase by six percent when they have children, while
women’s incomes decrease by four percent for each child they have.88 This
is in addition to the fact that, on average, women earn only eighty cents to
every dollar men earn, and women of color earn even less.89 In sum: men
earn more than women, fathers earn more than mothers, and fathers fail to
84. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Time to Try Compassion, Not Censure, for Families, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/business/economy/
time-to-try-compassion-not-censure-for-families.html (arguing that “the job market
has changed in such fundamental ways that many men” lacking in education can no
longer fulfill marriage obligations or afford to pay child support”).
85. To view one such study, see How the Child Support System Affects Low-Income Fa-
thers, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-ser-
vices/how-child-support-affects-low-income-fathers.aspx (last updated Sept. 2012).
The President’s Fatherhood Initiative has tackled the problem of absent fathers, in-
cluding those avoiding child support. It has dedicated much of its budget to urging
marriage as a fix for absent/non-supportive fathers, but research shows that invest-
ment in increasing the level of education of biological fathers would have a great
effect on their commitment to the mothers of their children and financial ability to
care for their children. See generally The President’s Fatherhood Pledge, NAT’L RESPON-
SIBLE FATHERHOOD CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.fatherhood.gov/pledge (last vis-
ited Feb. 11, 2017).
86. Id.
87. Who is poor?, INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY, http://www.irp.wisc.edu/faqs/faq3.htm
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
88. Claire Cain Miller, The Motherhood Penalty vs. the Father Bonus: A Child Helps Your
Career, if You’re a Man, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
09/07/upshot/a-child-helps-your-career-if-youre-a-man
.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0.
89. Pay Equity & Discrimination, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES., http://www.iwpr
.org/initiatives/pay-equity-and-discrimination (last visited Aug. 20, 2016). See also
Ariane Hegewisch & Asha DuMonthier, The Gender Wage Gap: 2015 Earnings Dif-
ferences by Race and Ethnicity, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (Mar. 2016), http://
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pay child support. These factors disadvantage mothers and drive them and
their children into a downward spiral of poverty.
Professor Shari Motro has promoted prenatal support payments to
women as a means of compensating mothers for the harms associated with
pregnancy, including psychological injuries, lost wages, maternity clothes,
and childbirth classes.90 In Preglimony, Professor Motro proposes a tax de-
duction for men paying such support.91 A tax deduction might serve to
motivate fathers to assist the pregnant mothers of their children.
In summary, mothers ought to (and surely do) use the non-support of
fathers during pregnancy, knowledge of fathers’ failure to support existing
children, and general knowledge of fathers’ underpayment of child support
to forecast the level of support they may expect once their children are
born.92 Fact patterns from state case law, discussed in Part III of this Article,
elucidate the resistance of some fathers to payment of child support.93 Nega-
tive paternal attitudes toward support factor into a woman’s relinquishment
decision,94 a decision that must be made during pregnancy. Thus, mothers
rely upon prenatal abandonment theory to safeguard their unfettered rights
to relinquish newborns to adoption.
www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-wage-gap-2015-earnings-differences-
by-race-and-ethnicity.
90. See Parness & Townsend, supra note 23, at 245. See also Motro, supra note 5, at
929–31; Anahad O’Connor, Really? The Claim: For a Difficult Pregnancy, Bed Rest is
Best, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013, 2:49 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
05/20/really-the-claim-for-a-difficult-pregnancy-bed-rest-is-best/?_r=0 (explaining
that the need for support for lost wages is realistic in that “one out of five pregnant
women in the United States is placed on bed rest, usually to help prevent complica-
tions like premature birth, hypertension and miscarriage”).
91. See generally Motro, supra note 56, at 682-97.
92. E.g., the birth mother who relinquished her child in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), spoke with me the night before the Supreme Court oral
argument. She explained that the father’s refusal to support her during her preg-
nancy and his child support arrangements for his older child influenced her decision
to relinquish her child. Conversation had on April 15, 2013.
93. See infra Section 3.3. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1316 (Miss.
1982) (“[H]e demanded that she not use his name in applying for welfare assis-
tance.”); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 227
N.W.2d 643, 646 (Wis. 1975) (“Rothstein’s response to this was that he wanted to
know the name of the doctor to make certain that his name could not be used on the
birth certificate as the father of the child.”).
94. See, e.g., In re Infant Child Skinner, 982 P.2d 670, 678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(upholding the termination of a father’s parental rights where the child’s mother
petitioned the court for termination because the father did not use the resources
available to him to provide support for his child).
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1.6 The Status of Fathering in the United States
Fathers play a crucial role in the development of children. However,
with a marked decrease in paternal involvement in child-rearing, prenatal
abandonment theory may provide a framework for pregnant women to
make decisions regarding their children’s future during pregnancy, rather
than after birth.
In 2010, twenty-seven percent of fathers lived separately from their
children; of these fathers, twenty-seven percent reported no visits with their
children in a year, and another thirty-one percent reported less than
monthly phone calls or emails.95 Other reports indicate that forty percent of
nonresident fathers have no regular contact with their children after the first
year of life, with non-contact increasing to fifty percent after the child turns
five.96
Children whose fathers are involved with their rearing have higher
IQ’s, possess stronger cognitive abilities, and attain higher academic
achievement through adolescence than children with uninvolved fathers.97
This higher educational attainment is closely correlated with higher future
income.98 Children with involved fathers also demonstrate good physical
and emotional health, better academic performance, pro-social behavior,
fewer school behavior problems, and a tendency to avoid drugs, violence,
and delinquent behavior.99 Conversely, absentee and non-support-paying
95. See Gretchen Livingston & Kim Parker, A Tale of Two Fathers: More Are Active, but
More Are Absent, PEW RES. CENT. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (June 15, 2011),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/06/15/a-tale-of-two-fathers/.
96. See Kohn, supra note 81, at 516.
97. Jeffery Rosenberg & W. Bradford Wilcox, The Importance of Fathers and the Healthy
Development of Children, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. ON CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT (2006), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/fatherhood.pdf.
98. Eduardo Porter, A Simple Equation: Education = More Income, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/business/economy/a-simple-equation-
more-education-more-income.html.
99. Rosenberg & Wilcox, supra note 97, at 12-13. Cf., Jessica Dixon Weaver, The First
Father: Perspectives on the President’s Fatherhood Initiative, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 297,
301 (2012). Stating:
It must be acknowledged that children raised by single parents do face
greater risks in all areas of well-being, mostly because they are more likely to
be poor. Because they are indigent, they are likely to grow up in poor hous-
ing located in unsafe neighborhoods, with low-achieving schools and few
community supports. In addition to these tangible negative factors, the
emotional or psychological effect of having no relationship with one parent
can lead to early experimentation with drugs, alcohol and sex, as well as
dropping out of school and subsequent criminal behavior. Once children
enter the juvenile justice system, they are much more likely to go to prison
once they reach adulthood. In contrast, children in two-parent homes tend
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fathers disadvantage non-marital children, increasing the likelihood of an
impoverished childhood and poor behavioral development.100
If a father shows little inclination to support a woman during her
pregnancy, she may assume that his disinterest will continue after birth. On
this understanding, she may wish to consider alternative options for the
fetus, including abortion or adoption. Because many of these decisions must
occur during pregnancy, prenatal abandonment theory helps pregnant
women extrapolate their current circumstances into the post-birth future to
better inform their decisions.
1.7 Conclusions from Demographic Analysis
Reflecting upon the demographics outlined above, it is clear that non-
marital mothers and their children operate at a disadvantage in contempo-
rary society. Half of all pregnancies are unintended, and half of those end in
abortion. Mothers are the likelier custodian of non-marital children, and
many fathers abandon child support obligations, thereby impoverishing sin-
gle custodial mothers and their children. Poverty is associated with poor
developmental outcomes for these children. A single woman may be unable
or unwilling to identify the father of her child, she may fear domestic abuse
or homicide if she does so, or she may be outraged by any requirement to
identify the man or men who might have fathered her children by rape.
Not surprisingly, single pregnant women are the most likely demo-
graphic to relinquish children to adoption.101 In making this decision, they
not to be as poverty-stricken as those in single-mother homes, and can
therefore afford to live in better housing, located in safer neighborhoods,
with higher-ranked schools and a number of community supports.
Id.
100. Marsha Garrison, Child Support and Children’s Poverty—A Review of Small Change:
The Economics of Child Support, 28 FAM. L.Q. 475, 503 (1994) (book review).
Stating:
Exposure to a single-parent family has been correlated with an enormous
number of social ills, including poor health, childhood behavioral
problems, delinquency, reduced educational attainment, lower occupational
status and income, and higher rates of poverty, early childbearing, and di-
vorce. While these disadvantages do not result solely from reduced socio-
economic status, this factor appears to be the most important of the
identifiable causes. Child support may not have the potential to lift already
poor, or near poor, children out of poverty, but it can ensure that the eco-
nomic hardship occasioned by family dissolution is equitably distributed
among family members so that children do not suffer disproportionately.
Id.
101. See, e.g. C.A. Bachrach et al., Relinquishment of premarital births: evidence from na-
tional survey data, 24 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 48 (1992); Lori Chambers, Newborn
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may consider factors such as fathers’ provision of prenatal support and the
risk of abuse and homicide. For example, the mother in Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, discussed in depth in the next section, factored the father’s refusal
to pay prenatal support into her relinquishment decision.102
Given these demographic and social forces, unmarried fathers should
not rely on mothers to protect their paternal rights. Rather, unmarried fa-
thers should protect their rights by affirmatively seeking information about
a possible pregnancy, signing putative father registries, filing paternity ac-
tions or otherwise establishing paternity, and paying or arranging to provide
documented prenatal support to the mothers of their children. A father who
provides regular and significant prenatal support and assistance to the
mother of his child ensures the best prenatal environment for his child and
protects his parental rights under the United States Constitution. Impor-
tantly, while requiring affirmative steps from a woman exposes her to the
significant risks of harm, requiring these affirmative steps from fathers is not
associated with known risks of domestic violence or homicide.
PART II. ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL
This decision was the first non-marital father’s rights case decided by
the United States Supreme Court in thirty years. While the Court’s major
holding regarded the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act, the case,
with its common fact pattern of a non-marital father refusing to pay prena-
tal support, broadly speaks to the problems faced by many unwed mothers.
More importantly, the Court’s assumption that a non-marital father could
abandon his fetus by failing to pay prenatal support, and that such aban-
donment might affect his parental rights, reflects the Court’s tacit endorse-
ment of prenatal abandonment theory. This holding implicitly validated the
laws of thirty-four states and represents a shift towards systematic accept-
ance of the theory.
Adoption: Birth Mothers, Genetic Fathers, and Reproductive Autonomy, 26 CAN. J.
FAM. L. 339 (2010).
102. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013). Birth Mother texted
Biological Father in the sixth month of her pregnancy asking him to either pay
support or terminate his parental rights. Id. “Biological Father responded via text
message that he relinquished his rights.” Id. This text exchange suggests Birth
Mother used Birth Father’s unwillingness to support her as a basis for an adoption
plan.
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2.1 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Baby Girl’s biological mother
(“Mother”) was a single Hispanic woman with two other children.103 She
and Baby Girl’s father (“Father”) were engaged to be married when they
conceived Baby Girl.104 Father was a Cherokee Indian.105 Mother notified
Father of her pregnancy before her first prenatal appointment and asked
him for support.106 He refused to provide financial support until Mother
married him (marriage would have increased Father’s military pay),107 which
she refused to do.108 Father had a history of failing to pay child support for
his older child,109 and he did not provide any support during Mother’s preg-
nancy with Baby Girl despite Mother’s repeated requests.110 At the time that
he was served with the adoption petition, four months into Baby Girl’s life,
he had not provided any support to Mother or Baby Girl.111
Father arranged for his friends to follow Mother when he suspected
that she was dating someone else during the pregnancy,112 but he ultimately
ascertained that she was working 12-14 hour days in order to support her-
self and her older children.113 At the beginning of her third trimester, after
multiple requests for support, Mother texted Father requesting that he ei-
ther provide prenatal support or terminate his parental rights.114 Father re-
sponded to Mother via text that he would terminate his parental rights
rather than pay child support to her.115 When asked at trial if his conduct
was “conducive to being a father” he answered, “I don’t believe so.”116
Mother developed an adoption plan with a South Carolina adoptive
couple (“Adoptive Parents”) and the couple provided financial support to
103. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 553 (S.C. 2012), rev’d 133 S. Ct.
2552 (2013).
104. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
105. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
106. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553 n.4.
107. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553 nn.3-4.
108. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553.
109. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 550 (“The mother of his first child was forced to take
court action after Father had amassed a child support arrearage of approximately
$11,000.”).
110. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 569–70.
111. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 588.
112. Brief for Am. Acad. of Adoption Attorneys as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers at 23–24, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550 (S.C. 2012) (No. 12-
399).
113. Transcript of Record at 482-83, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550 (S.C.
2012).
114. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 569.
115. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 569.
116. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 570.
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Mother during her pregnancy.117 Baby Girl was born in Oklahoma on Sep-
tember 15, 2009.118 Adoptive Parents attended the birth, where Adoptive
Father cut the umbilical cord.119 Father knew Baby Girl’s due date and the
location of the Oklahoma hospital where she was to be born.120 He did not
inquire about delivery of the baby, nor did he visit Baby Girl or her Mother
in the hospital at the time of delivery.121 Father did not pay any support
until Baby Girl was sixteen months old,122 and he first asked for visitation
with Baby Girl when she was twenty-two months old.123
Meanwhile, Mother’s attorney had inquired of the Cherokee Nation
during the pendency of the pregnancy as to Father’s status as an enrollee;
however, the attorney misspelled Father’s name as “Dustin” instead of
“Dusten,” and this resulted in the tribe’s erroneous response that Father was
not enrolled.124 Father’s Native American heritage was confirmed after the
birth.125 Baby Girl is 1.2% or 3/256 Cherokee.126
Adoptive Parents applied to the Interstate Compact for Placement of
Children (“ICPC”) in Oklahoma and South Carolina.127 They received
ICPC approval in South Carolina, their state of residence, and filed an
adoption petition there on September 18, 2009, three days after Baby Girl’s
birth.128 On January 6, 2010, Father, still in Oklahoma, was served notice
of the adoption petition.129 On January 14, 2010, Father filed a paternity
action in Oklahoma.130 On March 16, 2010, Adoptive Parents successfully
moved to dismiss the Oklahoma paternity action.131
The adoption proceeded in the South Carolina court.132 On March
30, 2010, Adoptive Parents amended their petition to acknowledge Father’s
Cherokee membership, and the Cherokee Nation filed a Notice of Interven-
tion in the South Carolina adoption action on April 7, 2010.133 Father’s
paternity was confirmed after the adoption court ordered paternity testing
117. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 570.
118. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552.
119. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
120. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 571 n.39.
121. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
122. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 579.
123. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 578.
124. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
125. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
126. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556 (2013).
127. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554.
128. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555, 570.
129. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
130. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
131. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
132. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 559.
133. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555, 572.
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on May 6, 2010.134 Father answered the adoption petition on May 25,
2010, stating he did not consent to the adoption.135 The trial ran from
September 12 to September 15, 2011.136
Father never had legal custody of Baby Girl under South Carolina or
Oklahoma law because she was born of a single woman; only Mother had
legal authority over Baby Girl.137
Under these facts, South Carolina law would have waived Father’s
consent because he had not paid prenatal support, but its courts held that
ICWA trumped state law.138
2.2 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Opinions and Holdings
On November 25, 2011, the South Carolina Trial Court issued an
order finding that ICWA applied,139 that the Existing Indian Family Doc-
trine exception to the ICWA requirements did not apply,140 that Father did
not consent to the adoption and his rights were not terminated,141 and that
Baby Girl would not be seriously injured by transferring her custody to
Father.142
On December 31, 2011, Adoptive Parents transferred the twenty-
seven-month-old Baby Girl to her father, whom she had never met.143 He
took her to Oklahoma.144
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that it had juris-
diction to decide the case over Oklahoma.145 It also found that Father satis-
fied the ICWA definition of “parent,” that Baby Girl satisfied the ICWA
definition of “Indian Child,” and that the Cherokee Nation is a “Federally
Recognized Indian Tribe.”146 Thus, it held that ICWA applied to the
case.147 It further held that Father’s rights could not be terminated, that the
best interests of Baby Girl were served by granting custody to Father, and
that the adoptive placement deviated from the ICWA placement prefer-
134. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
135. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
136. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
137. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2562 (2013).
138. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 576–79 (Kittredge, J., dissenting).
139. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
140. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
141. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
142. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
143. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
144. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
145. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 559.
146. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 560.
147. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 559–60.
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ences. It affirmed the trial court holding with a “heavy heart.”148 Justices
Kittredge and Hearn dissented at length.149
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court overturned the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision. The Court held that Father had
prenatally abandoned Baby Girl and had never had custody of her, and thus
it withheld the heightened parental protections of ICWA from him based
upon 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(d) and (f).150
The United States Supreme Court held that Baby Girl was an “Indian
Child” and that ICWA did apply, but it did not decide whether Father
qualified as a “parent” under ICWA.151 “Rather, assuming for the sake of
argument that he is a ‘parent,’ we hold that neither 25 USC 1912(f) nor 25
USC 1912(d) bar the termination of his parental rights.”152 The ICWA
defines unwed fathers as follows:
(9) “[P]arent” means any biological parent or parents of an In-
dian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an
Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It
does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been ac-
knowledged or established.153
Because Baby Girl’s father was not married to her mother, and because he
had neither acknowledged Baby Girl nor established paternity, Adoptive
Parents had argued that Father did not qualify as a “parent” under ICWA’s
148. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 565–67.
149. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567–91.
150. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013). The Court held:
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)—which bars involuntary termination of a parent’s
rights in the absence of a heightened showing that serious harm to the
Indian child is likely to result from the parent’s ‘continued custody’ of the
child—does not apply when, as here, the relevant parent never had custody
of the child. We further hold that § 1912(d)—which conditions involun-
tary termination of parental rights with respect to an Indian child on a
showing that remedial efforts have been made to prevent the “breakup of
the Indian family”—is inapplicable when, as here, the parent abandoned
the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child. Finally, we
clarify that § 1915(a), which provides placement preferences for the adop-
tion of Indian children, does not bar a non-Indian family like Adoptive
Couple from adopting an Indian child when no other eligible candidates
have sought to adopt the child.
Id.
151. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557 n.1, 2560.
152. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560.
153. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(9) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (emphasis added).
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heightened parental protections.154 By instead “assuming arguendo” that Fa-
ther was a “parent,” the Supreme Court ducked the questions of whether
state or federal law controlled which non-marital fathers qualify as an
ICWA “parent,” how the unwed father definition under ICWA should be
analyzed, and whether South Carolina’s black letter law on prenatal aban-
donment—waiving father’s rights—could have resolved Father’s status
under ICWA.155 Consequently, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl does not re-
solve the issue of how to identify those fathers that ICWA protects.
The Supreme Court could have withheld ICWA parental protections
from Father solely based upon his lack of custody after birth. This would
have: 1) established the absence of the “continued custody” prong required
under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)156 because Father did not seek or obtain custody
until after the adoption was filed; and 2) eliminated the need to provide
remedial services required under 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (d) to prevent breakup
of an Indian family because no Indian family existed absent father’s cus-
tody.157 Instead, the Court repeatedly included Father’s prenatal abandon-
ment in its calculus.158
In so doing, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the prenatal abandon-
ment followed the pattern previously set by state courts: considering every
fact with any possible bearing upon fathers’ intentions to either assume or
abandon parental responsibilities for their fetuses.159 Holistic consideration
of the circumstances has been deemed appropriate where a father’s constitu-
tional parental rights are at risk.160
154. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 560 (S.C. 2012).
155. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2574 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (referring to argu-
ments in the majority opinion at 2559–60).
156. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(f) (Westlaw through 2016 Pub. L. No. 114-219).
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the
absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
Id.
157. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(d) (Westlaw through 2016 Pub. L. No. 114-219).
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that
active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that
these efforts have proved unsuccessful.
Id.
158. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558, 2562–63, 2565 (2013).
159. See infra Section 3.2.
160. See infra Section 3.3.
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Whereas the South Carolina Supreme Court explicitly recognized
both Father’s prenatal abandonment and South Carolina’s extant law on
prenatal abandonment, it did not rely on South Carolina’s prenatal aban-
donment law to waive Father’s rights.161
The United States Supreme Court did not rely on South Carolina’s
prenatal abandonment law, but it did rely on the patterns described by pre-
natal abandonment theory to arrive at its holding, validating the theory of
prenatal abandonment law. The Court considered the father’s prenatal
abandonment with his failure to assume post-natal custody, using the pre-
natal and postnatal abandonment in tandem to support its ICWA analysis.
In so doing, the Court extended the reach of its recognition of prenatal
abandonment beyond South Carolina to other states without extant prena-
tal abandonment law. In essence, the Court made a failure to provide prena-
tal support undergird prenatal abandonment theory. And conversely, it
suggested that a father’s assumption of prenatal responsibilities is a relevant
factor in deciding a father’s rights in all newborn adoption cases and in all
paternal rights cases.
To this end, Justice Alito’s last paragraph of his majority opinion is
noteworthy. Here, for the first time in his analysis, he discusses the issue of
prenatal abandonment independently from the assumption of custody post-
birth:
As the State Supreme Court read §§ 1912(d) and (f), a biologi-
cal Indian father could abandon his child in utero and refuse any
support for the birth mother—perhaps contributing to the
mother’s decision to put the child up for adoption—and then
could play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to over-
ride the mother’s decision and the child’s best interests. If this
were possible, many prospective adoptive parents would surely
pause before adopting any child who might possibly qualify as
an Indian under the ICWA. Such an interpretation would raise
equal protection concerns, but the plain text of §§ 1912(f) and
(d) makes clear that neither provision applies in the present
context.162
The idioms “play the ICWA trump card” and “at the eleventh hour” evoke
images of gamesmanship and brinksmanship, respectively, and convey a
sense of outrage at a lower court decision that would advantage a father’s
161. Cf. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2564 (arguing that “the South Carolina Supreme
Court erred in finding that § 1912(f) barred termination of Biological Father’s pa-
rental rights.”).
162. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
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manipulative use of ICWA to reward his irresponsible pre-birth conduct.
The paragraph is unnecessary to the opinion, as all issues had been decided
before it. Thus, its inclusion underscores the Court’s warning that such
conduct imperils equal protection—equal protection that could only apply
to mothers and children.
Deconstructed, the indignation expressed in the last paragraph in-
cluded: first, that an unwed father could expect to wrest control of a new-
born child from a mother who had maintained a pregnancy, had dedicated
over nine months of her life to gestation and parturition, and who had
subjected her health, job, and finances to gestating that fetus without con-
tribution from the father; second, that the father might seek to control the
very child for whom he had earlier refused any responsibility; and third, that
a court might reward any father’s self-serving, manipulative, and irresponsi-
ble conduct, particularly given how deeply such conduct can affect the lives
of the mother and child. The Court’s subsequent comments about dissuad-
ing adoption of Native American children163 and raising equal protection
concerns confirm the importance of Native American children’s rights to
adoption and permanency under federal constitutional law.164 It would also
surely apply to any state law or state court decision rewarding a father’s
similar actions affecting the welfare of any child or mother.
Justice Alito’s words portend a broader application of prenatal aban-
donment theory extending beyond cases involving Native American chil-
dren. The Court in Adoptive Couple used prenatal abandonment theory to
withhold the extra protections reserved for the special class of Native Ameri-
can fathers. If prenatal abandonment can eliminate the heightened protec-
tions that Congress has provided parents of Native American children, it
should also operate to block fathers who lack those heightened protections
reserved for vulnerable populations. Thus, the Court made prenatal aban-
donment theory available to all non-marital fathers, mothers, and children.
Women should have the right to rely upon this prenatal abandonment
theory by evaluating the pre-birth conduct of their children’s fathers in
making a post-birth plan. Thus, a father should not be able to sabotage an
adoption plan based on his own pre-birth conduct. Children should have a
right to prompt permanency decided by the parent(s) who have the legal
parental prerogatives to exercise such control. Fathers should have the right
163. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2564 (Justice Alito mentioned concerns regarding
adoption of Indian children elsewhere as well: “And this would, in turn, unnecessa-
rily place vulnerable Indian children at a unique disadvantage in finding a permanent
and loving home, even in cases where neither an Indian parent nor the relevant tribe
objects to the adoption.”).
164. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2564.
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to protect their parental rights if they can prove they provided consistent
and meaningful prenatal support commensurate to their ability to pay.
PART III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This section documents the major trends in federal and state legisla-
tion and case law leading up to the present. Historically, “common law
imposed no legal obligation on the putative father to support an illegitimate
child under the doctrine of nullius filius.”165 However, key federal legislation
and jurisprudence have revised this presumption to account for the unique
challenges faced by non-marital children,166 weighed against the need to
preserve parental rights.167 Similar trends exist at the state level.168 As is
demonstrated in this section, the legal framework is ripe for explicit, across-
the-board acceptance and adoption of prenatal abandonment theory.
3.1 Federal Legislation and Case Law
Two parallel theories defining the rights of non-marital fathers have
emerged in federal legislation and jurisprudence during the last sixty years.
First, the “biology plus” theory posits that an unwed father must have more
than a mere biological relationship with his child in order to obtain consti-
tutional protection of his parental rights.169 While biology plus proved its
value in cases regarding support obligations and paternal rights in children
after birth, it is ill-suited to understanding such obligations and rights dur-
ing pregnancy. In contrast, prenatal abandonment theory addresses this lim-
itation by looking to the conduct of the father during pregnancy to
determine the nature and extent of his parental rights. This section provides
an overview of the emergence of the two theories in federal legislation and
jurisprudence.
Congress and the Supreme Court worked in parallel, ultimately devel-
oping two theories that defined the rights of non-marital fathers: “biology
165. In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 390 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). See Brief for the
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers at 7, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399).
166. SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 7, at 4 (Congressional child support action addressed
the facts that non-marital children lived in poverty, did poorly in school and exper-
ienced more emotional and behavioral problems).
167. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1208
(1972).
168. See infra Sections 3.2, 3.3.
169. See, e.g., Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father’s Right to
Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 976 (1992).
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plus” and prenatal abandonment. The states adapted their statutes to reflect
these theories.
“The evolution of unwed father law began in 1950 when Congress
first enacted legislation requiring states to enforce child support—a require-
ment typically dependent upon mothers identifying fathers of non-marital
children.”170 These child support laws changed the historical norm by im-
posing parental obligations on unwed fathers. It was only a matter of time
before the judiciary extrapolated the protection of parental rights from the
imposition of paternal obligations. In 1972, the United States Supreme
Court changed history by protecting an unwed biological father’s rights in
Stanley v. Illinois.171 It also established that a father’s contribution to the
lives of his children ought to be factored into a decision about his rights, as
Peter Stanley had lived with his children and their mother for many years.172
With the imposition of parental obligations and the protection of pa-
rental rights came the challenge of establishing paternity. In 1974, Congress
“created specific state requirements for establishing paternity and child sup-
port . . . and established the cooperation requirement.”173 This legislation
also explicitly required mothers to identify unwed fathers. On one hand,
this legislation facilitated paternal payment of child support, thus relieving
the state of supporting poor women through welfare. However, it required a
mother to identify the non-marital father regardless of her preference. This
requirement was troubling in situations of abuse, violence, or fear of retribu-
tion against the mother for the levying of child support obligations. In re-
sponse to such danger to mothers and children, Congress enacted a good
cause exemption174 waiving the identification requirement if it would “sub-
ject the child or mother to substantial danger or physical harm or undue
170. Brief for the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 7, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-
399).
171. See Stanley v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1209–10 (1972).
172. Peter lived intermittently with Joan for 18 years and with the children for the dura-
tion of their lives. When Joan died, Peter had given the children to the Ness family,
which prompts this author to wonder why he objected to the State’s intent to nomi-
nate the Ness’s as foster parents for the children. See Stanley, 92 S. Ct. at 1220
(Burger, J., dissenting).
173. Brief for the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 7, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-
399) (quoting Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater Sanctions
and the Failure to Account for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367, 372
(2000)). Accord Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647.
174. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974)
(establishing the good cause exception for women not to name fathers in order to
escape abuse). See also SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 7, at 43–44; Fontana, supra note
57, at 372–74.
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harassment.”175 With this exemption, Congress recognized the link between
abuse by fathers and child support.
The “biology plus” theory emerged from two United States Supreme
Court decisions in the late 1970s. In Quilloin v. Walcott, the Court withheld
constitutional protection for the parental rights of an unwed father who had
never legitimated his son, taken custody of him, or shouldered significant
responsibility for him.176 This case marks the seeding of “biology plus”—a
theory positing that an unwed father must have more than a mere biological
relationship with his child in order to obtain constitutional protection of his
parental rights.177
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court decided Caban v. Moham-
med, striking down a New York law that withheld the right to consent to
adoption from an unwed father who had actively reared his two young chil-
dren.178 In these two cases, we see the Court beginning to recognize and
uphold the constitutional parental rights of fathers who have more than a
genetic relationship with their children.
The nascent “biology plus” theory became more defined in 1983. In
Lehr v. Robertson, the Court upheld a New York law waiving notice of step-
parent adoption to an unwed father who had not filed with the state’s puta-
tive father registry, had not established his paternity, and had not supported
and rarely visited his two-year-old daughter.179 The Court commented that:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that oppor-
tunity and accepts some measure of the responsibility for the
child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child re-
lationship. . . . If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will
not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of
where the child’s best interests lie.180
With these sentences, the Lehr court announced that putative father registry
requirements passed constitutional muster and that constitutional protec-
tion was limited to those unwed fathers who assumed parental
175. 121 CONG. REC. 23,697 (1975). See also Mary R. Mannix et al., The Good Cause
Exception to the AFDC Child Support Cooperation Requirement, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 339, 339 (1988).
176. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
177. Zinman, supra note 169, at 976.
178. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
179. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267–68 (1983).
180. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
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responsibilities. New York had enacted an unwed father registry statute that
provided a statutory bright line rule providing registered unwed fathers with
rights to notice. The Lehr court found that the Constitution does not re-
quire notice of an adoption to unregistered fathers unless they exhibit a
commitment to parenting in other ways.
Importantly, Lehr went further than previous Court decisions in iden-
tifying the type of paternal conduct that would signify “full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood”181 affording responsible fathers protec-
tion under the federal Constitution’s due process clause. It did this by
describing Mr. Lehr’s failures: “[Lehr] has never had any significant custo-
dial, personal, or financial relationship with Jessica, and he did not seek to
establish a legal tie until after she was two years old.”182 This sentence led to
state standards defining the “plus” in the biology plus theory. “Thirty years
later, at least forty-one states report cases using the father’s commitment to
parenting as a standard to determine consent rights to adoption.”183
However, the Lehr court left unanswered the question of how to iden-
tify a man who had constitutionally protected his parental rights to a child
in utero. The Court obliquely answered this question six years later in
Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D.184 In this case, a married woman
conceived a child in an extramarital affair while living with her husband,
but subsequent to the birth lived intermittently with the child’s biological
father, Michael H.185 The Court upheld the constitutionality of a California
law providing a presumption of legitimacy to a child born of a married
woman cohabiting with a husband who was not impotent or sterile.186 The
plurality opinion imposed a prenatal limitation for constitutional protection
of a non-marital father’s rights: where the married mother “is, at the time of
the child’s conception and birth, married to and cohabitating with” her
husband and the married couple wishes to raise the child as the offspring of
their marriage.187 The Court never used the word “prenatal” to describe this
period of time, but the dissent highlighted that Michael H. did live sporadi-
cally with the mother and child after her birth and provided financial sup-
181. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
182. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
183. Brief for the Am. Acad. of Adoption Attorneys as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 15, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-
399). See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Rights of Unwed Father to Obstruct Adop-
tion of His Child by Withholding Consent, 61 A.L.R. 5th 151 (1998).
184. Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
185. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113–15.
186. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131–32 (upholding CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (1989) (re-
pealed 1994)).
187. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129.
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port for the child.188 Thus, Michael H. may be read to support a theory that
prenatal support would provide constitutional protection of a non-marital
father’s parental rights.
If any question was left after the Lehr v. Robertson and Michael H.
opinions as to what conduct creates, or in the alternative, waives constitu-
tional protection for a non-marital father’s parental rights with his fetus or
newborn child,189 Adoptive Couple answered it. In its adoption of prenatal
abandonment theory, the federal government was years behind the states.
Indeed, the states had begun addressing important questions regarding suffi-
ciency of support, and what support was required when the father doubted
his paternity, long before the United States Supreme Court decided Adop-
tive Couple v. Baby Girl. The next Section examines the evolution of state
legislation regarding prenatal parental obligations and rights, and Section
3.3 summarizes the key factors considered by state courts in applying such
legislation. The state law and court interpretations embody the unfolding of
biology plus theory for the prenatal period.
3.2 State Legislation
The states have adopted the central tenets of United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence while adapting to the social context in which families
develop: a rising out-of-wedlock birth rate, increasing awareness of the ef-
fects of abuse and rape, the ubiquity of travel and technology, and a grow-
ing acknowledgment of casual sexual encounters. In doing so, state laws
have clarified what conduct protects or forfeits parental consent rights.190 In
addition, all states have established electronic state databases for fathers to
file intentions to claim paternity. This section provides an overview of state
legislation. For greater detail, reference the Appendix, which lists all state
laws on prenatal abandonment.
First, it must be understood that fathers’ rights to consent and their
rights to notice are distinct rights. State statutes must therefore provide for
188. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 159–60 (White, J., dissenting).
189. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-65 (1983) (discussing contributions a
non-marital father must make to a child’s life to warrant constitutional protection).
190. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(3) (Westlaw through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.)
(Stating that with “regard to a child who is six months of age or less at the time the
child is placed with prospective adoptive parents, consent of an unmarried biological
father is not required unless . . . the unmarried biological father” files a paternity
action; files a paternity affidavit staying he is able and willing to take full custody of
the child, sets forth his plans for the child’s care, and agrees to court ordered child
support and payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, and actual or offered pay-
ment of mother’s pregnancy related expenses). See generally Adoption of Kelsey S.,
823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).
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notice of adoption or dependency actions at a meaningful time to qualifying
fathers and afford consent rights to fathers who have established a constitu-
tionally and/or statutorily protected relationship with the child. A judicial
determination of fathers’ rights to notice and/or consent must occur on a
short timeline in newborn adoptions, because the hearings or procedures
must occur soon after birth to secure the best interests of children. In new-
born adoptions, this requires fathers to have previously protected their pa-
rental rights to consent and notice. Some states guarantee notice and/or
consent to non-marital fathers who timely file with state putative father
registries.191 Concomitantly, such registries restrict rights to notice and/or
consent from fathers who have not timely protected their interests.
These registries are necessary because mothers can intentionally or ac-
cidentally thwart non-marital fathers in their efforts to assume parental re-
sponsibility. The mother may deliberately or unintentionally obfuscate the
father’s knowledge of pregnancy and/or birth by reporting she is not preg-
nant when she is or by reporting a due date incorrectly.192 The mother may
travel interstate or inter-country without the father’s knowledge. The
mother may misidentify or decline to identify a father because she genuinely
does not know his identity or because she fears domestic violence or murder
by the father. The mother may also resist involving a father if the concep-
tion occurred in a sexual assault. Lastly, the mother may simply wish to
deceive the father. Such actions would complicate the father’s ability to es-
tablish paternity, file with the forum state’s father registry, and obtain no-
tice of an adoption or protective custody action.193 Putative father registries
paint with a broad brush to give notice to all fathers who file timely such
that those fathers have opportunities to appear and defend.
191. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 192.016 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen.
Assemb.); MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). See also
UTAH CODE § 78B-6-121(3) (Westlaw though 2016 3d Spec. Sess.) (requiring that
a non-marital father file a paternity action, file a paternity affidavit, file with a fa-
ther’s registry and pay or offer to pay mother’s pregnancy related expenses).
192. See, e.g. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Mo. 2016). (“Birth Mother contacted
Birth Father in late March. Birth Mother informed him that her expected due date
had changed from early April to early May. This statement was intended to deceive
Birth Father of the real due date.”). See Robin Elise Weiss, Hidden and Denied Preg-
nancy, VERYWELL (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.verywell.com/hidden-and-denied-
pregnancy-2758580 (remarking that women do not always recognize that they are
pregnant). See also Robin Elise Weiss, Every Single Way to Estimate Your Due Date,
VERYWELL (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.verywell.com/your-pregnancy-due-date-cal-
culator-2758866 (remarking that due dates are always estimates).
193. See, e.g., Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720  (W. Va. 1998) (regarding a mother who,
in absence of national fathers’ registry, used interstate travel to confound and ulti-
mately stop a father from obtaining parental rights to his non-marital child).
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A father married to the mother of a child at birth is presumed to have
paternal rights and thus presumed to have both notice and consent rights.
This is not true of non-marital fathers. Registering with a father registry
within a state’s announced time frame ensures non-marital fathers notice of
adoption or dependency actions,194 but not necessarily consent rights.195 Fa-
thers can statutorily protect both their consent and notice rights to
newborns by filing an action to establish their paternity, providing prenatal
support, and filing with any state father’s registry.196 Voluntary Acknowl-
edgement of Paternity Affidavits (VAPAs) provide non-marital fathers with
a simple extrajudicial process to legally establish paternity by executing an
affidavit with a cooperative mother. Absent a cooperative mother, fathers
must provide prenatal support, file timely with father registries, and/or oth-
erwise comply with state statutes to ensure rights to both consent and
notice.
Putative father registries protect thwarted fathers’ rights to notice by
allowing fathers to file with a state registry at any time during a pregnancy
and obtain notice with an opportunity to be heard in an adoption or depen-
dency action.197 Putative fathers who also provide prenatal support may ob-
tain unfailing constitutional protection for their consent rights.
194. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 453.060.5, 453.060.1(6) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
195. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 192.016 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen.
Assemb.).
196. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 453.030.3 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MO.
REV. STAT. § 453.060.1(1)-(5) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). But see Adoption
of A.S., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that unwed father did
not achieve presumed father status on the basis of his prebirth conduct despite his
New York paternity judgment).
197. Mary Beck, A National Putative Father Registry, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 295, 301
(2007). The number of dependency actions related to drug exposed newborns has
increased to such a level that some states are enacting specific statutes to address
parental rights in such cases. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5(6)(b) (Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess.). Stating:
It is presumed that a parent is unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship upon a showing that: a. Within a three-year period immedi-
ately prior to the termination adjudication, the parent’s parental rights to
one or more other children were involuntarily terminated pursuant to sub-
section 2 or 4 of this section or subdivision* (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this
subsection or similar laws of other states; b. If the parent is the birth mother
and within eight hours after the child’s birth, the child’s birth mother
tested positive and over .08 blood alcohol content pursuant to testing under
section 577.020 for alcohol, or tested positive for cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine, a controlled substance as defined in section 195.010, or
a prescription drug as defined in section 196.973, excepting those con-
trolled substances or prescription drugs present in the mother’s body as a
result of medical treatment administered to the mother, and the birth
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Despite these advantages, only thirty-four states have enacted putative
father registries.198 The effectiveness of state registries may be further limited
in interstate dependency or adoption actions. In the event that conception
occurs in one state and a dependency action or adoption is filed in a second
state, the father’s registration in the state of conception will not protect his
rights to notice of a court action in a second state. These limitations speak
to the necessity of instituting a national registry; however, Congressional
action to do so has proven ineffective.
The United States Congress and Utah have attempted to rectify that
interstate problem. Senator James Inhofe and Representatives Vicky Hartz-
ler and Anne Kuster introduced a national registry called the Responsible
Father Registry in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives,
respectively.199 Representative Hartzler continues to develop a national reg-
istry bill.200 The Utah legislature unsuccessfully entertained S.B. 10, which
was a bill to enact a “Compact for Interstate Sharing of Putative Father
Registry Information.”201 The joint resolution urging enactment of this bill
includes the fact that “the United States Congress has not yet enacted legis-
lation facilitating the interstate sharing of putative father registry informa-
tion.”202 Protection of fathers’ rights to notice can only be fully protected
where the interstate movement of mothers and/or the filing of an adoption
petition in a state unknown to the father does not operate to foreclose the
father’s ability to obtain notice and consent rights tied to timely registration
in father registries.
mother is the biological mother of at least one other child who was adjudi-
cated an abused or neglected minor by the mother or the mother has previ-
ously failed to complete recommended treatment services by the children’s
division through a family-centered services case.
Id.
198. Beck, A National Putative Father Registry, supra note 197, at 299 (these registries are
difficult to total and categorize because they take different forms that may or may
not protect responsible birth fathers and mothers).
199. Protecting Adoption Act, H.R. 2818, 114th Cong. (2015); Protecting Adoption and
Promoting Responsible Fatherhood Act of 2015, S. 1637, 114th Cong. (2015). The
bills contain mandatory provisions to protect mothers and fathers and a provision
urging states to enact prenatal abandonment laws.
200. Email conversation between the author and Joe Tvrdy, legislative assistant to Rep.
Hartzler, last email 1/3/2017.
201. S.B. 10, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2015).
202. S.J.R. 1, 61st Leg., 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015).
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3.3 State Case Law
This section summarizes the emergence and application of prenatal
abandonment theory in state courts.203 The Appendix provides a state-by-
state account of prenatal abandonment legislation and case law. Some of the
more common elements in prenatal abandonment case law are listed below,
with cases discussed in greater detail to follow.
1. Father’s payment of prenatal support.204
2. Father’s contribution to medical costs.205
3. Father’s level of interest in fetus, mother, or pregnancy.206
4. Father’s abuse of mother and/or child or fetal
endangerment.207
203. Appendix A is a summary of all prenatal abandonment laws and decisions in the fifty
states. The cases discussed in this section are organized chronologically whereas cases
discussed in the Appendix are organized by state.
204. See, e.g., C.V. v. J.M.J., 810 So. 2d 692, 697 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) rev’d sub nom. Ex
parte C.V., No. 1981316, 2000 WL 1717011 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000) withdrawn and
superseded on reh’g, 810 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 2001); In re Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999); In re Adoption of Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989)
(determining that marginal financial support does not evince an assumption of pa-
rental duties); In re Adoption of Baby James Doe, 572 So. 2d 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (reversing denial of motion for rehearing in part where father provided
support in a repetitive, customary manner); In re Adoption of Anderson, 624 S.E.2d
626, 628-629 (N.C. 2006); In re Adoption of S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012); In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1979) (upholding lower court’s
determination of parental abandonment where father failed to provide financial sup-
port even though he knew the agency who had custody of the child); In re Adoption
of J.N.C., No. 2008-CA-25, 2008 WL 2861702, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 25,
2008); Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 786 (S.C. 2011); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lu-
theran Soc. Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. 1975) (uphold-
ing lower court’s determination that father abandoned his child before it was born
where father did not provide any support for the child).
205. See, e.g., Doe, 543 So. 2d 741; In re Adoption of D.J.V., 796 P.2d 1076 (Mont.
1990); Abernathy v. Baby Boy, S.E.2d 25 (S.C. 1993); T.M. v. B.B., 232 P.3d 1026
(Utah 2010).
206. See, e.g., John Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1313, 1316-17 (Miss. 1982);
In re Carrie GG, 709 N.Y.S.2d 247, 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); In re Kailee CC.,
579 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Lewis, 227 N.W.2d at 646.
207. See, e.g., C.V. v. J.M.J., 810 So. 2d at 696–97; In re T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d 184, 187
(Tex. App. 1984); In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. v. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d 961,
963–66 (Fla. 1995); In re Gaipa v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 867, 868, 870 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1996); In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 420, 428–29 (N.Y. 1990).
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5. Mother’s lying to adoptive petitioners and/or adoption
agencies regarding birth father.208
6. Mother’s or Mother’s family’s efforts to thwart Father’s as-
sumption of prenatal responsibilities.209
7. Effect of Mother’s moving between states.210
8. Father’s notice or awareness of the pregnancy and/or the
adoption.211
9. Father’s efforts to establish or evade legal responsibility for
the fetus or child.212
10. Father’s claims excusing his failure to assume parental re-
sponsibility because of
a. His incarceration;213
b. His legal expenses;214
c. Mother’s welfare benefits;215
d. The absence of court ordered support;216
e. Mother’s not asking for support;217
208. See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1184–85 (Kan. 2008); In re
Adoption of EHM, 808 So. 2d 397, 406 (La. Ct. App. 2000); In re Adoption of
Hart, 577 N.E.2d 77, 79–82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
209. See, e.g., In re M.D.K., 58 P.3d 74, 749–50 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); K.B. v. J.G., 9
So. 3d 1124, 1125–26 (Miss. 2009); ); Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D., 826 N.W.2d 242
(Neb. 2013); In re Kiran Chandini, 560 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); In re
Adoption of Suvak, No. 1-03-51, 2004 WL 231494, at *13–15 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
9, 2004); Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1184–85; Abernathy, 437 S.E.2d at 29; In
re Adoption of Baby Girl, 233 P.3d 517, 519, 524 (Utah Ct. App. 2010).
210. See, e.g., Adoption of A.S. v. Vincenzo, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012);
Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
211. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374, 380–81 (N.C. 2014); Robert
O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. 1992); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran
Soc. Services of Wis. & Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Wis. 1975).
212. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1316–17 (Miss. 1982); Lewis, 227
N.W.2d at 646.
213. See, e.g., In re HMK No. 304575, 2011 WL 6187076, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec.
13, 2011); In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 211–14 (N.D. 1979); In re Adoption of
Kyle, 592 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560–61 (App. Div. 1992); In re Stephen C., 566 N.Y.S.2d
178 (App. Div. 1991).
214. See, e.g., J.C.J. v. Heart of Adoptions, 989 So. 2d 32, 35–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
215. See, e.g., F.H., 283 N.W.2d at 210–13; Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 784 (S.C.
2011).
216. See, e.g., In re Adoption of D.J.V., 796 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Mont. 1990); In re Baby
Boy W., 831 P.2d 643, 646 (Okla. 1992).
217. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d 680, 690 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); In re J.L.G.,
808 So. 2d 491, 495 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
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f. Mother’s refusing support; father funding bank
account;218
g. Father’s attorney “misleading him;”219 or
h. Father’s failure to consult an attorney.220
11. The significance of Father’s reliable and prompt assump-
tion of parental responsibilities vis-a-vis Mother’s relin-
quishment decision.221
12. Father’s proposals of marriage.222
13. Father’s offer of a residence or other non-financial assis-
tance during pregnancy.223
14. Father’s living off Mother’s welfare or work income during
pregnancy.224
15. Father’s willingness to personally assume custody of the
child upon birth.225
16. Whether Father’s proactive efforts to assume custody and/
or responsibility constitute defensive efforts to block an
adoption.226
17. Father’s questioning/acknowledging paternity.227
218. See In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 750–51 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); In re
Wilkinson, No. 204217, 1998 WL 1989831, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1998);
Reeves, 708 S.E.2d at 785.
219. M.D.K., 58 P.3d at 749.
220. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima Cty. Juv. Severence Action No. S-114487, 876 P.2d
1121, 1133-35 (Ariz. 1994).
221. See, e.g., Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 896–901 (Cal. 1995); In re F.H.,
283 N.W.2d 202, 213–14 (N.D. 1979); In re Infant Child Skinner, 982 P.2d 670,
677–78 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. &
Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d 643, 646–47 (Wis. 1975).
222. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl M., 942 P.2d 235, 242 (Okla. Civ. App.
1997).
223. See, e.g., In re Adoption of John Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1989); In re Adop-
tion of Baby Boy B, 866 P.2d 1029, 1036–37 (Kan. 1994); In re Adoption of Baby
Boy S., 822 P.2d 76, 78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); Abernathy v. Baby Boy, 437 S.E.2d
25, 29 (S.C. 1993).
224. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. v. J.S.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 965, 970 (Fla. 1995).
225. See Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236–38 (Cal. 1992); In re Adoption of
Kyle, 592 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560-61 (1992); In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418,
420, 428–29 (N.Y. 1990); In re Stephen C., 566 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (App. Div.
1991); Abernathy, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
226. See, e.g., Ex parte J.W.B. & K.E.M.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1090–92 (Ala. 2005); In re
Appeal in Pima Cty. Juv. Severence Action No. S-114487, 876 P.2d 1121, 1133–35
(Ariz. 1994); Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 420, 428–29; In re Gionna L., 824
N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
227. See, e.g., Ex parte J.W.B. & K.E.M.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1090–91 (Ala. 2005); Ex
parte F.P. & R.P., 857 So. 2d 125, 136–38 (Ala. 2003); In re Adoption of D.M.M.,
955 P.2d 618, 619–21 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997); K.B. v. J.G., 9 So. 3d 1124, 1129–31
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18. Evidentiary standard applied.228
19. Reviewing court’s deference to trial court when evidence is
documentary versus ore tenus.229
The first appellate decision of record to grapple with the concept of
prenatal abandonment theory resulted in the theory’s dismissal; however, it
also formed the groundwork for its future application. In 1974, a Texas
appeals court dismissed prenatal abandonment theory when it wrote in El-
liot v. Maddox that the father’s conduct “assuredly could not have been an
act of abandonment of anyone then not yet born.”230 One year later, Texas
enacted a statute providing for prenatal abandonment.231 And in 1984,
Texas used that law to affirm a trial court’s termination of a father’s rights
for reasons including prenatal abandonment.232
(Miss. 2009); In re Adoption of S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d 382, 386–89 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012). Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 427–28; State ex rel. Lewis v. Luther Social
Services of Wisconsin & Upper Michigan, 227 N.W.2d 643, 646–47 (Wis. 1975).
228. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy B, 866 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Kan. 1994); J.C.J. v.
Heart of Adoptions, 989 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“A finding of
abandonment resulting in a termination of parental rights must be based upon clear
and convincing evidence.”).
229. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 822 P.2d 76, 78 (Kan. App. 1991). Ore
tenus evidence is evidence presented in person to the judge whereas depositions/
affidavits do not put a witness in front of the judge.
230. Elliot v. Maddox, 510 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). This decision was
quoted in F.H. for its language that voluntary abandonment could have included a
period of time prior to birth. See In re F.H. v. W.S., 283 N.W.2d 202, 212 (N.D.
1979) (quoting Elliot, 510 S.W.2d at 108).
231. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(H) (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of
84th Legis.)
The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that the parent
has . . . voluntarily and with knowledge of the pregnancy, abandoned the
mother of the child beginning at a time during her pregnancy with the
child and continuing through the birth, failed to provide adequate support
or medical care for the mother during the period of abandonment before
the birth of the child, and remained apart from the child or failed to sup-
port the child since the birth.
Id. See also Holley v. Adams, 554 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (granting respondent
father’s petition to terminate the parent-child relationship between the mother and
her son pursuant to § 161.001(b)(1)(H), referred to as TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 15.02(1)(H)).
232. See In re T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. App. 1984) (“[W]e hold the evidence
is clear and convincing that J.A.Z. ‘voluntarily, and with knowledge of the preg-
nancy, abandoned the mother of the child beginning at a time during her preg-
nancy . . . and remained apart from the child and failed to support the child since
the birth’”).
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In this same time period, the Wisconsin Supreme Court began to de-
fine and employ prenatal abandonment theory in a series of paternity cases.
In Lewis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s termina-
tion of a father’s parental rights, holding that the father had abandoned the
child before birth.233 This decision is the first clearly elucidated case in
which the court found prenatal abandonment theory and applied a mul-
tifactorial analysis to determine a father’s support or abandonment of his
fetus and the mother, an analysis that is now routine.
Lewis contains facts typically seen in subsequent state court opinions
on prenatal abandonment, including the mother’s early notification of the
father, the discussion of marriage, the father’s evasion of paternal responsi-
bilities (in this case, saying that he would tell the mother’s doctor not to put
his name on the birth certificate), the father’s disinterest in the wellbeing of
the fetus or mother, the father’s failure to provide financial support, the
mother’s notification to the father of an adoption plan, the father’s ques-
tioning of his paternity, and the mother’s decision to relinquish the child
due to the father’s refusal to accept responsibility.234
233. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d 643,
646 (Wis. 1975).
234. Lewis, 227 N.W.2d at 645–46. The facts in this case compel the conclusion that
Rothstein abandoned his child before it was born. The trial court concluded:
That his repeated denials of paternity, lack of concern for or interest in the
support, care and well-being—including pre-natal care—of the child, and
the disregard for the well-being of the child’s mother from the date the
pregnancy was announced to approximately the birthdate of the child man-
ifested a clear intent on the part of petitioner, Rothstein, to disassociate
himself from responsibility for the birth and care of the child . . . She
[mother] testified that he refused to marry her after she informed him of
her pregnancy, stating that he could not be sure he was the father of the
child. Rothstein denied these conversations . . . In entering its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court observed that it believed Miss
Lewis and disbelieved Rothstein on every point where their testimony was
in conflict, because her testimony was ‘substantially more credible and con-
vincing.’ The findings are not against the great weight and clear preponder-
ance of the evidence. In fact, we would make the same findings on the
record in this case . . . [S]he informed him . . . on December 24, 1967, that
she had been to a doctor, who confirmed her pregnancy. Rothstein’s re-
sponse to this was that he wanted to know the name of the doctor to make
certain that his name could not be used on the birth certificate as the father
of the child. He further stated he would not deny the possibility that he was
the father . . . After Karen [birth mother] arrived at the home of her aunt
and uncle in Janesville, she visited Rothstein two or three times in Chicago
and had several additional telephone conversations with him. . .On at least
one of these occasions she communicated to him the fact that her aunt and
uncle had offered to finance a wedding for them. Rothstein’s response was
that he did not know he was the father of the child, and that if he was not
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The Lewis court found that the birth mother had relied upon the
father’s pre-birth conduct in choosing adoption for the child.235 Further, it
held that she was entitled to make that decision during her pregnancy and
not required to give the father the full duration of the pregnancy to demon-
strate his intent to assume parental responsibilities.236 Judicial respect for a
mother’s limited nine-month timeline (particularly her need to make timely
decisions regarding adoption) is seen repeatedly in prenatal abandonment
cases. This may be especially true when a father eschews prenatal responsi-
bility but asserts parental rights after birth.
Finally, the Lewis opinion demonstrates that when testimony
presented by a mother and a father sharply conflict, trial courts weigh the
relative credibility of the parties. Because appellate courts give deference to
trial courts’ determinations of facts,237 responsible fathers and their attor-
neys should present all pertinent evidence during the trial court proceed-
ings. Strong evidentiary support may include careful documentation of
support payments (including those which were returned by the mother) and
demonstration that the father has conformed with all statutory require-
there was no reason for a marriage. Karen concluded that there was no hope
of changing Rothstein’s attitude toward her or the child. She therefore de-
cided to terminate her relationship with Rothstein and give the child up for
adoption after it was born. She wrote him a letter informing him of this fact
in the spring of 1968. Rothstein’s feelings, as evidenced by a statement to
Miss Lewis’ aunt in April, 1968, were that he was not ready to accept the
responsibility of marriage and a family, and that the conception of the baby
was the fault of Miss Lewis.
Id.
235. Lewis, 227 N.W.2d 643.
236. Lewis, 227 N.W.2d at 646–47. The Court recognized the mother’s decisional
timeline:
Rothstein’s refusal to accept responsibility required Miss Lewis to decide
whether to keep the baby or put it out for adoption after it was born. She
chose the latter course, making her decision in the best interests of the
child. She was not required to wait until the last minute to make this deci-
sion. She was entitled to act in reliance on Rothstein’s actions and state-
ments prior to and during the spring of 1968.
Id.
237. See, e.g., Ex parte J.W.B. & K.E.M.B., 933 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 2005); Ex parte C.V.,
810 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 2001). Some reviewing courts in prenatal abandonment cases
are distinguishing trial court credibility determinations based upon ore tenus evidence
versus out of court testimony. For example, reviewing courts give less deference to
trial courts relying on depositions and affidavits than in court testimony. See, e.g.,
J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1090 (“With deference to the presumption of correctness
afforded the probate court’s findings under the ore tenus rule, we hold that the
probate court did not exceed its discretion when it concluded that the biological
father has not been prevented from maintaining a significant parental relationship
with [the] minor child.”).
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ments, such as filing with father registries.238 These actions demonstrate the
credibility of fathers and preserve their rights.
North Dakota was the second state to hold that children can be aban-
doned before birth. In its 1979 decision In re F.H. v. W.S., the North Da-
kota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of parental
rights.239 The facts that grounded prenatal abandonment in F.H. are typical
but also include the father’s moving out of the state in which the mother
resided.240 The lower court held that the mother’s ability to rely upon wel-
fare or charity for needed support did not relieve the father of his support
duties.241 The court rejected the father’s claim that his incarceration should
excuse his failure to provide prenatal and postnatal support, because his
commission of the crimes for which he was incarcerated was voluntary.242
Like the Lewis Court, the F.H. Court held that adoption of a newborn
requires a prompt hearing.243 Fathers may claim this cuts off or cuts short
their opportunities to develop constitutionally protected relationships with
their children. To the contrary, the opportunity to pay prenatal support
offers all fathers the opportunity to constitutionally protect their parental
rights over a typical nine-month prenatal period.
In 1982, in John Doe and a Female Infant v. Attorney W., the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of a father’s
238. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 751 (Kan. App. 2002) (Beier, J.,
concurring). The father should document persistent attempts at support:
Even in the most acrimonious of situations, a father-to-be can fund a bank
account in the mother-to-be’s name. He can have property or money deliv-
ered to the mother-to-be by a neutral third party. He can and must be as
creative as necessary in providing material assistance to the mother-to-be
during the pregnancy and, the law thus assumes, to the child once it is
born. He must not be deterred by the mother-to-be’s lack of romantic in-
terest in him, even by her outright hostility. If she justifiably or unjustifi-
ably wants him to stay away, he must respect her wishes but be sure that his
support does not remain equally distant.
Id. See also Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 785 (S.C. 2011) (citing M.D.K. for the
proposition that father’s obligations to support child’s mother does not cease just
because the mother might “rebuke some of his efforts”, and terminating father’s
rights after little to no evidence was documented of him providing support to his
child’s mother).
239. In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 212 (N.D. 1979) (citing Elliot v. Maddox’s holding
that abandonment during the prenatal period could be included in the period of
time establishing ‘voluntary abandonment,’ and Lewis, which explicitly held that a
child could be abandoned before birth).
240. See F.H., 283 N.W. at 213.
241. F.H., 283 N.W. at 211.
242. F.H., 283 N.W. at 213.
243. See F.H., 283 N.W. at 210.
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parental rights.244 The Doe Court relied upon the previously discussed evi-
dence of prenatal abandonment, plus two new factors.245 First, the father
had demanded that the mother neither identify him nor provide his name
to the welfare agency.246 Second, the father had told the mother that the
pregnancy was her problem and her decision.247
The Doe case is the first in which a court noted that the father had
urged the mother to obtain an abortion and had misled the adoptive peti-
tioners into believing that he had no objections to an adoption. The rele-
vance of urging abortions on mothers goes unstated; although no case relies
upon it to ground prenatal abandonment, it is often listed in the facts. In
Doe, as in subsequent cases, the father’s urging of abortion was accompa-
nied by his failure to pay support.248
The Doe father first sought parental rights in defense to the adoption
filing.249 His belated assertion of his rights, which occurred after he had
refused to provide pregnancy support, suggests ambivalence about parenting
and/or an evasion of financial responsibility. While birth parents should
have the right to change their minds after birth and before relinquishment,
the conduct the Doe father demonstrated is far different from a simple
change of mind. As the court found, the Doe father instead “evinced a set-
tled purpose . . . to forego all parental duties.250 Such damning behavior
included the father’s prohibition of the use of his name on welfare docu-
ments, refusal of prenatal support, termination of his relationship with the
mother during the pregnancy, and insistence that decisions regarding the
pregnancy and the baby were exclusively those of the mother’s.251
244. Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1317 (Miss. 1982).
245. See Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d at 1316–17. Summarizing:
The evidence as summarized above (and accepted by the lower court) estab-
lishes that: (1) Doe, after the natural mother’s pregnancy was known to
him, suggested to her that she have an abortion; (2) he refused to contrib-
ute to the expense of her prenatal care; (3) he demanded that she not use
his name in applying for welfare assistance; (4) his relationship with her
ceased because he did not want the responsibility for both her and the
child; (5) he told her that the decision regarding the child’s destiny was hers
alone and that she could do whatever she wanted with the child; and (6) a
month prior to the baby’s birth, he advised appellee that he would surren-
der the child for adoption and had no objection to the baby’s being offered
for adoption.
Id.
246. Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d at 1316–17.
247. Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d at 1316–17.
248. See Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d at 1314.
249. See Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d at 1316.
250. See Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d at 1316.
251. See Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d at 1316–17.
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In 1984, in In the Interest of T.M.Z., a Texas appeals court affirmed a
trial court’s termination of a father’s rights for abandonment including dur-
ing a period of time pre-birth.252 Part of the father’s abandonment defense
in T.M.Z. was that it was the mother who left their place of abode.253 How-
ever, the mother left only when the father threw a radio at her stomach.254
Although he missed, he threw with such force that the radio went through a
wall.255 The court discussed the abuse but did not rely upon it in its hold-
ing.256 The role of abuse in determining father’s prenatal abandonment has
evolved over time: now, Florida considers even emotional abuse material to
a discussion of prenatal abandonment.257
In 1989, Ohio decided a series of cases in which it used prenatal aban-
donment to both uphold and withhold paternal rights. In In Re Adoption of
Hart, an appellate court affirmed a trial court’s decision waiving the father’s
consent because he had abandoned the mother during her pregnancy and
the child after birth.258 The father filed a paternity action one year after the
child’s birth in response to an adoption petition.259 On appeal, the father
claimed that the adoptive petitioners had fraudulently pled that the father
was unknown.260 The court held that knowledge possessed by the mother
could not be imputed to the adoptive parents. Mothers can decline to iden-
tify a father, and such non-identification typically does not relieve fathers of
prenatal support obligations. It is this situation that putative father registries
remedy, since fathers can register with or without the cooperation of the
mother and the timely registered father gets notice and an opportunity to
defend.
Florida’s courts also proved to be rich ground for the development of
prenatal jurisprudence. The Florida Supreme Court first upheld an adop-
tion on a theory of prenatal abandonment in 1989.261 In deciding In re
Adoption of John Doe v. Richard Roe, the court relied upon Lehr, holding
that the father’s prenatal conduct eliminated the father’s “privilege of veto-
ing the adoption.”262 The court expounded its reasoning:
252. In re T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
253. T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d at 186–87.
254. T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d at 186–87.
255. T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d at 186–87.
256. See T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d at 187.
257. See, e.g., Adoption of Baby E.A.W. v. G.W.B., 658 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 1995).
258. See In re Adoption of Hart, 577 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
259. Adoption of Hart, 577 N.E.2d at 80–81.
260. Adoption of Hart, 577 N.E.2d at 80–81.
261. In re Adoption of Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
262. Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d at 748.
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For the reasons set forth above, we concluded that it was critical
to the well-being of the child that the unwed father provide
prebirth support to the unwed pregnant mother when such sup-
port is needed and within his means. Having determined that
the welfare of the child is an element to be considered in an
adoption proceeding, we are ineluctably led to the conclusion
that prebirth conduct is relevant to the issue of abandonment. In
the instant case, we hold that the failure of respondent natural
father to provide prebirth assistance to the pregnant mother,
when he was able and assistance was needed, vested respondent
natural mother with the sole parental authority to consent to the
adoption of the child and removed from the natural father the
privilege of vetoing the adoption by refusing to give consent.263
This opinion was the first to detail the importance of prenatal health care
and nutrition to the future health of the child, and to relate those concerns
directly to the prenatal support of the father.264 The Court found that the
father’s “argument that he has no parental responsibility prior to birth
and . . . his failure to provide prebirth support [as] irrelevant to the issue of
abandonment is not a norm that society is prepared to recognize. Such an
argument is legally, morally, and socially indefensible.”265
Finally, the 1989 Doe v. Roe case presented a novel situation where the
father proposed marriage, signed a voluntary affidavit of paternity, and did
in fact marry the mother two months after the baby’s birth and placement
for adoption.266 Essentially, the Doe v. Roe court echoed the biology plus
theory,267 but in this case, the father’s protective conduct occurred too late
to avoid prenatal abandonment.
In 1990, the biology plus theory favored the father in In re Adoption of
Baby James Doe, in which the Florida Court refused to waive the father’s
consent rights because he had signed a lease for an apartment with the
mother, resided with her during the pregnancy, produced receipts for baby
furniture, bedding, clothing, and baby gifts, and produced the identification
band from the hospital of the child’s birth with the father’s surname on
it.268 The father’s preservation of evidence of the lease and applicable
purchases represents an important practice point for attorneys representing
fathers, as the mother’s and father’s testimonies often conflict in these cases.
263. Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d at 749.
264. Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d at 746.
265. Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d at 746.
266. Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d at 743.
267. Supra note 179 and accompanying text.
268. In re Adoption of Baby James Doe, 572 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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In 1990, In re Adoption of D.J.V., the Montana Supreme Court af-
firmed a trial court’s termination of birth father’s parental rights for aban-
donment based upon pre- and post- birth conduct.269 The birth parents’
testimony conflicted as to whether the father, whose net worth was
$200,000, had offered to pay for pregnancy-related medical expenses. The
evidence presented at trial demonstrated that he did not pay for “any ex-
penses of Carolyn’s [the birth mother’s] pregnancy or hospitalization, or
any child support following the birth of D.J.V.”270 The Court rejected Fa-
ther’s claim that the absence of a court order should excuse his non-pay-
ment of support271 and granted the step-parent adoption petition.272
Also in 1990, a New York Court of Appeals relied upon the biology
plus theory in the calculus of two prenatal support and abandonment cases
decided together: In re Raquel Marie X. v. Mr. and Mrs. C. and In re Baby
Girl S. v. Natural Father.273 A biology plus analysis protected the father’s
rights in one case and waived the father’s rights in the other case. New York
defined a six-month (second and third trimesters) pre-placement period as
the relevant prenatal interval and listed the abandonment factors to be con-
sidered as including: “public acknowledgement of paternity, payment of
pregnancy and birth expenses, steps taken to establish legal responsibility for
the child, and other factors evincing a commitment to the child.”274 The
court also indicated that a father’s qualifying interest required a willingness
to assume full custody of the child and not merely a desire to block adop-
tion by others.275
The Raquel Marie X. and Baby S. court reviewed United States Su-
preme Court jurisprudence about the rights of unwed fathers and explicitly
considered how a father could establish the custodial relationship required
to protect his parental interest.276 In doing so, the Court emphasized both
the financial and personal commitment of the father during pregnancy. In
its factual recitations, the court noted that the father in Raquel Marie X. had
assaulted the mother on several occasions and that the Appellate Division
found that the parents’ relationship, which resulted in marriage months af-
ter the birth, was neither normal nor stable. In that case, the Court
269. In re Adoption of D.J.V., 796 P.2d 1076 (Mont. 1990).
270. D.J.V., 796 P.2d at 1079.
271. See D.J.V., 796 P.2d at 1076–78 (holding that absence of court order mandating
support did not absolve natural of legal duty to support child; if father is able to
provide support and fails to do so during one-year period prior to petition for adop-
tion then consent is not required).
272. D.J.V., 796 P.2d at 1079.
273. In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 424 (1990).
274. Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 428.
275. Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 428.
276. Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 420–425.
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delivered no prenatal abandonment-related ruling associated with the
abuse,277 although a father’s abuse of a pregnant woman is frequently cited
in prenatal abandonment cases.278
In 1991, in In re Stephen C., and in 1993, in In re Adoption of Kyle,
New York waived an incarcerated father’s rights because he was not willing
to assume full custody of the child himself, despite his express wish that one
of his relatives act as guardian of the child for the duration of his incarcera-
tion.279 In Adoption of Kyle, New York waived the incarcerated father’s rights
despite his express wish that the child live with his mother while he served a
four-year sentence.280
Also in 1991, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., the Kansas Court of
Appeals upheld a trial court’s termination of an incarcerated father’s paren-
tal rights based upon his failure to provide support for the six months prior
to child’s birth when he had knowledge of the pregnancy.281 While the Baby
Boy S. Court considered typical factors in prenatal abandonment, it added a
novel non-financial factor: the father’s babysitting of the mother’s other
children.282 Babysitting enables mothers to attend prenatal medical appoint-
ments and is an important consideration benefitting the fetus’s development
and the mother’s health.283
In 1992, the Court of Appeals of New York waived a father’s consent
rights in Robert O. v. Russell K.284 In that case, the father had claimed an
exception to New York law requiring “promptness” because he did not
know of the birth.285 The court clarified that promptness in a father’s as-
sumption of responsibility is “measured in terms of the baby’s life not by
277. Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 420.
278. This is not surprising given the frequency of domestic abuse of all women, especially
pregnant women, in the United States. See infra Section 1.4.
279. In re Stephen C., 566 N.Y.S.2d 178, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); In re Adoption of
Kyle, 592 N.Y.S.2d 557, 560 (Sur. 1992). Subsequent cases show that New York
requires father’s personal assumption of custody and its requirement is not satisfied
by passing the child off to a relative. In re Gionna L., 824 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2006).
280. Adoption of Kyle, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
281. In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 822 P.2d 76, 78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (“the mother
testified that the father did not provide her with money, groceries, or a place to live,
nor did he give her his paycheck or babysit her other children. Moreover, the mother
stated the father showed a complete disregard for supporting her before his incarcera-
tion.”) The trial court concluded that the father made no effort to inquire after the
welfare of the mother in her pregnant condition.
282. Baby Boy S., 822 P.2d at 78 (These factors were disputed by the mother and father,
and the Appellate Court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
interpretation accepting the mother’s version.).
283. Baby Boy S., 822 P.2d at 78.
284. Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
285. Robert O., 604 N.E.2d at 102.
2017] PRENATAL  A B A N D O N M E N T 101
the onset of the father’s awareness.”286 The concurrence noted that putting
the onus on the father to seek information about pregnancy from the
mother was out of step with sexual mores and required men to invade the
mother’s privacy after a relationship had ended. But it did not note that it
would also be “out of step” to charge the mother with notifying the fa-
ther.287 Nonetheless, the same concurring judge concluded that the State’s
interest in finality outweighed the father’s interests.288
Also in 1992, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court upheld a trial court decision waiving the father’s consent
rights where he had not supported the mother during pregnancy.289 The
father’s appeal alleged that he had no obligations absent a court order bind-
ing him to pay pregnancy-related medical bills and child support.290 The
Court held that Oklahoma law requires prenatal support and child support
in the absence of a court order.291 It would be another ten years before a
Kansas concurrence distinguished that birth may trigger a legal obligation,
but voluntary support before birth “preserves the father-to-be’s rights.”292
Additionally in 1992, the California Supreme Court overruled the
trial and appellate courts’ decisions against the father in Adoption of Kelsey S.
and held that to determine whether an unwed father has demonstrated a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional, financial, and oth-
erwise—courts must analyze the father’s conduct both before and after the
child’s birth.293 The Court announced a two-step analysis: 1) whether the
father had demonstrated the necessary commitment to his parental respon-
sibilities, and 2) whether the father could be deprived of the right to with-
hold his consent to adoption.294 The Court indicated that factors for the
first step include the father’s willingness not just to block adoption but also
to assume full custody himself.295 In upholding the father’s rights, the Court
also considered the father’s public acknowledgement of paternity, payment
of pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his ability to do so,
and prompt legal action to seek custody of the child.296 It carved out an
286. Robert O., 604 N.E.2d at 103.
287. Robert O., 604 N.E.2d at 106.
288. Robert O., 604 N.E.2d at 106–07.
289. In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d 643, 645, 647 (Okla. 1992).
290. Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d at 645.
291. Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d at 646.
292. In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (J. Beier,
concurring).
293. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992).
294. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1237–38.
295. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1237 (quoting In re Raquel M., 559 N.E.2d 418, 423 (N.Y.
1990)).
296. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1237.
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exception in a footnote for the father who impregnates the mother by
rape.297
In 1993, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed a trial court
decision upholding a father’s parental rights in Abernathy v. Baby Boy.298
The Abernathy Court found that the father had appeared at the hospital of
birth, offered to pay medical birth expenses, and manifested a willingness to
assume sole custody of the child.299 The court cited Lehr, Stanley, and
Caban in holding that a father’s parental rights cannot depend upon the
whim of the unwed mother, and that the father had timely demonstrated a
willingness to develop a full custodial relationship with his child.300 The
Abernathy court concluded that the father’s parental rights could not de-
pend upon a mother’s refusal to avail herself of the father’s efforts to provide
emotional and financial support.301 In this case, the father’s urging of the
mother not to abort was accompanied by his provision of support and
transportation.302
Also in 1993, Ohio decided its second prenatal abandonment case, In
re Adoption of Klonowski, when its appellate court upheld a father’s consent
rights where he gave the mother a key to an apartment he had rented for
them and proposed marriage to the mother, and where she denied her preg-
nancy.303 Although father had neither paid nor offered to pay any medical
expenses associated with the pregnancy,304 the Court found no prenatal
abandonment.305
In two 1994 cases, Kansas courts demonstrated that prenatal abandon-
ment or support can, respectively, waive or preserve a father’s parental
rights. In Adoption of Baby Boy B., the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the
trial and appellate courts’ upholding of father’s consent rights to deny adop-
tion.306 The Court held that the key question was whether the father pro-
vided support to the mother during the six-month period before the child’s
birth.307 The father had housed the mother and her three children for six
weeks and spent money on entertainment, restaurants, and maternity
clothes for the mother.308 He had also offered her his income tax refund of
297. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1237 n.14.
298. Abernathy v. Baby Boy, 437 S.E.2d 25, 29 (S.C. 1993).
299. Abernathy, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
300. Abernathy, 437 S.E.2d at 28-29.
301. Abernathy, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
302. Abernathy, 437 S.E.2d at 27.
303. In re Adoption of Klonowski, 622 N.E.2d 376, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
304. Klonowski, 622 N.E.2d at 378.
305. Klonowski, 622 N.E.2d at 379.
306. In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Kan. 1994).
307. Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d at 1036–37.
308. Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d at 1036.
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$1,000 plus $1,100 for post-partum expenses, both of which the mother
refused.309 The Court held that the mother’s refusal of support was a rea-
sonable factor supporting the trial court’s protection of the father’s rights.310
Baby Boy B. is important in its discussion of evidence and evidentiary
standards. The Court pointed out that when evidence is all documentary,
the reviewing court may consider the case de novo.311
The Baby Boy B. Court held that “[t]he test to be applied in determin-
ing if the natural father’s consent is necessary under K.S.A.1992 Supp.
59–3136(h)(4) is one of reasonableness under all the relevant surrounding
circumstances existing in the case.”312 The Kansas Court’s reasonableness
standard is less demanding than Florida’s clear and convincing evidence
standard, applied in a 2008 decision.313 Courts may allow a lower eviden-
tiary standard for waiver of a non-marital father’s parental rights, as in Baby
Boy B., than for termination of them, as in Baby Boy N. (discussed next.)
The United States Supreme Court has held that termination of parental
rights requires a clear and convincing standard.314
In contrast to the waiver of parental rights in Baby Boy B., the Kansas
Appellate Court, in Baby Boy N., affirmed a trial court’s termination of a
father’s parental rights for failure to provide prenatal support.315 Here, the
Court rejected the father’s contentions that the mother did not need sup-
port, finding that he had never determined her need by asking or offering to
support her during the pregnancy.316 The Court also found that he termi-
nated their relationship and withdrew his support upon her disclosure of the
pregnancy.317 Additionally, the Court rejected the father’s argument that he
309. Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d at 1037.
310. Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d at 1037.
311. Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d at 1031–32. The dichotomy between ore tenus and documen-
tary evidence and the increased deference a reviewing court provides to ore tenus
evidence is also considered in the checkered cases that are considered in Alabama. See
discussion infra p. 162.
312. Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d at 1036.
313. J.C.J. v. Heart of Adoptions, 989 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
314. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). Contrast MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.447 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen. Assemb.) for grounds to
terminate parental rights with MO. ANN. STAT. §192.016.7 (Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen. Assemb.) which waives a man’s rights to consent to adoption
where he has not established himself as the legal father of a child. While these proce-
dures are different, they both result in a man’s loss of rights to withhold consent to
adoption.
315. In re Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d 680, 691 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
316. Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d at 690.
317. Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d at 690.
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had been misled by counsel, an argument that was also explicitly and
soundly rejected by another Kansas court eight years later.318
Also in 1994, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld its trial court in The
Father in Pima County Juvenile Action.319 That Court had previously consid-
ered and remanded this case for reconsideration of the facts with application
of the proper standard for abandonment.320 On its second review, the Court
evaluated the father’s prenatal conduct.321 The Pima County father argued
that he “could not form a relationship” with the child, who had been sur-
rendered at birth to the adoptive parents, but that the father had “assert[ed]
his legal rights at the first opportunity by responding to the petition to sever
[his rights].”322 The father also claimed that his due process rights were
violated because he could not afford an attorney and lacked the knowledge
to contest the adoption.323 The Court noted that the mother’s attorney had
given the father notice by letter of the pending adoption and that it was the
father’s own inaction that had kept him from the courtroom.324 The Court
held that the father had not affirmatively sought to block the adoption, seek
custody, or establish his paternity, and that his defensive filing did not cure
his inaction.325 A father’s defensive filings and failure to personally seek cus-
tody of the child have been cited with increasing frequency in prenatal
abandonment cases.326
In 1995, the California Supreme Court decided Adoption of Michael
H.. There, the Court found that post-birth conduct evincing a full commit-
ment to the responsibilities of parenting did not cure a failure to demon-
strate such full commitment pre-birth.327 The birth father had been
arrested—in one of two “violent outbursts”—for aggravated assault upon
the mother.328 Justice Kennard’s dissent and concurrence attributed the
break-up of the parents’ relationship to the mother without reference to the
father’s domestic violence.329 This omission of relevant facts ignores the in-
fluence of domestic violence on relationships, minimizes the danger of do-
mestic violence to women, especially pregnant women, and does not
318. In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 749 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
319. See In re Appeal in Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 876 P.2d 1121,
1136 (Ariz. 1994).
320. Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d at 1126.
321. Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d at 1133.
322. Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d at 1133.
323. Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d at 1134.
324. Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d at 1135.
325. Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d at 1133.
326. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
327. Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 901 (Cal. 1995).
328. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 893.
329. See Michael H., 898 P.2d at 901–10 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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acknowledge the role of domestic violence in the calculus of a woman’s
decision making about a pregnancy.
The Michael H. Court distinguished the statutory and constitutional
parental rights of the non-marital father and described the question as
whether the father had transformed his inchoate constitutional interest into
a constitutional right that entitled him to block the adoption.330 The Court
discussed the mother’s need for the father’s prompt and timely commitment
to the responsibilities of parenting, and relied upon the trial court’s finding
that the father had not committed himself to parenting during the preg-
nancy nor acted as though he objected to the adoption until two weeks after
Michael was born.331 The Court specifically discussed the importance of the
father’s timely notice of objection or consent to adoption due to the short
timeline in which the mother must make a decision to abort, adopt, or
parent the baby,332 recognizing the limited time between the moment a
woman realizes that she is pregnant and the moment that the law requires
she maintain the pregnancy. Only in this period does she have exclusive
control over her body and her pregnancy; as her options become increas-
ingly limited, she may be forced to share parental decisions with the father.
California’s elucidation of mothers’ choices—abortion, adoption, or
parenting—assists their decision making by clarifying and limiting the fa-
ther’s ability to intervene in proportion to his assumption of responsibility.
Thus, if the father fails to timely provide prenatal support, a woman may
forego abortion and chose adoption, secure in the knowledge that she alone
can control the relinquishment decision.
In 1995, six years after Florida’s first prenatal abandonment deci-
sion,333 the Florida Supreme Court held that a father’s conduct, including
the absence of emotional support to the birth mother and the father’s emo-
tional abuse of the birth mother, could constitute grounds for a finding of
prenatal abandonment.334 In In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., the mother
testified that she was employed and self-supporting until an accident forced
her out of work. She further testified that the father grabbed her, shook her,
and spit on her, that the father’s only phone calls to her after she moved
away from him were pointless early morning phone calls to annoy her, and
that the father attended one of the mother’s prenatal doctor visits, during
which he acted like an “ice cube”335 (the father testified that he had not
attended any doctor’s visits). The trial court found that while the mother
330. See Michael H., 898 P.2d 895–96.
331. See Michael H., 898 P.2d 896.
332. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 898.
333. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla. 1989).
334. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 964, 967 (Fla. 1995).
335. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 964.
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and father lived together for part of the pregnancy, the father used the
mother’s food stamps and her Aid to Dependent Children check to supple-
ment his earnings.336 For the first time, the Court found that the father’s
cohabitation with the birth mother in Baby E.A.W. was a decisional factor
for prenatal abandonment, rather than for protection of paternal rights.337
The trial court did not consider cohabitation to be a form of prenatal sup-
port in this case because the father was depending on the mother’s resources
rather than providing support.338 The state Supreme Court upheld this
finding, and further held that the father’s lack of emotional support and his
emotional abuse of the mother constituted explicit considerations in a find-
ing of prenatal abandonment.339
In 1996, a Michigan Court in In re Brianna Marie Gaipa v. Johnson
vacated a trial court order finding the father had provided prenatal support
and set out test factors to determine the adequacy of prenatal support.340
The father physically abused the mother, and she “lived in a series of do-
mestic violence shelters.”341 The Court held that the test to be applied is
whether the “father provided reasonable support or care under the circum-
stances of the case” and listed these factors:
[the] father’s ability to provide support or care, the needs of the
mother, the kind of support or care provided, the duration of
the support, whether the mother impeded the father’s efforts to
provide her with support, and any other factors that might be
significant under the facts of the case.342
The concept that a father has a responsibility to provide either “support” or
“care” is an important addition to the prenatal abandonment theory.343 Re-
quiring a father to provide care and/or support gives courts a vehicle to
factor in the father’s abuse of the mother. This consideration is necessary, as
abuse imperils both mother and child as much as failure to provide financial
support.
In 1997, a Kansas appellate court addressed a father’s statutory prena-
tal support obligation where he and the mother questioned his paternity in
In re Adoption of D.M.M. After not paying prenatal support, the father later
336. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 970.
337. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
338. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
339. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 697.
340. See In re Gaipa v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
341. Gaipa, 555 N.W.2d at 868.
342. Gaipa, 555 N.W.2d at 869.
343. See Gaipa, 555 N.W.2d at 869.
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learned of his paternity and attempted to assert parental rights.344 The fa-
ther claimed violations of his fundamental constitutional right to custody
and of his due process rights, claiming there had been no reasonable oppor-
tunity to provide prenatal support, since paternity had been in doubt. The
court held that uncertainty of paternity did not excuse prenatal support
obligations because excusing such obligations would:
[N]egate the legislative intent behind 59-2136 of providing ‘a
measure by which to gauge a father’s commitment to his child
during pregnancy, a time when a mother’s obligations and re-
sponsibilities are clear and unavoidable. The statute sets up a
balancing obligation of the father to the child and recognizes
that those parental responsibilities arise prior to birth.’345
The D.M.M. court clarified that even though its holding might conceivably
require more than one man to pay prenatal support, such multiple pay-
ments were preferable to depriving a pregnant woman of any support.346 “If
any of those partners wishes to preserve his parental rights in the event of a
later adoption, each one will be required to initiate reasonable efforts toward
supporting the mother prior to the child’s birth.”347 To hold otherwise
would undermine policy supporting the prenatal health of fetuses and allow
any man to avoid prenatal support by simply alleging that mother had other
sexual partners who might have fathered the fetus.
Also in 1997, Oklahoma affirmed a trial court’s holding in Baby Girl
M. that waived the father’s consent to the adoption of his daughter.348 The
father reported that he had proposed to the mother, but the Court held that
marriage proposals do not “amount to ‘any action to legally establish his
claim to paternity of the child.’”349 The Baby Girl M. Court explicitly held
that intent to exercise parental responsibility was insufficient to establish
legal paternity,350 even though a marriage during the pregnancy would have
established legal paternity.351
In 1999, in In re Infant Child Skinner, the Washington Court of Ap-
peals considered the effects of a father’s prenatal non-support in its decision
344. In re Adoption of D.M.M., 955 P.2d 618, 784 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
345. D.M.M., 955 P.2d at 622.
346. D.M.M., 955 P.2d at 622.
347. D.M.M., 955 P.2d at 622.
348. In re Adoption of Baby Girl M., 942 P.2d 235, 244 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997).
349. Baby Girl M., 942 P.2d at 242.
350. Baby Girl M., 942 P.2d at 243.
351. Jeffrey A. Parness, Imprecise State Parentage Laws, 76 LA. L. REV. 481, 483 (2015).
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to terminate paternal rights.352 The facts of non-support in Skinner were
typical, but the Skinner court went further by factoring into its considera-
tion the effect of the father’s prenatal non-support on the mother’s relin-
quishment and adoption decision. In Skinner, the mother testified that she
turned to an adoption agency because she did not believe she had the finan-
cial means to rear her child.353 A father’s prenatal abandonment foists the
difficult relinquishment decision upon mothers. Such fathers should not be
rewarded with parental rights at the eleventh hour, after nine months of the
very abandonment and neglect that has forced a mother to come to a pain-
ful relinquishment decision.354
Also in 1999, a tortured dance between the Alabama Supreme Court
and the Alabama Legislature began achieving notoriety.355 That year, the
Supreme Court, in a thirty-three page opinion, affirmed a trial court’s find-
ings that a father had prenatally abandoned his child.356 The opinion de-
scribed significant abuse by the father of the mother, including an incident
in which the mother’s shoulder was dislocated and father was arrested for
“battery upon a pregnant woman.”357 The Alabama Supreme Court issued
its first opinion on November 17, 2000, but withdrew it upon rehearing
and substituted a new one in 2001.358 In the final decision, the Alabama
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and upheld the father’s parental
rights amidst several concurrences and dissents, as well as a recusal.359 On
remand, the C.V. Court departed from its own rule,360 and, in an astound-
ing display of judicial jujitsu, adopted trial court factual findings based
352. In re Infant Child Skinner, 982 P.2d 670, 678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). Stating facts
supporting the trial court judgment:
Indeed, Skinner testified that she contacted New Hope because she did not
believe she had adequate support to raise the child. Williams has also as-
signed error to the finding that after he learned of Skinner’s pregnancy, he
‘showed no evidence of any ability or commitment to change himself, he
has taken no parenting class, he dropped out of a school program at Clal-
lam Bay Correctional Center, he was fired from his job in the kitchen at
Clallam Bay Correctional Center, and he has proposed no realistic plan for
caring for the child.’
Id.
353. Infant Child Skinner, 982 P.2d at 678.
354. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564-65 (2013).
355. See Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d 700, 706 (Ala. 2001).
356. C.V. v. J.M.J., 810 So. 2d 692, 697 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) rev’d sub nom. Ex parte
C.V., No. 1981316, 2000 WL 1717011 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000) withdrawn and super-
seded on reh’g, 810 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 2001).
357. C.V. v. J.M.J., 810 So. 2d at 697.
358. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 701–02.
359. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 701–02.
360. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 705.
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upon ore tenus evidence by upending the trial court’s ore tenus findings of
fact.361 The C.V. Court held that consent to adoption implied by prenatal
abandonment could be revoked after birth, as is the case in voluntary con-
sent to adoption.362 This Court’s finding that prenatal abandonment was
revocable abrogates the theory’s value to mothers, who must make decisions
about abortion and relinquishment during pregnancy based upon the birth
father’s conduct. The decision also disregards the importance of financial
support to a developing fetus. To allow a father to vitiate the mother’s plan
after birth undercuts any legislative intent to inform mothers’ decisional
analysis about abortion or adoption, facilitate adoptive placements, respect
mothers’ parental rights, and ensure permanency for children.
Justice Lyon concurred specially, writing that Alabama did not have
prenatal abandonment until 1999, after the subject child was born, when its
legislature explicitly added prenatal abandonment to its statutory law.363
Justice Lyons suggested that the timing required reversing the appellate
court’s affirmance, which relied upon prenatal abandonment law that was
not explicit in the statute until after relevant events.364 Justice Moore, con-
curring, wrote that Alabama did have prenatal abandonment precedent
prior to the 1999 legislative amendment.365
The Alabama Supreme Court in C.V. held that the trial court’s find-
ing that the birth father had emotionally, financially, and physically abused
the mother during her pregnancy could go to the father’s fitness to parent,
but not to prove his abandonment.366 The 1996 Michigan decision defining
prenatal abandonment as failure to provide support and care367 is the better
analysis for purposes of prenatal abandonment because it includes the sig-
nificant effects of abuse upon the physical health of the fetus and the
mother as well as the impact of the abuse upon the mother’s analysis of
abortion, adoption, or parenting options. The C.V. court, by limiting the
role of abuse to only a finding of unfitness, undermined the totality of
361. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 715. For a discussion of ore tenus evidence, see supra
page 144 and page 147, note 237 and accompanying text.
362. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 729.
363. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 708.
364. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 708.
365. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 703.
366. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 722. The Supreme Court did not presume that the trial
court’s findings of fact were correct under the ore tenus rule, because the trial court
relied upon deposition testimony of the birth mother and not upon any oral presen-
tation to the trial court judge. Under the ore tenus rule, a reviewing court presumed
trial court findings are correct as long as the findings are based upon actual testi-
mony in court and not upon affidavits or deposition. Id. at 719.
367. In re Gaipa v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Mich. App. 1996).
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circumstances analysis typically associated with prenatal abandonment
determinations.
In contrast to C.V., an Alabama trial court found that the father of a
child born 25 days before the State’s enactment of prenatal abandonment
legislation had prenatally abandoned the child in Ex parte F.P..368 The Su-
preme Court subsequently reversed Ex parte C.V. a second time in 2001,
holding that prenatal abandonment did not exist in 1997 when the subject
child was born,369 and reversed Ex parte F.P. in 2003, on the basis that the
Alabama six-month prenatal abandonment statute was impermissibly ap-
plied retroactively when the subject child’s gestation expired before the stat-
ute was six months old.370
The Supreme Court in F.P. largely adopted the dissenting opinion of
Judge Yates in the appellate opinion, which found that the birth father had
diligently pursued his legal rights over the child.371 The dissenting Supreme
Court justice, Justice Stuart, pointedly contested Justice Yates’s facts as mis-
characterizing the birth father’s prenatal conduct, and highlighted that the
trial court had based its facts upon ore tenus evidence.372 Justice Stuart indi-
cated that the birth father had shunned the mother at school (both birth
parents were seventeen years old), and that he had denied to the assistant
principal both that she was pregnant and that he was the father of her
child.373 That the F.P. Court declined to presume the correctness of the trial
court’s findings of fact in Ex parte F.P. marks the second time it derogated
ore tenus evidence in a birth father’s rights case over prenatal abandon-
ment.374 While the ore tenus evidence deference did not operate in the first
two Alabama prenatal abandonment birth father cases, the Alabama Su-
preme Court did defer to the ore tenus evidence of a trial court in 2005 in
Ex parte J.W.B. .375
The Alabama Supreme Court and its legislature disputed the existence
of prenatal abandonment, its irrevocability, and when the theory became
effective and/or available, notwithstanding precedential holdings. For exam-
ple, after the Supreme Court held in C.V. (2001) that implied consent to
adoption could be voluntarily revoked by the father after birth, the 2002
legislative amendments clarified the irrevocability of pre-birth abandon-
368. See F.P. v. J.K.M., 857 So. 2d 110, 112 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001), rev’d sub nom. Ex
parte F.P., 857 So. 2d 125, 125 (Ala. 2003).
369. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d at 727.
370. See Ex parte F.P., 857 So. 2d at 138.
371. F.P. v. J.K.M., 857 So. 2d at 118.
372. Ex parte F.P., 857 So. 2d at 139–42.
373. Ex parte F.P., 857 So. 2d at 140.
374. See Ex parte F.P., 857 So. 2d at 139.
375. Ex parte J.W.B. & K.E.M.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1087 (Ala. 2005).
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ment.376 Alabama’s ore tenus evidence deference rule did not operate in the
first two prenatal abandonment birth father cases.377 However, the Alabama
Supreme Court did defer to the ore tenus evidence of a trial court in 2005 in
J.W.B..378
In 2002, Kansas affirmed the trial court’s decision to terminate the
father’s parental rights in In re Adoption of M.D.K..379 The Court wrote that
all relevant circumstances should be considered in determining whether the
father was thwarted by the mother and whether his prenatal support satis-
fied the statutory requirements. The court’s analysis included factors such
as: alleged interference from the mother, whether the father’s offers were
merely general offers of assistance, the mother’s needs, the father’s knowl-
edge of the mother’s address, the mother’s threats of restraining orders, and
the father’s ability to pay support.380 Judge Beier’s concurrence emphasized
the central and basic point of prenatal support cases: that support may not
be court ordered prior to birth, but that it preserves the father’s parental
rights. Judge Beier states unequivocally:
An unwed man who learns that his unwed sexual partner is preg-
nant and intends to carry the pregnancy to term has only one
way to ensure he can exercise his parental rights after the birth,
regardless of whether the mother intends to exercise hers: He
must relinquish possession and control of a part of his property
or income to the mother-to-be during the last 6 months of the
pregnancy so that she may use the items or money to support
herself or prepare for the arrival of the child. He must do this
regardless of whether his relationship with the mother-to-be con-
tinues or ends. He must do this regardless of whether the
mother-to-be is willing to have any type of contact with him
whatsoever or to submit to his emotional or physical control in
any way. The birth may be the event that triggers a legal obliga-
tion of support, but it marks the end of the period when volun-
tary support can preserve the father-to-be’s right to raise his
child.381
376. See Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 2001).
377. ALA. CODE § 26-10A-9 (Westlaw through Act 2017-81 of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
378. See Ex parte J.W.B. & K.E.M.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1090–92 (Ala. 2005).
379. In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 747 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
380. See M.D.K., 58 P.3d at 748–50. For an example of a father successfully suing the
mother of his child’s family for interference with parental rights see Kessel v. Leavitt,
511 S.E.2d 720 (1998).
381. M.D.K., 58 P.3d at 750.
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The M.D.K. father reported that his attorney advised him that he owed no
support until a court ordered it,382 implying that the attorney committed
malpractice.383
In 2008, a Florida appellate court applied a standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence in its decision to terminate a father’s parental rights for
prenatal and postnatal abandonment.384 The court found that the father
had prenatally abandoned his fetus and that termination of his parental
rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence.385 This heightened
standard is appropriate when a court is terminating parental rights, but a
lower burden attaches when the father has not established parental rights
and the court is waiving his consent to adoption because he has not estab-
lished rights to that consent.386 The J.C.J. court explicitly rejected the fa-
ther’s claim that his costs for litigation to prevent the adoption should
excuse his failure to pay prenatal or postnatal child support.387 Other fathers
have posited various similar justifications, including that welfare was cover-
ing the mother’s prenatal costs or that incarceration made payment impossi-
ble, to limited success.388
Maternal “fraud” is another theme that emerges from the case law. In
its most recent prenatal abandonment case, Adoption of A.A.T., the Kansas
Supreme Court terminated paternal rights in the face of the father’s allega-
tions that the birth mother had committed fraud.389 Conception occurred
382. M.D.K., 58 P.3d at 747.
383. M.D.K., 58 P.3d at 750 (stating “[h]e who hesitates truly is lost, and a lawyer who
advises otherwise commits malpractice.”).
384. J.C.J. v. Heart of Adoptions, 989 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
385. J.C.J., 989 So. 2d at 36. For the proposition that the clear and convincing standard
of proof for termination of parental rights is necessary, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 755, 769–70 (1982).
386. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 866 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Kan. 1994) (explaining
the lower burden of substantial competent evidence).
387. J.C.J., 989 So. 2d at 35–36. After reversing court below, citing the dissent of the
court below:
We should not equate the filing of ‘court papers’ and the taking of legal
positions with the establishment of human relationships. A child can be
abandoned just as surely when papers have been filed with a court as when
they have not been. While those papers sit in a folder in a courthouse,
children grow. They are read to and tucked in at night. They are nursed to
health. They are taught. They are nurtured. They are loved. And they love
back. And bonds are formed - but not with a biological father who has
allowed himself to remain absent from the child’s life.
Id.
388. See, e.g., In re F.H. v. W.S., 283 N.W.2d 202, 211–12 (N.D. 1979) (citing numer-
ous cases where courts rejected father’s claims that incarceration made payment
impossible).
389. In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1204 (Kan. 2008).
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in New York; after informing the father of the pregnancy in October, the
mother moved to Kansas, refusing to give the father her new address.390 In
January, the mother told the father she had aborted.391 The father doubted
her veracity but did not file with the New York putative father registry, file a
paternity action, or take any action in Kansas.392 In fact, the mother had
lied about the abortion to the father and had instead put the baby up for
adoption.393 She had also lied to the adoption agency and the adoptive par-
ents about the father’s name.394 Birth mother fraud or lies appear frequently
in the case law.395 However, birth mother fraud rarely frustrates the parental
rights of a father who provides reliable and consistent prenatal support, un-
less the mother actively thwarts him.396 Fathers and their lawyers are well-
advised to file with putative father registries (where available), file paternity
actions, and establish confirmable bank accounts into which regular depos-
its are made for the welfare of a fetus.
Active maternal “thwarting” may take several shapes. For example, in
Dr. K.B. and Dr. R.M. v. J.G., the Mississippi Supreme Court protected the
rights of the birth father despite his failure to pay prenatal support on the
basis of the mother’s actions to thwart his interests.397 In this case, the Cau-
casian birth mother notified the African American father, J.G., that he
might be the father along with eight other men, all of whom were appar-
ently not African-American.398 Her twins were biracial, so J.G. was the
likely father.399 In this case, the Court determined that J.G.’s failure to pay
support was justified because the birth mother had thwarted him with her
promiscuity, by threatening to file harassment charges against him if he
called her during the pregnancy, by her parents’ hostility toward him based
upon his race, which motivated him to avoid her home, and by asking him
390. A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1185.
391. A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1185.
392. A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1195–96.
393. A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1195–96.
394. A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1195–96.
395. See, e.g., In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Mo. 2016); T.W. v. M.C., 363 P.3d
193, 197 (Colo. 2015), reh’g denied (Jan. 11, 2016); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d
720, 739 (1998) (providing examples of birth mother efforts to thwart birth fathers
that result in tort actions, disciplinary complaints against attorneys and agencies, or
actions for fraud).
396. See A.A.T., 196 P.3d at 1195 (finding abandonment where “the record does not
evidence any support, financial or otherwise, being provided, with the exception of
some insignificant financial payments of $200 for airfare and ‘$20 here, $20
there.’”).
397. See Dr. K.B. v. J.G., 9 So. 3d 1124, 1130–31 (Miss. 2009).
398. Dr. K.B., 9 So. 3d at 1126–27.
399. Dr. K.B., 9 So. 3d at 1126.
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to keep their relationship a secret.400 This decision is significant in its devia-
tion from the majority of holdings, which require a father who is uncertain
of his paternity to nonetheless provide prenatal support in order to both
support the fetus that is possibly his and to protect his parental rights to
that fetus.401 The role of uncertain paternity has not excused prenatal aban-
donment in other cases,402 but the role of racial discord and threatened
harassment charges in this case augmented the uncertain paternity and alto-
gether constituted a sufficient excuse for the father’s prenatal
abandonment.403
In 2010, Utah affirmed its trial court’s decision in In re Adoption of
T.B. to dismiss a father’s motion to set aside the adoption of his daughter
for failure to comply with statutory requirements.404 The opinion focused
on whether the father had developed constitutional protection of his paren-
tal rights through a qualifying relationship with his child under Lehr, even
though the father had not timely complied with Utah’s statute section 78B-
6-121(3). In its interpretation of the statutory language (“consent of an
unmarried biological father is not required”), the Court applied the follow-
ing test:
[T]he father must (1) initiate paternity proceedings; (2) file no-
tice that he has commenced paternity proceedings with the state
registrar of vital statistics; (3) file a sworn affidavit with the dis-
trict court stating that he is willing and able to take full custody
of the child, setting forth his plans to care for the child, and
agreeing to a court order of child support and payment of medi-
cal expenses; and (4) offer to assist, and actually assist, with ex-
penses associated with the pregnancy and birth. Each of these
requirements must be satisfied prior to the time that the natural
mother executes her consent to adoption or relinquishes the
child for adoption.405
The majority acknowledged that the father had requested receipts from
which to pay prenatal medical expenses and sought the mother’s permission
to monitor her pregnancy and attend the birth, but that the mother had
been uncooperative.406 The dissent questioned what more the father could
400. Dr. K.B., 9 So. 3d at 1130–31.
401. Dr. K.B., 9 So. 3d at 1130–31.
402. See, e.g., In re Adoption of D.M.M., 955 P.2d 618, 622 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
403. See Dr. K.B., 9 So. 3d at 1130–31.
404. See In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026, 1027 (Utah 2010).
405. T.B., 232 P.3d at 1031 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
406. T.B., 232 P.3d at 1027–28.
2017] PRENATAL  A B A N D O N M E N T 115
have done in the short space between birth and the mother’s consent to
adoption fifty-four days later.407 The majority responded that the father
could have complied with the statute.408 The dissent examined what consti-
tutional protection a father could obtain during the prenatal period that
would trump his failure to comply with statutory process.409 Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl suggests that prenatal support provides that constitu-
tional protection.410
In 2011, in Roe v. Reeves, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided
its second prenatal abandonment case when it reversed a trial court’s hold-
ing that the father’s consent to adoption was necessary.411 The Court
quoted the Kansas 2002 decision in M.D.K. for the rule that a mother’s lack
of romantic interest and even hostility does not prevent a father from fund-
ing a bank account or providing assistance through a third party.412 The
Court explicitly rejected the father’s claim that the mother’s reliance upon
government benefits to provide for her basic needs relieved the father of his
prenatal support obligations.413
In 2012, California decided a two-state prenatal abandonment case, in
which conception occurred in New York and adoption in California.414 In
Adoption of A.S., the appellate court held that a New York filiation order
made shortly after the child’s birth did not establish the father’s right to
prevent adoption filed in California.415 The Court also analyzed New York
law and found that the father’s filiation order could bestow consent rights if
the father also promptly asserted his interest and willingness to assume cus-
tody of the child; the factors in that test included his payment of pregnancy
and birth expenses.416 The court concluded that neither California nor New
York law would protect this father’s consent rights.417 In a globalized world,
bi-state cases are increasingly common, and a national putative father regis-
try where fathers could assert their intentions to assume parental responsi-
bility would do much to protect at least the rights to notice of responsible
fathers, who would then have the opportunity to provide prenatal support.
407. T.B., 232 P.3d at 1035–36.
408. T.B., 232 P.3d at 1035–36.
409. See T.B., 232 P.3d at 1038–40.
410. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
411. Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 784–5 (S.C. 2011).
412. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d at 783 (quoting In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 750–51
(Kan. Ct. App. 2002)).
413. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d at 784.
414. Adoption of A.S., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 2012).
415. A.S., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 19.
416. A.S., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 27–28.
417. A.S., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 27–28.
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Also in 2012, in In re Adoption of S.K.N., North Carolina upheld the
birth father’s rights where he had lived with the mother during the preg-
nancy and provided support to her after the birth.418 The parents’ relation-
ship was “punctuated by domestic violence [and] substance abuse” and the
mother was afraid to tell the father of the pregnancy.419 She denied to the
father that she was pregnant and kept the boy’s birth a secret, which the
father discovered almost immediately.420 North Carolina provides consent
rights to unwed fathers who: 1) acknowledge paternity of the child; 2) make
reasonable and consistent prenatal support payments commensurate with
their means, including pregnancy related medical expenses; and 3) visit or
communicate with the mother during and after the pregnancy.421 The
Court held that when the father’s mother placed a phone call to the Divi-
sion of Social Services, in which she acknowledged the father’s paternity,
that act sufficed for the father’s acknowledgment of paternity required by
the first prong.422 The father’s living with the birth mother satisfied both
the second and third prongs.423 The holding that a man’s mother can estab-
lish his paternity in a phone call to a state office is surprising, because such
acknowledgement does not trigger responsibilities or rights and may not
reflect the father’s belief as to his paternity or his willingness to accept re-
sponsibility. However, in this case the father also took immediate actions to
assert paternity upon learning of his son’s birth, contemporaneous with his
mother’s phone call.424 The Court’s concluding admonishment that
mothers cannot be in total control of adoption425 is consistent with United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence that a non-marital father’s rights de-
pend upon the responsibility he has assumed.426
In 2014, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided In Re Adoption
of S.D.W. and reinstated the trial court’s judgment in favor of the adoptive
parents after the biological father attempted to intervene and to dismiss the
adoption.427 The Court made explicit what efforts are required of an unwed
father to determine the existence of pregnancy in a woman with whom he
had a multiyear relationship in which they had sexual relations “10 to 20
times a week.”428 The mother had previously conceived by the father and
418. See In re Adoption of S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
419. S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 384.
420. S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 384.
421. S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 385.
422. S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 385.
423. S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 386.
424. S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 385.
425. See S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 389.
426. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
427. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014).
428. S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 375.
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aborted with the father’s knowledge, and the father testified that the mother
was on birth control, but he was not knowledgeable about what form the
contraception took.429 The father never used condoms.430
Despite the opportunity to limit its decision to the highly particular-
ized facts of the case, the Supreme Court’s analysis broadly framed the es-
sential question in S.D.W. as whether “the qualifications for notice are
beyond the control of an interested putative father.”431 The father alleged
both that he was unaware that the mother was pregnant and that he had no
reason to know she was.432 The Court noted that the mother had fraudu-
lently named another man as the father, upon which information the
agency relied, and that the mother had visited the actual father two months
after the child was born and they “marked the occasion [his birthday] with
another act of sexual intercourse,” and that she still did not notify the father
of the birth.433 While the Court found the conduct of both parents troub-
ling, it held that nothing the mother had done had put notification of the
pregnancy beyond the father’s control.434
This North Carolina case addresses a pattern in which women are
historically held responsible for birth control and for notifying a father of
pregnancy. The Court declined to establish a rule by which sex serves as
notice of a possible pregnancy and instead based its decision upon facts as
applied to its statutes.435 At least fourteen states now place responsibility on
men to inquire whether pregnancy resulted from sexual relations with a
429. S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 376.
430. S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 376.
431. See S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 380 (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263–64).
432. See S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 379.
433. S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 387.
434. S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 380–81.
Johns [Father], on the other hand, demonstrated only incuriosity and dis-
interest. He knew that Welker [Mother] was fertile because she already had
a child when they met. He knew that, despite Welker’s purported use of
birth control, he had impregnated her once, leading to an abortion. He
assumed that her subsequent birth control methods would be effective
without making detailed inquiry. He and Welker continued an active sex
life, even after they broke up. From John’s perspective, the sex was unpro-
tected and contraception was wholly Welker’s responsibility. The burden
on him to find out whether he had sired a child was minimal, for he knew
how to contact Welker. All he had to do was ask, for when he finally did
call her, she told him. All the while, S.D.W. continued to live and bond
with his adoptive parents.
Id.
435. S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 381.
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woman,436 and demographics supporting the policy for this rebalancing of
reproductive responsibilities are discussed in Section 1 of this paper. Perhaps
the emerging issue in prenatal abandonment will be to allocate whether it is
the mother’s responsibility to give or the father’s responsibility to obtain
timely notice that a pregnancy resulted after sexual relations. In S.D.W.,
where the mother had defrauded the adoption agency and adoptive parents,
but not the father, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was the
father’s passivity that had resulted in his lack of notice.437 The same issue of
the father’s notice of pregnancy has arisen in putative father registry cases
and courts have uniformly held, consistent with this North Carolina deci-
sion, that the responsibility belongs to the father.438
436. See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1050–51, n. 76, 77 (2002) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-
106.01(F) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. §19-8-12(a)(6) (Westlaw through Act 10 of
2017 Legis. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 16-1505(f)(2) (Westlaw through 2016); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/12.1(g) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of 2016 Reg. Sess.); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 42-2-204(1) (Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3107.061 (Westlaw through 2016); MINN. STAT. § 259.52(8) (Westlaw
through 2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.254 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. of 84th Legis.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-110 (Westlaw through 2016 3d
Spec. Sess.). New Jersey has no putative father registry but provides that an act of
sexual intercourse constitutes constructive notice (for due process purposes) that a
man may have conceived a child—unless the mother actively deceives him and
thwarts his efforts to find her, thereby activating the statutory fraud protections. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46 (Westlaw through 2017). An Ohio dissent discussed exten-
sively that state’s statute providing that sexual intercourse with a woman puts a man
on notice that if a child is born as a result and the putative father fails to file with the
registry, the child may be adopted without his consent pursuant to law. In re Adop-
tion of Baby Boy Brooks, 737 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). See also In re
Adoption of S.J.B, 745 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1988); In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734
N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99
(N.Y. 1992). In Michigan Supreme Court Justice Levin’s dissent in the Baby Jessica
case, he indicated that putative fathers know that sexual intercourse may result in
pregnancy and thus know of the opportunity to establish a family and the need to
protect that opportunity. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 687 (Mich. 1993)
(Levin, J., dissenting). Accord MO. REV. STAT. § 453.061 (Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen. Assemb.) (stating “[a]ny man who has engaged in sexual
intercourse with a woman is deemed to be on notice that a child may be conceived
and as a result is entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding only as provided in this
chapter.”).
437. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014).
438. Beck, supra note 436, at 1050–51. States began legislating that sex served as notice
in 1997, and judges began commenting on how sex-constitutes-notice-of-pregnancy
legislation was in step with modern mores by 1999. Id. See also infra note 507.
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3.4 Synopsis of Case Analysis
The state cases reflect judicial analysis of multiple factors and particu-
larized facts to determine whether a non-marital father has developed a rela-
tionship with an unborn child that qualifies him for constitutional
protection of his rights. Some of the more common facts seen in these deci-
sions were listed at the beginning of this section and noted in each case
discussion.
At least one commentator has noted the emphasis on case facts in
determining non-marital fathers’ rights in adoption and bemoans the arbi-
trary manipulation of those facts to suit the prejudices of the judge.
The variations among courts with respect to the termination of a
father’s parental rights upon a finding of abandonment is illus-
trative of the subjective nature of this issue. Some courts allow a
finding of abandonment on the basis of a father’s prebirth con-
duct, considering such factors as the father’s attitude towards the
pregnancy and towards any arrangements for the subsequent
placement of the child. These factors are extremely arbitrary and
often courts ‘are moved by natural sympathy in a case’ which
compels them to construe the facts in a light that will support
the decision they wish to render. The unpredictability stemming
from the courts’ application of the facts to the law of abandon-
ment urgently needs resolution because of its effect on the chil-
dren involved.439
Judges also note the concern that bias could play a role in decisions based
on fact patterns.440 The California Michael H. decision may provide an ex-
ample of a court construing the facts in order to reach a predetermined
decision.441 In her concurring opinion, Justice Kennard argued that the ma-
jority artfully constructed its opinion in order to “justify” its outcome of
not removing a four-and-a-half year old child from the only home he had
ever known.442
Most trial court and appellate decisions do turn on the facts, giving
rise to entire articles on how to apply mathematical and statistical analyses
439. Tracy Cashman, When is a Biological Father Really a Dad?, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 959,
976–77 (1997) (describing DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 489 U.S.
189, 202–03 (1989), “contending lower court constructed a decision favoring the
child on the basis of the gruesome facts of the case.”).
440. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202–03 (1989); see Cashman, supra note 439, at 976–77.
441. See Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 901 (Cal. 1995).
442. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 906–10 (Kennard, J., concurring).
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to case facts to determine the outcome.443 The clear intent of these analyses
is to recognize parental rights commensurate with the father’s assumption of
responsibility.444 We may hope that the law is applied fairly to the facts and
that a balance is reached between giving proper weight to the conduct of a
responsible father and protecting a child’s rights to rapid permanency and a
mother’s right to sole decision making authority where appropriate.
PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRENATAL ABANDONMENT LAW
DERIVED FROM DEMOGRAPHICS AND CASE LAW
The shifting social landscape should inform public policy and state
laws on prenatal abandonment/support theories. Existing state court prena-
tal abandonment decisions demonstrate how courts both analyze and in-
form relevant public policy issues undergirding mother’s rights,445 children’s
rights to permanency,446 the health of fetuses and children,447 and father’s
rights.448 The federal Constitution demands the protection of the liberty
interests of unmarried fathers, unmarried mothers, and their non-marital
children.449
What emerges from a synthesis of constitutional rights, demographics,
and prenatal abandonment case law is that state policy on prenatal aban-
donment should aim to ensure: 1) support by both parents of a non-marital
fetus; 2) children’s and newborns’ rights to support and immediate perma-
nency with parents; 3) non-marital mothers’ rights to privacy, safety, sup-
port, and importantly, to unilateral control over their children when fathers
have not timely assumed responsibilities; and 4) non-marital fathers’ rights
to privacy and clear information on how to protect their parental rights
without relying on mothers.
States must enact three key legal protections to protect these interre-
lated rights: 1) allocate the responsibility to the father to determine the
pregnancy and identify himself as the father; 2) require the father to con-
443. See Fred Kort, Quantitative Analysis of Fact-Patterns in Cases and Their Impact on
Judicial Decisions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1966).
444. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
445. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013); see also State ex rel.
Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d 643, 646–47
(Wis. 1975).
446. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013).
447. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1989).
448. In re Adoption of Suvak, No. 1-03-51, 2004 WL 231494, at *2–4 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 9, 2004).
449. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000). The plurality and dissent at-
tempt to define parental liberty interests as they are not enumerated constitutional
rights and bear state definition “elaborated with care.” Id. at 65–66, 73; id. at 93
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 95–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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tribute prenatal support or waive his parental prerogatives before birth to
inform the mother’s short decisional timeline, in order to ensure the best
prenatal environment for fetuses and avoid pregnancy-related abuse of the
mother; and 3) ensure parental prerogatives to fathers who have constitu-
tionally protected their parental rights with prenatal support.
4.1 Allocate the Responsibility to Father to Determine Pregnancy and
Identify Himself as Father
The father is the better parent with whom to vest responsibility to
obtain notice of pregnancy and to identify himself as a parent. This may
seem counterintuitive because the mother is the first to know about the
pregnancy. Nonetheless, allocating legal responsibility to the parent with the
most to lose is the most effective means of protecting the rights of all par-
ties. The demographics of non-marital births, domestic assault and homi-
cide, rape, casual sexual encounters, non-payment of child support, and
under-involvement of fathers with their non-marital children all support
vesting fathers with the responsibility to take affirmative action.
The byzantine businesses of notifying a father of a pregnancy and
identifying a father of a non-marital fetus can occur in two separate ways.
Either the mother can inform the father of pregnancy450 and paternity, or
the father can inquire of the mother if she became pregnant following sexual
intercourse.451 Identification of a father can therefore depend upon the abil-
ity and willingness of either parent, and the burden should not fall solely
upon mothers.
Identification of a child’s father is complicated by each parent’s misin-
formation about failure rates of commonly used contraceptives, ignorance of
reproductive physiology, and today’s practice of engaging in casual and
multiple sexual relationships. Parties may have little or no relationship to
each other and may not know how to communicate with each other. Fur-
ther, critical issues such as child support enforcement, domestic violence,
and rape factor into the willingness of either or both parents to identify the
father. Problematically, these issues are woven into the identification deci-
sions for mothers of the more than four in ten children born out of wedlock
in the United States.
Women with multiple partners around the time of conception may be
unable to identify the father of a fetus. A woman’s reproductive ignorance,
particularly where she has vaginal bleeding after conception, also confounds
450. E.g., Lewis, 227 N.W.2d at 645 (finding of fact that mother told father of the
pregnancy).
451. E.g., In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374, 380–81 (N.C. 2014) (holding that
father should inquire of mother as to pregnancy).
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her identification of a father and calculation of due date. When ultrasound
dating of a pregnancy occurs months after conception, the mother’s recol-
lection of relevant sexual partners may be fuzzy. Women may also mistak-
enly assume that the use of a contraceptive rules out an individual man
from having fathered a child, when in fact the contraceptive may have failed
and he may be the father. In summary, a woman’s ability to identify a father
may be effectively compromised.
The unrelenting frequency of domestic violence and homicide associ-
ated with pregnancy contributes to some mothers’ unwillingness to name
fathers even when they can identify them. As noted in Part I of this Article,
statistics bear out the legitimacy of these fears.452 By enacting legislation
relieving mothers of the obligation to identify fathers in abusive situations,
Congress has acknowledged that the notification of men of pregnancy and
its attendant support obligations may incur abuse of the mother and/or
child.453
Placing the burden on fathers to identify themselves is particularly
appropriate when mothers are physically impaired or unconscious at the
time of conception. While the woman is the first to know of a pregnancy,
some men are actually better positioned to know if they fathered a woman’s
fetus than the mother herself. Generally, a man’s impregnation of a woman
necessitates some level of consciousness on his part, whereas she may be
impaired or even unconscious. Therefore, men may be better equipped to
identify the women that they impregnated. In cases of rape, the state justice
system may operate to dissuade fathers from identifying themselves because
states may waive or terminate a rapist’s parental rights454 and/or prosecute
him for the rape.
452. See supra Section 1.4.
453. Soc. Serv. Amend. of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975); SOLOMON-
FEARS, supra note 7, at 4; see also 121 CONG. REC. H7141 (daily ed. Jul. 21, 1975)
(statement of Rep. James Corman); Fontana, supra note 57, at 372–73 (explaining
that the amendment established the good cause exception for women not to name
fathers in order to escape abuse); Mannix et al., supra note 175, at 339 n.5 (“Con-
gress was concerned about situations in which cooperation might result in ‘substan-
tial danger or physical harm or undue harassment to the mother or child.’”).
454. See Nevares v. M.L.S., 345 P.3d 719 (Utah 2015) (holding that parental rights are
withheld from a 20-year-old man/father who statutorily raped a 15-year-old girl/
mother according to Utah law but not Colorado law); see also MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.447.5(5) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). The statute states:
The juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to terminate the
parental rights of the child’s parent when it appears that one or more of the
following grounds for termination exist . . . (5). The child was conceived
and born as a result of an act of forcible rape or rape in the first degree.
When the biological father has pled guilty to, or is convicted of, the forcible
rape or rape in the first degree of the birth mother, such a plea or convic-
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At least fourteen states put the burden on fathers of non-marital chil-
dren to determine the existence of a pregnancy and in essence self-identify
and notify themselves.455 These states provide that men are on notice of a
possible pregnancy by virtue of having had intercourse with a woman,
thereby relieving women of the responsibility of notifying a father of possi-
ble paternity and effectively allocating the burden of discovery to men.456
This means that men have to actively inquire of women about possible con-
ception in order to learn if they have fathered a fetus.
This shift of responsibility from mother to father to determine preg-
nancy is complicated. Judges have recognized that men who repeatedly in-
quire of women about pregnancy may risk claims of harassment.457
Additionally, men may not realize that symptoms of pregnancy alert some
woman to the fact of pregnancy sooner than others, and may not be suffi-
ciently informed about reproductive physiology to know how often to in-
quire whether a woman has become pregnant.458 Importantly, men are not
historically accustomed to this responsibility, may be ignorant of the re-
sponsibility, and may resist carrying it out. Additionally, potential child
support responsibilities may factor into men’s willingness to pursue notifica-
tion of pregnancy.459
Ignorance of contraceptive failure rates is another factor influencing
fathers’ inquiries into possible pregnancy, as underscored by a North Caro-
lina decision discussed in Part III of this Article.460 The S.D.W. trial court
recited that:
A putative Father who engages in a sexual relationship with a
woman multiple times without benefit of contraception is on
notice that a child may result from the sexual relationship and
must make diligent inquiry to discover the existence of his child
tion shall be conclusive evidence supporting the termination of the biologi-
cal father’s parental rights.
Id.
455. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 453.061 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen.
Assemb.); see Beck, supra note 436, at 1050–51 n.76, 77.
456. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.061 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen. As-
semb.) (“Any man who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a woman is deemed
to be on notice that a child may be conceived and as a result is entitled to notice of
an adoption proceeding only as provided in this chapter.”).
457. See Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 106 (N.Y. 1992) (Titone, J.,
concurring).
458. See supra Sections 1.1, 1.2.
459. See supra Sections 1.5, 1.6.
460. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. 2014).
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in order to establish a Constitutional Parental Right regarding
that Minor Child.461
In this case, the appellate court based its holding on facts that the father
knew the mother was fertile, had left birth control up to the mother, had
not specifically confirmed details of her birth control, and had not called
the mother at all during the entire pregnancy.462 While both the trial court
and state Supreme Court allocate responsibility to the father to inquire
about a possible pregnancy, the S.D.W. analysis permits the interpretation
that contraceptive use is exculpatory, perhaps relieving men of inquiring
about a pregnancy if they confirm use of contraceptives by the woman or
use a condom. But this view ignores contraceptive failure rates. Notice of
pregnancy is fraught with difficulty when even judges refuse to acknowledge
that contraceptives fail.
Men’s uncertainty about their paternity further impedes inquiry re-
garding pregnancies and payment of prenatal support. Men may resist pay-
ing prenatal support because their genetic paternity is not typically
confirmed until after birth.463 However, state case law provides that any
possible father of a fetus must provide prenatal support if he wishes to pro-
tect his parental rights, even if that requires more than one man to provide
prenatal support.464 At least one man has argued that the mother’s “promis-
cuity” thwarted him from paying support.465 However, courts have de-
manded payment of prenatal support even in cases in which paternity was
uncertain.466
Holding multiple potential fathers accountable for prenatal support
serves the general policy and legislative purposes of advancing the interests
of unborn children and of relieving women from serving as the sole source
of support in pregnancy. Whether or not this is fair to multiple men who
461. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 377–78.
462. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d at 380–81.
463. See infra Sections 1.1, 1.2.
464. In re Adoption of D.M.M., 955 P.2d 618, 622 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). Explaining:
Any man should be aware that he may become the father of a child as a
result of having sexual intercourse with a woman, regardless of the number
of sexual partners she has. If any of those partners wishes to preserve his
parental rights in the event of a later adoption, each one will be required to
initiate reasonable efforts toward supporting the mother prior to the child’s
birth.
Id.
465. E.g., Dr. K.B. v. J.G., 9 So. 3d 1124, 1128 (Miss. 2009).
466. See Dr. K.B., 9 So. 3d at 1128, 1130–31. The court did not rely upon the ambigui-
ties attendant to the ten possible fathers and instead relied upon the father’s reasona-
ble fear of contacting the mother and confronting the mother’s parents. Id.
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had sexual relations with one woman, the fact is that paying prenatal sup-
port is a cost of protecting parental rights.467
Both men and women face substantial impediments to identifying the
father of a fetus/child and giving or seeking notice of pregnancy. The end
result is that fathers may not support fetuses and mothers during pregnancy,
to both the mother and child’s peril. Importantly, the legal obligation to
provide support cannot be enforced during the pregnancy, despite the sig-
nificant legal implications of failure to do so.468
In sum, public policy demands and case law suggests that men be
obligated to inquire of their sexual partners whether pregnancy resulted
from sexual intercourse, and that women be simultaneously relieved of the
obligation to notify men of pregnancy or paternity. Some state court deci-
sions have recognized this.469 The threat of domestic violence and homicide
place too great a burden on mothers. And men have too much to lose by
relying upon women whose abilities and willingness to notify men of im-
peding fatherhood vary greatly. The biological imperative is that women are
automatically notified of pregnancy and simultaneously maternity. Women
automatically bear the physiological burdens of pregnancy, of making deci-
sions about abortion or pregnancy, and of supporting their pregnancies and
fetuses. Men, on the other hand, bear no physiological burden but have
much at stake in supporting their fetuses, and in determining and protect-
ing paternity. Paternity law performs best when it vests responsibility in the
class of persons with the most to lose by missing notification of pregnancy:
the fathers.470
4.2 Require Fathers to Provide Support During Pregnancy
or Waive Parental Prerogatives
Requiring fathers to pay prenatal support or waive parental rights is
necessary in order to inform the mother’s short decisional timeline, ensure
467. See In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (Beier, J.,
concurring) (clarifying that attorneys who misguide potential fathers on this point
do so at their peril of malpractice actions because “[t]he birth may be the event that
triggers a legal obligation of support, but it marks the end of the period when volun-
tary support can preserve the father-to-be’s right to raise his child”).
468. See generally M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745.
469. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374, 380–81 (N.C. 2014) (holding
that where the mother fraudulently identified the father on birth and adoption docu-
ments and failed to notify him of the pregnancy but the father did nothing to in-
quire about whether pregnancy had resulted from sexual intercourse, the father was
not deprived of due process of law through the adoption of his child against his
wishes due to his failure to “tak[e] any of the steps that would establish him as a
responsible father”).
470. See Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1992).
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the best prenatal environment for fetuses, and to avoid pregnancy-related
abuse impacting the mother’s liberty and safety interests.
A. Mother’s Decisional Timeline
Women have legally, physically, and emotionally enforced timelines in
which to make decisions about pregnancy, abortion, and adoption.471 A
woman may obtain an abortion until twenty-two weeks of gestation. When
a man investigates the possibility of pregnancy, and provides support in the
early weeks of gestation, the mother is able to forecast a father’s voluntary
level of support and assistance into her abortion calculus.
When a woman makes a decision to maintain a pregnancy, the father
has another eighteen to twenty weeks in which to constitutionally protect
his parental rights to a child by providing support and assistance to the
pregnant mother of his child. Some states explicitly require prenatal support
during the second and third trimesters or the last six months of a preg-
nancy.472 This information about father’s willingness to support a fetus/
child is crucial to women considering adoption,473 particularly once legal
abortion is no longer available to a woman. Numerous case decisions, in-
cluding the first-ever reported prenatal abandonment case, cite the entitle-
ment of a mother to decide whether to relinquish a child to adoption
during the pregnancy, and do not require her to wait until birth to give a
father time to evince his assumption of parental responsibilities.474
While a mother may relinquish a child months or even years after
birth, waiting to relinquish for any period of time after birth necessarily
exposes mothers and babies to increased opportunities to bond.475 Relin-
quishment after increased bonding severs a relationship that is more devel-
471. See UNIV. OF N.M. CTR. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, http://www.unmcrh.org/abortion-
care/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (The University of New Mexico offers abortion
until 22 weeks gestation. Abortions conducted before nine weeks’ gestation are med-
ical; abortions done after nine weeks must be conducted surgically in a clinic, and
abortions done after 12–16 weeks may require an overnight stay).
472. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-9(a)(1) (Westlaw through Act 2017-81 of 2017 Reg.
Sess.); In re Adoption of D.M.M., 955 P.2d 618, 618 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
473. Karen Pazol et al., Abortion Surveillance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6108a1.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2015) (The CDC reports that “[i]n 2009, most (64.0%) abortions were
performed at 8 weeks’ gestation, and 91.7% were performed at 13 weeks’
gestation.”).
474. E.g., State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d
643, 646–47 (Wis. 1975).
475. See generally Kay M. Robson & R. Kumar, Delayed Onset of Maternal Affection After
Childbirth, 136 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 347, 351 (1980) (concluding that maternal
bonding increases over time).
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oped and involves that much more anguish and emotional adjustment for
mother and child.476
Thus, a mother’s decisional timeline is essentially the period of preg-
nancy. Fathers complain that the prenatal abandonment timeline is too
short for them and plead for time after birth to pay support and to demon-
strate responsibility.477 Such complaints by fathers about brief timelines ig-
nore the fact that fathers have nine full months of pregnancy to assume
responsibilities to protect their parental rights.
Requiring support during the second and third trimesters gives suffi-
cient opportunity for fathers to determine if the pregnancy resulted from
their sexual intercourse and to pay the support and provide the assistance
that protects their parental rights, all while informing birth mothers’ choices
and advancing the health of fetuses and newborns. Requiring support dur-
ing pregnancy to protect paternal rights is sensible and not unduly burden-
some to fathers, given the burden that falls on mothers and children if
fathers fail to provide support.
B. Best Prenatal Environment for Fetuses
Fathers’ historical avoidance of responsibilities associated with their
children imperils their own parental rights, the health of their fetuses and
children, and the safety of their children’s mothers. As illustrated in some of
the factual vignettes discussed in Part III, some men may regard non-marital
pregnancy as the mothers’ problem.478 Data confirms that many fathers do
not pay their child support and documents the under-engagement of many
non-custodial fathers with their children.479
Florida’s first prenatal abandonment case relied upon the deleterious
effects of insufficient financial support upon the developing fetus and has
been quoted in other state decisions.480 Fathers’ non-support necessarily fac-
tors into the poverty experienced by single mothers, and poverty is
476. Id.
477. See In re Adoption of H.N.R., 2014-Ohio-4959, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (in
which the father claims fathers are too distracted and too busy in children’s first
months of life to register with putative father registries or initiate the establishment
of paternity).
478. E.g., Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1316–17 (Miss. 1982) (where the father
refused to take responsibility for the child and told the mother not to notify the
welfare agency that he was the father); Lewis, 227 N.W.2d at 646 (where the father
threatened to call the doctor to make sure his name was not on the birth certificate).
479. See supra Section 1.5; NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES supra note 85.
480. Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1162 (D.C. 1990); In re Adoption of Michael H.,
898 P.2d 891, 898 (Cal. 1995); In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla.
1989).
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associated with demonstrably poor developmental outcomes for children.481
Fathers’ absence or reduced engagement with children is associated with
children’s lower academic achievement, corresponding reduced income
level, and increased criminal activity. Failure to pay prenatal support
portends to a mother that a father will not support the child after birth.
C. Pregnancy-Related Abuse
In addition to detrimentally affecting children, fathers’ non-support
can constitute a form of abuse of the custodial parent or the pregnant
woman. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl demonstrates the financial abuse that
women often face during pregnancy as well as its association with other
known features of abuse, and its facts support the conclusion that states
should require prenatal support or waive fathers’ rights.482
In Adoptive Couple, Father had told Mother by the time of her first
prenatal appointment (before her timeline for abortion vanished) that he
would not contribute financial support unless she married him.483 His de-
mand was fatuous, since birth fathers’ support obligations are independent
of marital status, as are women’s support needs for medical bills, transporta-
tion, clothing, and lost wages during a pregnancy.484 More significantly,
Father’s marriage ultimatum constituted exploitation, because it attempted
to force the mother to stay in the relationship, “to use his control over
finances to deprive [her] of necessary monies for herself or her children.”485
Father’s abusive tactics continued four months after the birth and
placement of the child, when he invoked the Indian Child Welfare Act
481. See supra Sections 1.5, 1.6.
482. See generally supra Section 1.4 (explaining the risks and consequences of domestic
violence during pregnancy).
483. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct.
2552 (No. 12-399), 2012 WL 4502948 at *5–6.
484. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 578 (S.C. 2012), rev’d 133 S. Ct.
2552 (2013) (Kittredge, J., dissenting) (stating “[an unwed father] must provide
support regardless of whether his relationship with the mother-to-be continues or
ends.”) (quoting Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 783 (S.C. 2011)). See also Shari
Motro, Responsibility Begins at Conception, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2012), nytimes.com/
2012/07/07/opinion/time-for-pregnancy-support-alimony.html (discussing women’s
need for financial support during pregnancy).
485. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1360 (E.D. Penn.
1990); Facts About Domestic Violence and Economic Abuse, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/files/EconomicAbuse.pdf. (last visited
Sept. 23, 2016); Economic Abuse, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.mmgconnect.com/projects/userfiles/File/DCE-STOP_NOW/
NCADV_Economic_Abuse_Fact_Sheet.pdf. (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
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(ICWA) because Mother did not keep his baby.486 Over text message, Father
made it clear it that terminating his parental rights to evade paying support
would be acceptable to him as long as Mother kept his baby. It was only
when he realized Mother was not keeping his baby that he objected.487
Abusers’ manipulation of finances and legal processes—in this case
ICWA—to maintain control of their victims is often not recognized by
judges.488 “In fact, many abusers appear to be manipulating the court.”489
This is evidenced in Adoptive Couple by the recitation of disturbing facts of
financial abuse, stalking, and manipulation by both the majority and the
dissent, although neither names the father’s controlling, coercive conduct as
the abuse it was.490
Such judicial oversight exposes women to domestic abuse and homi-
cide when they have rendered themselves vulnerable by the obligations they
assume in choosing pregnancies over abortions. The public deludes itself
that domestic violence affects only a few women491 and that only physical
battering constitutes abuse.
Over nine months of her life, Baby Girl’s Mother had subjected her
health and her finances to a pregnancy for which Father had refused any
responsibility. After birth, Father wrested control of the very child he had
abandoned and to whom Mother had just dedicated nine months of her
life, and he prevailed in obtaining a court-ordered transfer of the child to
him.492 This eviscerated Mother’s liberty interest in placing Baby Girl up for
adoption and diminished Mother’s post-relinquishment recovery by voiding
her choice of an open adoption with a hand-picked adoptive family493—all
actions theoretically protected by the South Carolina legislature.494 The
486. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d at 555; id. at 569–70 (Kittredge, J.,
dissenting).
487. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013).
488. Gender Bias in the Courts of the Commonwealth Final Report, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 705, 751 (2001).
489. Id.
490. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552–53, 569–70 (Kittredge, J., dissenting); Tran-
script of Record, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550 (2012) (No. 12-
399).
491. The author testified for an adoption bill in the Missouri Legislature in the Children,
Families and Persons with Disabilities Subcommittee of the House. After the author
quoted statistics on domestic violence and its impact upon relinquishing mothers, a
representative said, “Well, that’s only a few women.” Before the Children, Families
and Persons with Disabilities H. Subcomm., 99th Sess. (Mo. Mar. 13, 2014).
492. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
493. See generally Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 590.
494. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-17-20B (Westlaw through 2016 Sess.) (“Unless the court
orders otherwise, the custody of an illegitimate child is solely in the natural mother
unless the mother has relinquished her rights to the child.”). As the Iowa Supreme
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Supreme Court’s description of Father’s “eleventh hour” assertion of pater-
nal rights and observation that the father “play[ed] the ICWA card” at his
convenience indicate the Court’s strong distaste for Father’s conduct.495 Jus-
tice Alito wrote that a decision allowing such conduct by a father would
raise equal protection concerns.496
When fathers do not provide prenatal support, or when fathers exert
disturbing and manipulative coercive control and/or physically abuse a preg-
nant woman, public policy and state law should allocate sole control over
newborns to birth mothers.
4.3 Ensure Parental Prerogatives to Fathers Who Have Constitutionally
Protected Their Parental Rights by Prenatal Support
The converse legal theory, protecting fathers’ rights in the prenatal
period, must co-exist with prenatal abandonment theory. Lehr made clear
that an unwed father’s rights are commensurate with his assumption of sub-
stantial personal, custodial, and financial responsibilities for his child.497
Adoptive Couple extended the possibility of establishing this relationship
during the prenatal period.498 Prenatal abandonment theory is also prenatal
support theory. The father’s rights must be protected when he assumes pre-
natal responsibilities and mothers must have exclusive rights to control their
children at birth if fathers do not assume responsibilities prenatally.499
Mothers can thwart fathers by misleading them about pregnancies,500
lying about an expected date of confinement (due date),501 moving between
states or out of the country,502 or refusing to accept specific and definite
Court eloquently stated, “The State has no right to influence [a birth mother’s]
decision by preventing her from choosing a family she feels is best suited to raise her
child.” In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2008).
495. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013).
496. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
497. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
498. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
499. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559, 2560.
500. In re Adoption of S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“As her
weight gain from the pregnancy became obvious, Ms. Godwin continued to deny
that she was pregnant, insisted that she was simply ‘gaining weight’, and expressed
‘outrage’ when questioned about it.”).
501. In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Mo. 2016). (“Birth Mother contacted Birth
Father in late March. Birth Mother informed him that her expected due date had
changed from early April to early May. This statement was intended to deceive Birth
Father of the real due date.”).
502. See Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490 (Miss. 1998); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720
(W. Va. 1998). In these cases, birth mother used interstate travel to overcome the
investigative and legal efforts of the fathers to establish their legal rights to their
children.
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offers of prenatal support.503 The effect of such fraudulent or obstructive
conduct by a mother can cause a father to miss key state deadlines and/or
fail to provide prenatal support.504 State law must provide fathers with
means of protecting their parental rights without reliance upon mothers or
adoption agencies.
The majority of states have now legislated putative father registries,
where a man can register his intent to claim paternity.505 Such registration
allows a father to overcome any obstacles he might encounter in asserting
and claiming paternity, including his inability to locate the mother, the
mother’s deliberate obfuscation of her whereabouts, or the mother’s refusal
to respond to the father’s legitimate inquiries.506 Registration is cheap (the
cost of a letter) and can be completed easily on forms available online, in
hospitals of birth, and in State Child Protective Agencies. Importantly, re-
gistration does not require that the father continue a relationship with the
mother.507
However, not all states have registries, and thus some states deprive
men of an economical system of obtaining notice of an adoption or protec-
tive custody action. At least one judge has lamented his state’s failure to
legislate registries.508
503. In re Adoption of S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 389 (“[T]he legislature ‘did not intend to
place the mother in total control of the adoption to the exclusion of any inherent
rights of the biological father.’”) (quoting In re Adoption of Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142,
148 (N.C. 2001)); In re Adoption of Anderson, 360 N.C. 271, 274–75 (2006).
504. In re Adoption of S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d at 384.
505. Beck, supra note 197, at 339.
506. See supra Section 3.2.
507. See, e.g., Mahrukh S. Hussaini, Incorporating Thwarted Putative Fathers into the Adop-
tion Scheme: Illinois Proposes a Solution After the “Baby Richard” Case, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 189, 220 (1996).
The burden placed on putative fathers under Illinois’ new legislation is not
necessarily out of step with modern mores or the realities of contemporary
heterosexual relationships. Neither is it completely unrealistic. To meet the
burden which the new legislation places on a putative father, he need
neither remain in contact with a woman with whom he has had sexual
intercourse, nor turn to other sources of information to determine whether
he has conceived a child with her. Under the new legislation, a putative
father need only file with the putative father registry based on his knowl-
edge that he has had intercourse with a woman and commence a parentage
action within thirty days of that filing. His interests will not be jeopardized
if he ends relations with her, and his social habits are not, therefore, greatly
affected. By simply mailing a postcard to the registry and commencing a
parentage action, tasks which can hardly be labelled a burden, a putative
father can preserve his rights to notice and consent.
Id.
508. See generally In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1988).
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Unfortunately, no national registry exists. State father registries cannot
ensure notice to fathers of interstate adoptions if the father does not know
the state of birth or of adoption. For example, a man is unable to register in
the “right” state if a mother leaves the state of conception or an adoption
action is initiated by adoptive parents in a state unknown to the father.509
The national Responsible Father Registry bill, now called the Protecting
Adoption Act, would go toward fixing this interstate problem by erecting a
national registry linking all participating state registries.510 However, this
Act would not help fathers in states without registries. A national registry
would prevent any mother’s deliberate or accidental obfuscation of an adop-
tion by providing a timely registered father in any state with notice of any
adoption proceeding for a child of the woman named in his registry filing.
Although no national registry exists, Utah’s legislature also recently enter-
tained a bill that would create a national registry to facilitate cooperation
among states.511
Mothers may also thwart fathers by threatening them with civil pro-
tective orders or criminal actions for harassment.512 When mothers threaten
to lodge harassment claims, fathers must desist contact and are best advised
to file paternity actions pre-birth to evidence their intent to establish pater-
nity and file with putative father registries where possible. Such fathers must
document their interest and their financial support. And importantly, if a
mother refuses to accept prenatal support, case law suggests that the father
can protect himself by establishing a fund with the mother’s knowledge for
support of the fetus.513 State law must protect fathers against any fraud,
must protect fathers who establish paternity timely, and must credit fathers
with prenatal support if they establish funds for that purpose and mothers
have been appraised.
Non-marital fathers’ parental rights merit constitutional protection
when they have established Lehr’s personal, custodial and financial relation-
ship standard before or after birth. As discussed in Part I, Section 1.6, these
paternal rights are important to fathers as well as children, as evidence shows
that children whose fathers are involved in childrearing demonstrate higher
intelligence quotients, attain higher academic achievement, avoid drugs and
509. E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (Westlaw through 2017).
510. See supra Section 3.2.
511. S.B. 10, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2015).
512. See Dr. K.B. v. J.G., 9 So. 3d 1124 (Miss. 2009). See also In re Adoption of M.D.K.,
58 P.3d 745, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (“Finally, J.T. contends his attempts to
support D.K. were hindered by interference from D.K. and D.K.’s mother. Specifi-
cally, J.T. cites D.K.’s requests for him to stop calling and D.K.’s threats to obtain a
restraining order against him.”).
513. Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 783–85 (S.C. 2011); In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58
P.3d 745, 750–51 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
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violence, and enjoy good emotional and physical health.514 It is imperative
for fathers and children that state law operationalize means for fathers to
protect their parental rights against fraud and obfuscation.
Fathers may complain that they did not know of laws requiring them
to assume parental responsibilities pre-birth or to register with state putative
father registries. This complaint is not surprising given the evolutionary his-
tory of non-marital fathers’ responsibilities. Thus, it is important to start
publicizing laws informing fathers of their rights and responsibilities to non-
marital children. Some states have enacted filing fee surcharges which go to
administer putative father registries and may fund publicizing their regis-
tries.515 The national father registry bill has always contained a provision for
a national publicity campaign and requirements that states publicize their
registries.516
To the extent that the nature of non-marital fathers’ ignorance stems
from a historical norm of abdicated responsibility, the most effective solu-
tion may be education at the high school level regarding the number of
non-marital births in the United States, the effects of teen pregnancy upon
children and their mothers and their fathers, the effectiveness of various
contraceptives, the child support calculation tables for fathers or non-custo-
dial parents of non-marital children, and the options state Child Support
Enforcement organizations utilize in collecting payments such as criminal
penalties and revocation of drivers’ licenses.517
CONCLUSION
When women choose to continue pregnancies, despite unwed fathers’
refusal to provide support, they rely upon prenatal abandonment laws to
escape physical and economic abuse and to protect their liberty interests in
placing their children for adoption. Withholding the protection of state pre-
natal abandonment laws in the name of the Indian Child Welfare Act would
have eviscerated women’s constitutional interests in parenting decisions and
514. See supra Section 1.6.
515. E.g., IND. CODE § 31-19-2-8 (Westlaw through 2016 Second Reg. Sess. of 119th
Gen. Assemb.) (providing for a $50 putative father registry fee); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 192.016.11, 453.020.2 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen. Assemb.)
(same).
516. Beck, supra note 197.
517. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen.
Assemb.). See generally License Restrictions for Failure to Pay Child Support, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-ser-
vices/license-restrictions-for-failure-to-pay-child-support.aspx (containing a list of
states and what licenses may be affected by failure to pay child support).
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their unquestionable right to life. The United States Supreme Court did not
allow it in Adoptive Couple.
States, each with their own domestic abuse, dependency, paternity,
and dissolution laws, have highly developed adoption laws protecting
mothers’ constitutional rights in parenting and in personal safety. Thirty-
four states recognize prenatal abandonment theory.518 The prenatal aban-
donment in Horton Hatches the Egg is unusual in that it is the mother,
Mayzie, who prenatally abandons her fetus/egg, which is not physically pos-
sible for a human mother.519 Nonetheless, the story of Horton’s Egg was
518. See infra Appendix.
519. States do use civil laws to protect fetuses from both their mothers and fathers. See
generally 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(t) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of
2016 Reg. Sess.), found constitutional in In re Jamarqon C., 788 N.E.2d 344, 353
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003). See MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447.5(6) (Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess. of 98th Gen. Assemb.), which reads:
The parent is unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship be-
cause of a consistent pattern of committing a specific abuse including, but
not limited to, specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child
relationship which are determined by the court to be of a duration or na-
ture that renders the parent unable for the reasonably foreseeable future to
care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of
the child. (b) It is presumed that a parent is unfit to be a party to the parent
and child relationship upon a showing that: a. Within a three-year period
immediately prior to the termination adjudication, the parent’s parental
rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated pursuant
to subsection 2 or 4 of this section or subdivision (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this
subsection or similar laws of other states; b. If the parent is the birth mother
and within eight hours after the child’s birth, the child’s birth mother
tested positive and over .08 blood alcohol content pursuant to testing under
section 577.020 for alcohol, or tested positive for cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine, a controlled substance as defined in section 195.010, or
a prescription drug as defined in section 196.973, excepting those con-
trolled substances or prescription drugs present in the mother’s body as a
result of medical treatment administered to the mother, and the birth
mother is the biological mother of at least one other child who was adjudi-
cated an abused or neglected minor by the mother or the mother has previ-
ously failed to complete recommended treatment services by the children’s
division through a family-centered services case; c. If the parent is the birth
mother and at the time of the child’s birth or within eight hours after a
child’s birth the child tested positive for alcohol, cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine, a controlled substance as defined in section 195.010, or
a prescription drug as defined in section 196.973, excepting those con-
trolled substances or prescription drugs present in the mother’s body as a
result of medical treatment administered to the mother, and the birth
mother is the biological mother of at least one other child who was adjudi-
cated an abused or neglected minor by the mother or the mother has previ-
ously failed to complete recommended treatment services by the children’s
division through a family-centered services case; or d. Within a three-year
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extraordinarily popular,520 which suggests the public’s endorsement of Hor-
ton’s story. The moral of Horton’s story is that the real parent stands the
post no matter what: “I meant what I said and I said what I meant . . . An
elephant’s faithful one hundred percent!”521
The operation of prenatal abandonment requires non-marital fathers
to assume responsibility despite the complications of contemporary
demographics. State efforts to shape this theory are guided by the cases
discussed in Part III of this Article. Unmarried men should bear the respon-
sibility to inquire of women with whom they have had sexual intercourse as
to whether pregnancies resulted and must identify themselves as fathers.
They must provide documented prenatal support and assistance to women
who are pregnant when any possibility of their paternity exists. Finally, they
should register with putative father registries and file paternity actions ap-
propriately. State laws must 1) protect the privacy and domestic safety of
non-marital mothers who maintain pregnancies; 2) protect non-marital fa-
thers’ rights when they can document significant and consistent prenatal
support and assistance, commensurate with their means, and have concomi-
tantly taken appropriate and timely action to assume and establish legal
paternity; and 3) withhold non-marital fathers’ rights to consent to adop-
tion where fathers have committed documented domestic violence against
the mothers of their fetuses or abdicated prenatal support responsibilities in
the absence of birth mother fraud.
That forty-one percent of the nation’s children are born outside of
marriage, that non-marital children are more likely to live in poverty to
period immediately prior to the termination adjudication, the parent has
pled guilty to or has been convicted of a felony involving the possession,
distribution, or manufacture of cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine, and
the parent is the biological parent of at least one other child who was adju-
dicated an abused or neglected minor by such parent or such parent has
previously failed to complete recommended treatment services by the chil-
dren’s division through a family-centered services case.
Id.
520. Horton Hatches the Egg has remained popular in the United States. In 2001, PUB-
LISHERS WEEKLY reported that the book had sold 987,996 copies to date, placing it
at 138 in the magazine’s list of the best-selling children’s books of all time. Debbie
H. Turvey, All-Time Bestselling Children’s Books, PUBLISHER’S WEEKLY (Diane
Roback ed.) (Dec. 17, 2001), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/chil-
drens/childrens-industry-news/article/28595-all-time-bestselling-children-s-books
.html. In 2007, the National Education Association named the book one of its
“Teachers’ Top 100 Books for Children” based on an online poll. Teacher’s Top Books
for Children, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/grants/teachers-top-100-
books-for-children.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
521. See SEUSS, supra note 2. Horton makes this statement repeatedly in the non-
paginated book.
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their detriment, and that non-marital mothers are uniquely vulnerable to
domestic violence and homicide mandates that the states make fathers’
rights commensurate with the responsibilities they assume during the prena-
tal period.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF PREABANDONMENT THEORY
AS APPLIED IN EACH STATE
Alabama
ALA. CODE § 26-10A-9 (2015)
(a) A consent or relinquishment required by Section 26-10A-7 may be im-
plied by any of the following acts of a parent:
(1) Abandonment of the adoptee. Abandonment includes, but is not
limited to, the failure of the father, with reasonable knowledge of the preg-
nancy, to offer financial and/or emotional support for a period of six
months prior to the birth.522
Case Law
In 2000, in C.V. v. J.M.J. and T.F.J.523, the Alabama Supreme Court
issued its first prenatal abandonment opinion; the Court withdrew it upon
rehearing and substituted a new one in 2001,524 ultimately holding that a
father could revoke his prenatal abandonment just as he could revoke his
consent, therefore upholding his parental rights.525
In 2003, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed its trial and appellate
courts in Ex Parte F.P. and R.P. on the basis that the Alabama six-month
prenatal abandonment statute was impermissibly retroactively applied where
the subject child’s gestation expired shortly before the statute was six
months old.526
In 2006, the Alabama Supreme Court decided Ex parte J.W.B. and
upheld the trial court’s finding of the birth father’s consent implied by his
prenatal abandonment.527 The intermediate court had reversed the trial
court and the Supreme Court again reversed, restoring the findings made by
the trial court. The trial court had concluded, based upon ore tenus evi-
dence, that a mother had not thwarted the father’s developing a protective
relationship with his child.528 As is common in prenatal abandonment cases,
522. ALA. CODE § 26-10A-9 (Westlaw through Act 2017-81 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)).
523. See C.V. v. J.M.J., 810 So. 2d 692, 692 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) rev’d sub nom. Ex
parte C.V., No. 1981316, 2000 WL 1717011 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000) withdrawn and
superseded on reh’g, 810 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 2001) (Crawley, J., dissenting) (a man has
no duty to support his child before his paternity can be established, but other states
have held differently).
524. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 2001).
525. See C.V., 810 So. 2d at 700. See discussion supra Section 3.3.
526. Ex parte F.P., 857 So. 2d at 137–38. See discussion supra Section 3.3.
527. Ex parte J.W.B. & K.E.M.B., 933 So. 2d 1081, 1092 (Ala. 2005).
528. J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1090.
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the J.W.B. Court extensively examined the totality of circumstances giving
rise to a finding of prenatal and post-birth abandonment.529 The birth fa-
ther was one of two possible fathers.530 The mother never lied to the father
and the father did not file with the putative father registry.531 The father did
not institute legal proceedings until he was served with notice of an adop-
tion of which he already knew.532 His filing was defensive in that he did not
proactively seek legal and financial responsibility for the child but only filed
action to establish paternity in reaction to the adoption filing.533 Such inac-
tion has been a factor in the decisions of numerous courts in prenatal aban-
donment findings.534
Arizona
In 1994, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the trial court in The
Father in Pima County Juvenile Action.535 The Court held that the father had
not affirmatively sought to block the adoption, seek custody, or establish his
paternity and that his defensive filing did not cure his inaction, nor did his
claim that he could not afford an attorney.536
California
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102425.
(a) The certificate of live birth for any live birth occurring on or after Janu-
ary 1, 2016, shall contain those items necessary to establish the fact of the
birth and shall contain only the following information:
529. J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1083–85.
530. J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1083.
531. J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1090.
532. J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1090–91.
533. See J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1090–91.
534. See J.W.B., 933 So. 2d at 1092 (quoting Murdock, J., in K.W.J. v. J.W.B., 933 So.
2d 1075, 1081 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)).
We should not equate the filing of ‘court papers’ and the taking of legal
positions with the establishment of human relationships. A child can be
abandoned just as surely when papers have been filed with a court as when
they have not been. While those papers sit in a folder in a courthouse,
children grow. They are read to and tucked in at night. They are nursed to
health. They are taught. They are nurtured. They are loved. And they love
back. And bonds are formed-but not with a biological father who has al-
lowed himself to remain absent in the child’s life.
Id. See also In re Appeal in Pima Cty. Juv. Severence Action No. S-114487, 876 P.2d
1121, 1135 (Ariz. 1994); Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1316 (Miss. 1982).
535. See In re Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d 1121.
536. Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action, 876 P.2d at 1133–35. See discussion supra Section
3.3.
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(1) Full name and sex of the child.
(2) Date of birth, including month, day, hour, and year.
(3) Place of birth.
(4) Full name, birthplace, and date of birth of each parent, including
month, day, and year, and the parental relationship of the parent to the
child.
(C) If the parents are not married to each other, the father’s name
shall not be listed on the birth certificate unless the father and the mother
sign a voluntary declaration of paternity at the hospital before the birth
certificate is submitted for registration. The birth certificate may be
amended to add the father’s name at a later date only if paternity for the
child has been established by a judgment of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion or by the filing of a voluntary declaration of paternity.537
Case Law
In 1992, The California Supreme Court reversed a termination of fa-
ther’s rights in Adoption of Kelsey S. when it developed a two-step analysis to
determine whether an unwed father has demonstrated a full commitment to
his parental responsibilities both before and after the child’s birth.538
In 1995, the California Supreme Court decided Adoption of Michael
H., in which it found that post-birth conduct evincing a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenting cannot cure a failure to demonstrate such
full commitment before birth539 and held that the father’s rights were prop-
erly terminated.540
In 1999, a California appeals court decided In re Ariel H. and deter-
mined that father was not a presumed father and waived his parental
rights.541 Ariel H. is one of the more entertaining prenatal abandonment
decisions. The question was whether the father had demonstrated a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional, financial, and oth-
erwise—both before and after birth including “public acknowledgment of
paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his
ability to do so, and prompt legal action to seek custody of the child.”542
The court commented that “[w]hile eager to participate in the procreating
part—Joshua (the father) apparently had unprotected sex with Lisa at least
537. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102425 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
538. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236–37 (Cal. 1992). See discussion supra
Section 3.3.
539. Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 897, 904 (Cal. 1995).
540. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 901. See discussion supra Section 3.3.
541. See In re Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
542. Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127.
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40 times—he never made a serious effort to assume the true mantel of
fatherhood.”543 The father had hung out with his friends at the mall, had
spent what money he had on compact discs, did not go to see his child, and
did not notify his parents about the baby or otherwise publicly acknowledge
his paternity.544 The court concludes that “Joshua is no Horton”, referring
to Dr. Seuss’s popular children’s book Horton Hatches the Egg.545
In 2012, a California appellate court decided a two-state prenatal
abandonment decision against a father in Adoption of A.S., in which it held
that a New York filiation order made shortly after the child’s birth did not
establish father’s right to prevent adoption filed in California.546
Colorado
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105(3)(C)(III) (1994)
(3.1) The court may order the termination of the other birth parent’s paren-
tal rights upon a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child
and that there is clear and convincing evidence of one or more of the fol-
lowing: (c) That the parent has not promptly taken substantial parental
responsibility for the child. In making this determination the court shall
consider, but shall not be limited to, the following: (II) Whether the parent
has failed to pay regular and reasonable support for the care of the child,
according to that parent’s means; and (III) Whether the birth father has
failed to substantially assist the mother in the payment of the medical, hos-
pital, and nursing expenses, according to that parent’s means, incurred in
connection with the pregnancy and birth of the child.547
Delaware
DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13 § 1103(A)(2)(A)(1)(A) (2009)
a. The Court may order a termination of parental rights based upon
abandonment if the Court finds that the following occurred and that the
respondent intended to abandon the child: 1. In the case of a minor who
has not attained 6 months of age at the time a petition for termination of
parental rights has been filed, and for whom the respondent has failed to: A.
543. Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127.
544. Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127.
545. Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128.
546. Adoption of A.S., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). See discussion
supra Section 3.3.
547. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-105(3)(c)(III) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of
71st Gen. Assemb.).
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Pay reasonable prenatal, natal and postnatal expenses in accordance with the
respondent’s financial means[.]548
Florida
FLA. STAT. § 63.089(4) (2012)
(4) Finding of abandonment. A finding of abandonment resulting in a ter-
mination of parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evi-
dence that a parent or person having legal custody has abandoned the child
in accordance with the definition contained in s. 63.032. A finding of aban-
donment may also be based upon emotional abuse or a refusal to provide
reasonable financial support, when able, to a birth mother during her preg-
nancy or on whether the person alleged to have abandoned the child, while
being able, failed to establish contact with the child or accept responsibility
for the child’s welfare.549
Case Law
In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court decided In re Adoption of John
Doe v. Richard Roe.550 The appellate court had reversed the trial court’s
grant of adoption and certified the question of whether prenatal abandon-
ment could waive father’s consent to adoption; the Supreme Court an-
swered affirmatively.551
In 1990, one year later, Florida used the biology plus theory to cut in
favor of a father in In re Adoption of Baby James Doe v. Doe when it re-
manded a case involving a father who produced documentary proof of mon-
etary support and the identification band from the hospital of the child’s
birth with his surname on it.552
In 1995, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed trial and appellate court
decisions in In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. v .J.S.W.553 The Court held that
father’s conduct—including absence of his emotional support to mother
and his emotional abuse of mother—could constitute grounds for a finding
of prenatal abandonment.554
In 2008, a Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court’s termina-
tion of a father’s parental rights for prenatal and postnatal abandonment in
548. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13. § 1103(a)(2)(a)-(a)(2)(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw through 2017).
549. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.089(4) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of 25th Legis.).
550. See In re Adoption of John Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
551. John Doe, 543 So. 2d at 743.
552. See generally In re Adoption of Baby James Doe, 572 So. 2d 986, 987–88 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990). See discussion supra Section 3.3.
553. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
554. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 962.
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Heart of Adoptions.555 The court used a clear and convincing evidentiary
standard to terminate father’s parental rights based upon prenatal
abandonment.556
Georgia
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(B)(4)(D) (2008)
(b) If there is a biological father who is not the legal father of a child and he
has not executed a surrender . . ., he shall be notified of adoption proceed-
ings regarding the child in the following circumstances:
(4) If the court finds from the evidence . . . that such biological
father who is not the legal father has performed any of the fol-
lowing acts:
(D) Provided support or medical care for the mother either
during her pregnancy or during her hospitalization for the
birth of the child.557
Idaho
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1504(2)(b)(iii) (2014)
(2) In accordance with subsection (1) of this section, the consent of an
unmarried biological father is necessary only if the father has strictly com-
plied with all requirements of this section.
(b) With regard to a child who is under six (6) months of age at
the time he is placed with adoptive parents, an unmarried bio-
logical father shall have manifested a full commitment to his pa-
rental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in
this subsection and prior to the date of the filing of any proceed-
ing to terminate the parental rights of the birth mother. The
father shall have strictly complied with all of the requirements of
this subsection by:
(iii) If he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paying a
fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in con-
nection with the mother’s pregnancy and the child’s birth,
in accordance with his means, and when not prevented from
555. J.C.J. v. Heart of Adoptions, 989 So. 2d 32, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
556. For an example of the clear and convincing standard of proof needed for termination
of parental rights see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
557. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(b), (b)(4), (b)(4)(D) (Westlaw through 2016 Sess.).
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doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful
custody of the child.558
Illinois
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/8 (2013)
(b) Where consents are required in the case of an adoption of a minor
child, the consents of the following persons shall be sufficient:
(B) The father of the minor child, if the father:
(iv) in the case of a child placed with the adopting parents
less than 6 months after birth, made a good faith effort to
pay a reasonable amount of the expenses related to the birth
of the child and to provide a reasonable amount for the fi-
nancial support of the child before the expiration of 30 days
following the birth of the child, provided that the court may
consider in its determination all relevant circumstances, in-
cluding the financial condition of both biological
parents[.]559
Iowa
IOWA CODE § 600A8(3)(a)(2)(d)
[ ] The following shall be, either separately or jointly, grounds for ordering
termination of parental rights:
3. The parent has abandoned the child. For the purposes of this sub-
section, a parent is deemed to have abandoned a child as follows:
(2) In determining whether the requirements of this paragraph
are met, the court may consider all of the following:
(d) With regard to a putative father, whether the putative
father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with the
putative father’s means, for medical, hospital, and nursing
expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s preg-
nancy or with the birth of the child, or whether the putative
558. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1504(2), (2)(b), (2)(b)(iii) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
559. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/8(b), (b)(B), (b)(B)(iv) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-983 of
2016 Reg. Sess.).
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father demonstrated emotional support as evidenced by the
putative father’s conduct toward the mother.560
Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(1)(D)
(h)(1) [T]he court may order that parental rights be terminated, upon a
finding by clear and convincing evidence, of any of the following:
(D) the father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed
without reasonable cause to provide support for the mother dur-
ing the six months prior to the child’s birth[.]561
Case Law
In 1991, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., the Kansas Court of Appeals
upheld a trial court’s termination of incarcerated father’s parental rights.562
In 1994, Kansas courts decided two prenatal abandonment cases and
demonstrated that prenatal abandonment/support can operate to waive or
preserve father’s parental rights. In Baby Boy B., the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the trial and appellate courts’ upholding of father’s consent rights
to deny adoption and discriminated between appellate review of documen-
tary and ore tenus evidence as well as set a reasonableness evidentiary
standard.563
In Baby Boy N., the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court
decision to terminate father’s parental rights for failure to provide prenatal
support, which he unsuccessfully attempted to blame on poor legal
advice.564
560. IOWA CODE § 600A.8(3), (3)(a)(2), (3)(a)(2)(d) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
561. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136(h)(1), (h)(1)(D) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
562. In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 822 P.2d 76, 78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he
mother testified that the father did not provide her with money, groceries, or a place
to live, nor did he give her his paycheck or babysit her other children. Moreover, the
mother stated the father showed a complete disregard for supporting her before his
incarceration.”). The trial court concluded that the father made no effort to inquire
after the welfare of the mother in her pregnant condition. Id. See discussion supra
Section 3.3.
563. In re Adoption of Baby Boy B, 866 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Kan. 1994). See discussion
supra Section 3.3.
564. In re Baby Boy N., 874 P.2d 680, 689-90 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). See discussion supra
Section 3.3.
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In 1997, a Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed its trial court’s termina-
tion of father’s parental rights in In re Adoption of D.M.M., in which both
mother and father questioned his paternity.565
In 2002, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s deci-
sion to terminate a father’s parental rights in In re Adoption of M.D.K.566
Judge Beier’s concurrence emphasized a central issue to prenatal support
cases—that support may not be court ordered prior to birth but that it
preserves the father’s parental rights.567
In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court decided In re Adoption of A.T.T.,
where it affirmed the trial court’s termination of a father’s parental rights for
nonsupport during the pregnancy in a multi-state case where the mother
moved from the conception state to Kansas to give birth and relinquish her
baby and refused to give father her new address.568
Kentucky
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.065(1)(e)
(1) The putative father of a child shall be made a party and brought before
the circuit court in the same manner as any other party to an involuntary
termination action if one (1) of the following conditions exists:
(e) He has contributed financially to the support of the child,
either by paying the medical or hospital bills associated with the
birth of the child or financially contributed to the child’s sup-
port; or
(2) Any person to whom none of the above conditions apply shall be
deemed to have no parental rights to the child in question.569
Louisiana
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1138(B)(1)
A. At the hearing of the opposition, the alleged or adjudicated father must
establish his parental rights by acknowledging that he is the father of the
565. See In re Adoption of D.M.M., 955 P.2d 618 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). See discussion
supra Section 3.3.
566. In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 747–48 (Kan. App. 2002).
567. M.D.K., 58 P.3d at 750. See discussion supra Section 3.3.
568. In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180, 1184–85 (Kan. 2008). See discussion
supra Section 3.3.
569. KY. REV. STAT. § 625.065(1)(e) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
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child and by proving that he has manifested a substantial commitment to
his parental responsibilities and that he is a fit parent of his child.
B. Proof of the father’s substantial commitment to his parental responsibili-
ties requires a showing, in accordance with his means and knowledge of the
mother’s pregnancy or the child’s birth, that he either:
(1) Provided financial support, including but not limited to the
payment of consistent support to the mother during her preg-
nancy, contributions to the payment of the medical expenses of
pregnancy and birth[.]
D. If the court finds that the alleged or adjudicated father has failed to
establish his parental rights, it shall decree that his rights are terminated.570
Case Law
In 2000, in the case In re Adoption of E.H.M., a Louisiana appellate
court affirmed the lower court’s holding terminating the biological father’s
rights.571 Both courts looked at several factors to determine if the biological
father assumed parental responsibilities and ultimately determined he was
not fit to be a parent. Biological father showed his unfitness by physically
abusing birth mother on several occasions, abusing drugs and alcohol, and
committing several crimes leading to his incarceration.572 The fact that bio-
logical father failed to provide any support to birth mother while she was
pregnant also showed his unfitness to be a parent:
Furthermore, before he was incarcerated, he made no effort to
provide financial support for TLM or the unborn baby. ACM
was working for his father and uncle, and they allowed him to
work as he pleased. TLM testified that if he had a hangover, he
would stay in bed instead of going to work. Even with his spo-
radic work habits, he testified he made $1,200 per month. That
money was not saved or spent for the upcoming expenses of fa-
therhood, however, even though he was living with his parents
and paying nothing for room and board.573
In 2001, a Louisiana appellate court reversed a trial court’s holding
and terminated a biological father’s parental rights in In Re Adoption of
570. LLA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1138(B)(1) (Westlaw through 2016).
571. In re Adoption of EHM, 808 So. 2d 397, 406 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
572. Adoption of EHM, 808 So. 2d at 406.
573. Adoption of EHM, 808 So. 2d at 406.
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J.L.G.574 The court looked at the biological father’s support of the mother,
his visitation, and his fitness to be a parent to determine whether the biolog-
ical father was fit to be a parent.575 The court also discussed the irrelevance
of mother’s failure to request support:
TJT argues in brief that MLG never requested support from
him. Article 1138 does not refer to providing support “if re-
quested.” A father who is committed to his parental responsibili-
ties will offer support to his child without being asked.
Furthermore, MLG testified she did not ask him for support
because to have done so would have been a vain and useless act:
“I didn’t ask him for that because I knew he wasn’t going to give
it to me.576
Michigan
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.39(1)-(2)
(1) If the putative father does not come within the provisions of subsec-
tion (2), and if the putative father appears at the hearing and requests cus-
tody of the child, the court shall inquire into his fitness and his ability to
properly care for the child and shall determine whether the best interests of
the child will be served by granting custody to him. If the court finds that it
would not be in the best interests of the child to grant custody to the puta-
tive father, the court shall terminate his rights to the child.
(2) If the putative father has established a custodial relationship with the
child or has provided substantial and regular support or care in accordance
with [his] ability to provide such support or care for the mother during
pregnancy or for either mother or child after the child’s birth during the 90
days before notice of the hearing was served upon him, the rights of the
574. In re Adoption of J.L.G., 808 So. 2d 491, 494–95 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
575. Adoption of J.L.G., 808 So. 2d at 494–95, 499.
It is undisputed that TJT provided no financial support to MLG while she
was pregnant, paid no medical expenses for MLG or JLG, and provided no
cash, diapers, formula, or items for JLG after she was born. At most, he and
his mother provided four clothing outfits and a rattle. . . . TJT knew he
could have made contributions to the child’s support through CCS, but he
stated that if a child was not going to be a part of his life, he was not going
to support the child.
Id.
576. Adoption of J.L.G., 808 So. 2d at 494–95, 499.
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putative father shall not be terminated except by proceedings in accordance
with [MCL 710.51(6) ] or [MCL 712A.2].577
Case Law
In 1996, a Michigan court in In re Brianna Marie Gaipa v. Johnson
vacated a trial court order finding a father had provided prenatal support
and set out test factors to evaluate prenatal support including the father’s
physical abuse of the mother.578
In 1998, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided in In re Adoption of
J.L.G. that a putative father had the ability to provide financial support to
the mother during her pregnancy, but failed to do so.579 In a short memo-
randum opinion, the court held that the birth mother’s refusals to accept
baby items from the putative father’s family and her failure to answer his
two offers of support did not relieve putative father of his obligation to
provide support under Mich. Comp. Laws § 710.39(2).580 The court ulti-
mately affirmed the lower court’s termination of the putative father’s paren-
tal rights.581
In 2011, In Re H.M.K., the Michigan Court of Appeals discussed an
incarcerated father’s support obligations to the birth mother.582 The court
held that the father’s obligation to provide financial support still existed
even when he was in prison and noted that the father’s ability to provide
support is determined by his “actual financial resources whatever their ori-
gin, including wages from employment, proceeds of a legal settlement,
rental income, and monetary gifts.”583 Using Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 710.39(1), the court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s holding that
the biological father’s parental rights were terminated because he did not
provide substantial and regular support during the birth mother’s
pregnancy.584
577. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.39(1)-(2) (Westlaw through P.A.2016).
578. In re Gaipa v. Johnson, 555 N.W.2d 867, 867–68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). See dis-
cussion supra Section 3.3.
579. In re Wilkinson, No. 204217, 1998 WL 1989831, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 2,
1998)
580. Wilkinson, No. 204217, 1998 WL 1989831, at *1.
581. Wilkinson, No. 204217, 1998 WL 1989831, at *1.
582. HMK No. 304575, 2011 WL 6187076, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2011).
583. HMK, No. 304575, 2011 WL 6187076, at *2.
584. HMK, No. 304575, 2011 WL 6187076, at *2.
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Mississippi
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-6
(4) Proof of an alleged father’s full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood would be shown by proof that, in accordance with his means
and knowledge of the mother’s pregnancy or the child’s birth, that he
either:
(a) Provided financial support, including, but not limited to, the
payment of consistent support to the mother during her preg-
nancy, contributions to the payment of the medical expenses of
pregnancy and birth, and contributions of consistent support of
the child after birth; that he frequently and consistently visited
the child after birth; and that he is now willing and able to as-
sume legal and physical care of the child; or
(b) Was willing to provide such support and to visit the child
and that he made reasonable attempts to manifest such a paren-
tal commitment, but was thwarted in his efforts by the mother
or her agents, and that he is now willing and able to assume legal
and physical care of the child.585
Case Law
In 1982, in John Doe and A Female Infant v. Attorney W., the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of a father’s pa-
rental rights where the father had misled the adoptive parents and sought
parental rights only in defense to their adoption filing.586
In 2009, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered prenatal abandon-
ment and protected the rights of the father in Dr. K.B. and Dr. RM. v
J.G.587 The Court decided that the father’s failure to provide prenatal sup-
port was justified because the birth mother had thwarted him with her pro-
miscuity and by threatening to file harassment charges against him.588
Montana
MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-610.4(b) (2013)
585. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-6 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
586. John Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1313 (Miss. 1982). See discussion supra
Section 3.3.
587. Dr. K.B. v. J.G., 9 So. 3d 1124, 1124 (Miss. 2009).
588. Dr. K.B, 9 So. 3d at 1130–31. See discussion supra Section 3.3.
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(1) The parental rights of a putative father may be terminated by the court
if the putative father has failed to timely establish and maintain a substantial
relationship with the child.
(4) In order to meet the minimal showing of having established a substantial
relationship with regard to a child who is the subject of an adoption pro-
ceeding involving a child who is under 6 months of age at the time that the
child becomes the subject of adoption proceedings, a putative father has the
burden to show that the putative father has manifested a full commitment
to parental responsibilities by:
(b) if the putative father had actual knowledge of the pregnancy,
paying a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in
connection with the pregnancy and the child’s birth in accor-
dance with the putative father’s means when not prevented from
doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful cus-
tody of the child[.]589
Case Law
In 1990, in In re Adoption of D.J.V., the Montana Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court’s termination of birth father’s parental rights for aban-
donment despite his claim that he was under no court order to support
based upon pre- and post-birth conduct.590
Nebraska
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.22.5 (2009)
The court shall determine that such father’s consent is not required for
a valid adoption of the child upon a finding of one or more of the
following:
(5) The father had knowledge of the pregnancy and failed to
provide reasonable support for the mother during the
pregnancy[.]591
589. MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-610.4(b) (Westlaw through 2017 Sess.).
590. In re Adoption of D.J.V., 796 P.2d 1076, 1078–79 (Mont. 1990). See discussion
supra Section 3.3. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1992)
and In re Adoption of M.D.K. 58 P.2d 745 (Kan Ct. App 2002) for other examples
of cases explaining that prenatal support is required to avoid a finding of abandon-
ment absent court order child support for a fetus.
591. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.22.5 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of 105th Legis.).
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Case Law
In 2013, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s waiver
of a birth father’s consent in Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D. .592 The question in
this case was the effect of the mother’s intentional obfuscation about the
baby’s date of birth in response to his inquiries.593 The Court held such
misrepresentation could estop the mother from obtaining summary judg-
ment waiving the father’s parental rights for failure to comply with a statute
that required him to file a post-birth objection to an adoption within five
days of birth with the Nebraska father registry.594 The Nebraska registry
allows pre-birth filing, but that does not guarantee notice to the father.595
This case relates to prenatal abandonment in several ways. Nebraska requires
a notice to birth father that recites his obligation to pay pre-birth sup-
port.596 The Nebraska Supreme Court decided the case on father’s late fa-
ther registry filing because Nebraska law requires father’s filing in the five
days after birth and prebirth filing will not suffice to protect his parental
rights.597 But had father paid prenatal support, the court could have decided
the case on constitutional grounds without reference to the five-day filing
obligation.
Nevada
NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.011 (1975)
A mother is “abandoned” if the father or putative father has not pro-
vided for her support during her pregnancy or has not communicated with
her for a period beginning no later than 3 months after conception and
extending to the birth of the child.598
Case Law
In 1998, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s termina-
tion of a father’s parental rights for abandonment in In re Parental Rights as
to Symantha Renae Carron.599 The use of prenatal conduct to undergird
592. See Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D., 826 N.W.2d 242 (Neb. 2013).
593. Jeremiah J., 826 N.W.2d at 245. Mother had also lied to Father that he was not the
father of her unborn child. Id. at 244.
594. Jeremiah J., 826 N.W.2d at 247.
595. Jeremiah J., 826 N.W.2d at 251–52 (Connolly, J. concurring).
596. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.13.7 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of 105th Legis.).
597. Jeremiah J., 826 N.W.2d at 252 (Connolly, J. concurring).
598. NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.011 (Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
599. In re Carron, 956 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1998), overruled by In re N.J., 8 P.3d 126 (Nev.
2000).
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abandonment was an issue of first impression for Nevada, and the Court
held that a father’s pre-birth conduct may not by itself justify termination of
father’s parental rights, but it can serve, at least in part, as the basis for
termination of parental rights.600 The Carron Court in 1998 did not
mention or perhaps did not know of the existence of N.R.S. 128.011,
which was enacted in 1975 and provides that failure to provide prenatal
support of and contact with birth mother constitutes abandonment of the
birth mother.601 This holding, with its failure to recognize the state prenatal
abandonment statute, continues to vex practitioners in the state because it
leads to inconsistent and unpredictable results.602
New Hampshire
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:6 (2006)
I. In an intrastate or interstate adoption, but not an international adoption,
the following persons shall be given notice by the court and shall have the
right to request a hearing to prove paternity:
(d) A person who is . . . providing financial support to [birth
mother] or the child at the time any action under this chapter is
initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child’s father
prior to the mother surrendering her parental rights pursuant to
RSA 170-B:9 or the mother’s parental rights being involuntarily
terminated.603
New Jersey
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a) (1998)
a. A person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of P.L.1977, c.
367 (a) shall have the right to object to the adoption of his child False In a
contest between a person who is entitled to notice pursuant to section 9 of
P.L.1977, c. 367 (C.9:3-45) objecting to the adoption and the prospective
adoptive parent, the standard shall be the best interest of the child. The best
interest of a child requires that a parent affirmatively assume the duties en-
600. Carron, 956 P.2d at 788–89, overruled by N.J., 8 P.3d at 126.
601. NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.011 (Westlaw through end of 2015 Reg. Sess.) (Abandoned
Mother is defined as, “[a] mother is ‘Abandoned’ if the father or putative father has
not provided for her support during her pregnancy or has not communicated with
her for a period beginning no later than 3 months after conception and extending to
the birth of the child.”).
602. Interview with Ishi Bunin, Fellow of the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys
(Sept. 10, 2014).
603. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:6 (Westlaw through end of 2016 Reg. Sess.).
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compassed by the role of being a parent. In determining whether a parent
has affirmatively assumed the duties of a parent, the court shall consider,
but is not limited to consideration of, the fulfillment of financial obligations
for the birth and care of the child. . . .604
New Mexico
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-3(F)(4)(a)(5) (2012)
F. “acknowledged father” means a father who:
(4) has openly held out the adoptee as his own child by estab-
lishing a custodial, personal or financial relationship with the
adoptee as follows:
(a) for an adoptee under six months old at the time of place-
ment: 5) has provided reasonable and fair financial support
to the mother during the pregnancy and in connection with
the adoptee’s birth in accordance with his means and when
not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized
agency having lawful custody of the adoptee or the adoptee’s
mother[.]605
New York
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(e)(iii)
1. Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall
be required as follows:
(e) Of the father, whether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-
wedlock who is under the age of six months at the time he is
placed for adoption, but only if: (iii) such father paid a fair and
reasonable sum, in accordance with his means, for the medical,
hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with the
mother’s pregnancy or with the birth of the child.606
Case Law
In 1990, the New York Court of Appeals relied upon biology plus
theory in the calculus of two prenatal support/abandonment cases decided
together: in In re Raquel Marie X. v. Mr. and Mrs. C. and In re Baby Girl S.
604. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a) (Westlaw through 2017).
605. N.M. STAT. ANN. §32A-5-3(F)(4)(a)(5) (Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.).
606. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(e)(iii)(McKinney through 2008).
154 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 24:53
v. Natural Father.607 The court protected father’s rights in one case and
waived fathers’ rights in the other case. The court indicated that a father’s
“qualifying interest . . . require[s] a willingness himself to assume full cus-
tody of the child,” and “not merely attempt to block the adoption by
others.”608
In 1990, New York courts made conflicting decisions in two cases. In
In re Kiran Chandini, a New York appellate court upheld a father’s consent
rights when the mother refused his offer of child support.609 But in John E.
v. Doe, a New York appellate court waived father’s rights where the mother
had refused the father’s offers of support.610 The distinguishing factor was
the John E v. Doe Court’s finding that the father’s only interest was in
blocking the adoption.611
In 1991, In re Stephen C., a New York appellate court waived an incar-
cerated father’s rights, because he was not willing to assume full custody of
the child himself.612 In 1993, in In re Adoption of Kyle, a New York appellate
court similarly waived another incarcerated father’s rights.613
In 1992, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division decided In
re Kailee CC., in which it affirmed the trial court’s decision waiving the
father’s consent to adoption for prenatal abandonment.614 The court’s dis-
cussion centered on such factors as the father’s urging the mother to un-
dergo abortion upon her early notice to him of the pregnancy, her giving
him her adoption attorney’s professional card to facilitate contact, his quit-
ting his employment, his leaving his place of lodging and becoming a street
person, his never expressing any objection or interest in the adoption plan,
and his continued use of drugs.615 The Kailee court emphasized the father’s
knowledge of the adoption plan and the efforts of the mother to facilitate
his communication with the adoption attorney. The father’s knowledge of
the adoption plan during the pregnancy emerges as a decisional factor possi-
bly because he has the notice to consider cooperating with the adoption or
providing the prenatal support necessary to protect his parental rights.
607. See In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418(N.Y. 1990).
608. Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d at 428. See discussion supra Section 3.3.
609. See In re Kiran Chadini, 560 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
610. John E. v. Doe, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
611. John E., 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
612. See In re Stephen C., 566 N.Y.S.2d 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). See discussion supra
Section 3.3.
613. In re Adoption of Kyle, 592 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). See discussion
supra Section 3.3.
614. In re Kailee CC., 179 A.D.2d 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
615. Kailee CC., 179 A.D.2d at 891–92.
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Also in 1992, a New York court waived father’s consent rights in Rob-
ert O. v Russell K.616 The father had claimed an exception to New York law
requiring “promptness” because he did not know of the birth.617
In 2000, In re Carrie GG., a New York court waived a father’s consent
where the only interest he showed in the child was to block the adoption
and held that the mother had no obligation to encourage the father to de-
velop a meaningful relationship with child.618
In 2006, In re Adoption of Matthew D., a New York court upheld a
father’s consent rights where he had expressed a willingness and desire to
raise the child, filed a proceeding to establish paternity prior to child’s
birth619 (but failed to file with the state’s putative father registry), and did
not help financially support the mother or pay for her medical expenses.620
The dissent wrote that the father’s desire to parent was undermined by his
failure to take steps to develop his plan to raise the child—for example, his
small, dangerously located apartment that was not fit for a baby.621
In another 2006 case, In re Gionna L., a New York court waived a
father’s consent where his living with the mother was an attempt to evade
law enforcement and the father sought custody in his mother in “nothing
more than an effort to block the adoption by others, rather than [an as-
sumption of] custodial care.”622
North Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) (1997)
Unless consent is not required under G.S. 48-3-603, a petition to
adopt a minor may be granted only if consent to the adoption has been
executed by:
616. See Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
617. Robert O., 604 N.E.2d at 102.
To conclude that petitioner acted promptly once he became aware of the
child is to fundamentally misconstrue whose timetable is relevant. Prompt-
ness is measured in terms of the baby’s life not by the onset of the father’s
awareness. The demand for prompt action by the father at the child’s birth
is neither arbitrary nor punitive, but instead a logical and necessary out-
growth of the State’s legitimate interest in the child’s need for early perma-
nence and stability.
Id. See also discussion supra Section 3.3.
618. In re Carrie GG, 709 N.Y.S.2d 247, 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
619. In re Adoption of Matthew D., 818 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (App. Div. 2006).
620. Matthew D., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
621. Matthew D., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
622. In re Gionna L., 824 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (App. Div. 2006).
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(2) In a direct placement, by:
b. Any man who may or may not be the biological father of
the minor but who:
4. Before the earlier of the filing of the petition or the date of a hear-
ing under G.S. 48-2-206, has acknowledged his paternity of the minor AND
II. Has provided, in accordance with his financial means, reason-
able and consistent payments for the support of the biological
mother during or after the term of pregnancy, or the support of
the minor, or both, which may include the payment of medical
expenses, living expenses, or other tangible means of support,
and has regularly visited or communicated, or attempted to visit
or communicate with the biological mother during or after the
term of pregnancy, or with the minor, or with both[.]623
Case Law
In 2006, North Carolina held in In re Adoption of Anderson that mere
offers of support by a father do not constitute sufficient compliance with its
statute.624 The question for the Court was whether the father made consis-
tent and reasonable support payments, and noted that the mother’s refusal
to accept assistance could not defeat the father’s paternal interest.625 Where
the mother had declined the father’s tender of $100, the court instructed
that the father could then have opened a bank account or established a trust
fund.626
In 2012, a North Carolina appellate court upheld birth father’s rights
where he had lived with mother including during the pregnancy and after
birth providing support for her in In re Adoption of S.K.N..627
In 2014, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided In re Adoption of
S.D.W. and determined what efforts are required of an unwed father to
determine whether a woman with whom he had a multiyear relationship
had become pregnant.628
623. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) (Westlaw through end of 2016 Reg.
Sess.).
624. In re Adoption of Anderson, 624 S.E.2d 626, 628–630 (N.C. 2006).
625. Anderson, 624 S.E.2d at 629–631.
626. Anderson, 624 S.E.2d at 631.
627. In re Adoption of S.K.N., 735 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). See discussion
supra Section 3.3.
628. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014). See discussion supra
Section 3.3.
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North Dakota
Case Law
In 1979, in In re F.H. v. W.S., the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed its trial court’s termination of parental rights and held that
mother’s reliance upon welfare and father’s incarceration did not relieve fa-
ther of support obligations.629
Ohio
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (2015)
Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following:
(B)The putative father of a minor if either of the following applies:
(2) The court finds, after proper service of notice and hear-
ing, that any of the following are the case:
(c) The putative father has willfully abandoned the
mother of the minor during her pregnancy and up to the
time of her surrender of the minor, or the minor’s place-
ment in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs
first.630
Case Law
In 1989, in In re Adoption of Hart, an Ohio appellate court affirmed a
trial court decision waiving a father’s consent.631 The father claimed that the
adoptive petitioners had fraudulently pled that the father was unknown and
the court held that knowledge possessed by the mother could not be im-
puted to the adoptive parents.632
In 1993, in In re Adoption of Klonowski, an Ohio appellate court af-
firmed a trial court protected a father’s consent rights where he gave mother
a key to an apartment he had rented for them.633
In 2004, in In Re Adoption of Suvak, the Ohio Supreme Court af-
firmed its appellate and trial courts’ holdings protecting a fifteen-year-old
father’s rights because the sixteen-year-old mother’s father and family had
ordered him out of their home and threatened the father with criminal
629. In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 214 (N.D. 1979). See discussion supra Section 3.3.
630. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (Westlaw through 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb.).
631. Hart, 577 N.E.2d at 80, 84.
632. Hart, 577 N.E.2d at 81–82. See discussion supra Section 3.3.
633. In re Adoption of Klonowski, 622 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). See
discussion supra Section 3.3.
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charges and/or a protective order if he continued to see the mother.634 The
Court held that the father had not “willfully” abandoned the mother during
pregnancy.635 This case demonstrates active thwarting of the father’s at-
tempts to assume responsibility and that such thwarting, even when con-
ducted by the mother’s parents rather than the mother herself, operates to
preserve the father’s consent rights.
In 2008, in In re Adoption of J.N.C., an Ohio appellate court affirmed
a trial court’s decision terminating a father’s parental rights.636 The court
noted that the father’s providing birth mother with a coat, one pair of shoes,
and “some money” was not enough financial support to require his consent
for adoption.637
In 2009, in In re Adoption of Potts, an Ohio appellate court affirmed a
trial court decision to require the father’s consent where the father registered
timely with the state’s putative father registry and repeatedly offered the
mother both assistance and support during the pregnancy.638 The mother
told him he was not the child’s father and threatened him with a protective
order if he persisted in his offers.639 The court held that the father’s offers
were sufficient to overcome the Ohio statute on willful prenatal abandon-
ment.640 The mother’s threats to seek criminal charges or restraining orders
against the father absent abuse supported a finding that she actively
thwarted the father’s attempts to assume prenatal responsibility.641
Oklahoma
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-4.2
C. Consent to adoption is not required from a father or putative fa-
ther of a minor born out of wedlock if: 1. The minor is placed for adoption
within ninety (90) days of birth, and the father or putative father fails to
show he has exercised parental rights or duties towards the minor, includ-
ing, but not limited to, failure to contribute to the support of the mother of
634. In re Adoption of Suvak, No. 1-03-51, 2004 WL 231494, at *6–7 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 9, 2004).
635. Suvak, 2004 WL 231494, at *6–7.
636. In re Adoption of J.N.C., No. 2008-CA-25, 2008 WL 2861702, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 25, 2008).
637. J.N.C., No. 2008-CA-25, 2008 WL 2861702, at *2.
638. In re Adoption of Potts, No. C-080689, 2009 WL 724059, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App
Mar. 20, 2009).
639. Potts, 2009 WL 724059, at *1.
640. Potts, 2009 WL 724059, at *1.
641. Potts, 2009 WL 724059, at *1.
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the child to the extent of his financial ability during her term of
pregnancy[.]642
Case Law
In 1987, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D. the Oklahoma Supreme
Court affirmed the portion of its trial court holding waiving father’s right to
consent, because the basis for his constitutional interest was lost when he
failed to assume those prenatal parental responsibilities which would have
provided permanency and stability for his child.643
In 1992, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., the Oklahoma Supreme
Court upheld a trial court decision waiving father’s consent rights holding
that Oklahoma law requires prenatal support in absence of a court order.644
In 1997, Oklahoma affirmed a trial court’s holding in Baby Girl M.
that waived father’s consent to the adoption of his daughter holding that
marriage proposals do not amount to “any action to legally establish his
claim to paternity of the child.”645
South Carolina
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(5)(b) (2008)
(A) Consent or relinquishment for the purpose of adoption is required of
the following persons:
. . . (5) the father of a child born when the father was not mar-
ried to the child’s mother, if the child was placed with the pro-
spective adoptive parents six months or less after the child’s
birth, but only if:
. . . (b) the father paid a fair and reasonable sum, based on
the father’s financial ability, for the support of the child or
for expenses incurred in connection with the mother’s preg-
642. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-4.2 (Westlaw through 2d Sess. of 55th Legis. 2016). See
discussion supra Section 3.3.
643. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1068, 1071 (Okl. 1985) reh’g denied
(Sept. 16, 1987). Father had knowledge of the pregnancy, did not provide for
mother during her pregnancy, did not pay for medical expenses related to the birth
and/or of the child or the mother, did not attempt to learn when and where the
child had been born, and essentially abandoned the support and care of the mother
and child during pregnancy and at birth. Id. at 1068. See discussion supra Section
3.3.
644. In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d 643, 646 (Okla. 1992).
645. In re Adoption of Baby Girl M., 942 P.2d 235, 242-43 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997).
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nancy or with the birth of the child, including, but not lim-
ited to, medical, hospital, and nursing expenses.646
Case Law
In 1993, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed its trial court
decision upholding a father’s consent rights in Abernathy v. Baby V. where
mother refused father’s offers of support.647
In 1997, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed its trial
court’s holding that father’s consent to adoption was not required in Doe v.
Brown.648 Father had conceived the child by statutory rape, had not paid
expenses associated with mother’s pregnancy or birth of the child and had
not made “good faith efforts to assume parental responsibility and comply
with the statute” which was described as the “Abernathy standard” that it
set out in its 1993 decision in which it protected a father’s rights.649
In 2011, in Roe v. Reeves, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
a trial court’s holding that the father’s consent was necessary upon finding
that the father’s contributions were insufficient to establish a claim of right
to consent under the statute.650 The Court quoted the 2002 Kansas decision
in M.D.K.651 for the rule that a mother’s lack of romantic interest and even
hostility does not prevent a father from funding a bank account or provid-
ing assistance through a third party.652 The Court explicitly rejected the
father’s claim that the mother’s reliance upon government benefits to pro-
vide for her basic needs relieved the father of his prenatal support
obligations.653
Tennessee
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102
(1)(A) For purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of par-
ent(s) or guardian(s) of a child to that child in order to make that child
available for adoption, “abandonment” means that: . . . (iii) A biological or
legal father has either willfully failed to visit or willfully failed to make rea-
sonable payments toward the support of the child’s mother during the four
646. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(A)(5)(b) (West through 2016 Sess.).
647. Abernathy v. Baby Boy, 437 S.E.2d 25, 29 (S.C. 1993). See discussion supra Section
3.3.
648. Doe v. Brown, 489 S.E.2d 917, 920–21 (S.C. 1997).
649. Brown, 489 S.E.2d at 921.
650. Roe v. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d 778, 785 (S.C. 2011).
651. In re Adoption of M.D.K., 58 P.3d 745, 750-51 (Kan. App. 2002).
652. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d at 784.
653. Reeves, 708 S.E.2d at 784.
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(4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child; provided, that in
no instance shall a final order terminating the parental rights of a parent as
determined pursuant to this subdivision (1)(A)(iii) be entered until at least
thirty (30) days have elapsed since the date of the child’s birth[.]654
Case Law
In 1999, a Tennessee appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order
terminating a father’s parental rights in Bethany Christian Services.655 The
court noted that father provided no financial support to birth mother and
the child, avoided birth mother’s phone calls, ignored her at school, and did
not visit the birth mother and the child.656 The court noted that this factual
situation was clearly governed by the state’s prenatal abandonment statute657
and ultimately held the responsibility is placed upon a biological father to
initiate contact and give support: “He cannot rely upon [birth mother’s]
failure to contact him or provide him with bills, because he had the respon-
sibility to initiate contact and give support.”658
Texas
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001
The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent
has: . . . (H) voluntarily, and with knowledge of the pregnancy, abandoned
the mother of the child beginning at a time during her pregnancy with the
child and continuing through the birth, failed to provide adequate support
or medical care for the mother during the period of abandonment before
the birth of the child, and remained apart from the child or failed to sup-
port the child since the birth[.]659
Case Law
In 1984, Texas affirmed a trial court’s termination of father’s rights for
abandonment including prebirth in In re T.M.Z. where the court held that
654. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102 (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
655. Bethany Christian Servs. v. Jackson, No. 03A01-9810-JV-00345, 1999 WL 356303,
at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 1999).
656. Bethany Christian Servs. No. 03A01-9810-JV-00345, 1999 WL 356303, at *4.
657. Bethany Christian Servs. No. 03A01-9810-JV-00345, 1999 WL 356303, at *4.
658. Bethany Christian Servs. No. 03A01-9810-JV-00345, 1999 WL 356303, at *4.
659. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of 84th
Legis.).
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abandonment was more than a physical separation and included turning
one’s back on a duty.660
Utah
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(3)(d)
(3) Except as provided in Subsections (6) and 78B-6-122(1), and subject to
Subsection (5), with regard to a child who is six months of age or less at the
time the child is placed with prospective adoptive parents, consent of an
unmarried biological father is not required unless, prior to the time the
mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child for adop-
tion, the unmarried biological father: . . .
(d) offered to pay and paid, during the pregnancy and after the
child’s birth, a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses in-
curred in connection with the mother’s pregnancy and the
child’s birth, in accordance with his financial ability, unless:
(i) he did not have actual knowledge of the pregnancy;
(ii) he was prevented from paying the expenses by the person
or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child; or
(iii) the mother refuses to accept the unmarried biological
father’s offer to pay the expenses described in this Subsec-
tion (3)(d).661
Case Law
In 2010, in In re Adoption of Baby Girl, a Utah Appeals Court affirmed
a trial court’s denial of father’s consent rights.662 The majority did not con-
sider father’s offers to pay prenatal support and instead focused on the ade-
quacy of his setting forth a plan of care for the child and his failure to agree
“to a court order of child support.”663 It is the dissent that focuses on the
adequacy of father’s prenatal support where mother refused his offer to pay
birth expenses.664
660. In re T.M.Z., 665 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. App. 1984). See discussion supra Section
3.3.
661. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(3)(d) (Westlaw through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.).
662. In re Adoption of Baby Girl, 2010 UT App 114, ¶ 4, 23, 233 P.3d 517, 519, 524.
663. In re Adoption of Baby Girl, 2010 UT App 114 at ¶ 16, 22, 233 P.3d at 522, 524.
664. In re Adoption of Baby Girl, 2010 UT App 114 at ¶ 33, 233 P.3d at 526.
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Later in 2010, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s deci-
sion dismissing father’s motion to set aside the adoption where he had failed
to comply with statutory requirements in In re Adoption of T.B.665
In 2014, Utah considered prenatal support in In re Adoption of J.S.,
where father had offered prenatal support and mother refused.666 The court
indicates that father’s offer satisfied the prenatal support plank in its statu-
tory scheme but his failure to comply with the paternity affidavit of the
statutory requirements did not significantly advance the state’s interest in
protecting children.667 Thus father did not transform his inchoate interest
in his child to a constitutionally protected interest because the offer to pay
prenatal support was but one of four statutory criteria required. The ques-
tion is whether Utah would have found father constitutionally protected his
parental rights by actually paying prenatal support. This case suggests not
and maintained the analysis it used in In re Adoption of T.B. .668
Vermont
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 3-504(a)(1)(A)
(a) If a respondent answers or appears at the hearing and asserts parental
rights, the court shall proceed with the hearing expeditiously. If the court
finds, upon clear and convincing evidence, that any one of the following
grounds exists and that termination is in the best interest of the minor, the
court shall order the termination of any parental relationship of the respon-
dent to the minor:
(1) In the case of a minor under the age of six months at the
time the petition is filed, the respondent did not exercise paren-
tal responsibility once he or she knew or should have known of
the minor’s birth or expected birth. In making a determination
under this subdivision, the court shall consider all relevant fac-
tors, which may include the respondent’s failure to:
(A) pay reasonable prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses in
accordance with his or her financial means[.]669
665. In re Adoption of T.B., 2010 UT 42, ¶ 2, 13, 233 P.3d 1026, 1027, 1029.
666. In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 11, 102, 358 P.3d 1009, 1013, 1041.
667. In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51 at ¶ 103, 358 P.3d at 1041.
668. In re Adoption of T.B., 2010 UT 42 at ¶ 40-44, 233 P.3d at 1035-36.
669. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 3-504(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw through 2015-2016 Legis.
Sess.).
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Washington
Case Law
In 1999, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed its trial court
termination of father’s parental rights in In re Infant Child Skinner, discuss-
ing mother’s resort to adoption based upon father’s failure to support her.670
West Virginia
W. VA. CODE § 48-22-306(b)(2) (2001)
(b) Abandonment of a child under the age of six months shall be presumed
when the birth father:
(1) Denounces the child’s paternity any time after conception;
(2) Fails to contribute within his means toward the expense of the pre-
natal and postnatal care of the mother and the postnatal care of the
child;
(3) Fails to financially support the child within father’s means; and
(4) Fails to visit the child when he knows where the child resides: Pro-
vided, That such denunciations and failure to act continue uninter-
rupted from the time that the birth father was told of the conception of
the child until the time the petition for adoption was filed.
(c) Abandonment of a child shall be presumed when the unknown father
fails, prior to the entry of the final adoption order, to make reasonable
efforts to discover that a pregnancy and birth have occurred as a result of his
sexual intercourse with the birth mother.671
Wisconsin
WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)(b) (2011)
Grounds for termination of parental rights shall be one of the following: . . .
(6) Failure to assume parental responsibility. (a) Failure to as-
sume parental responsibility, which shall be established by prov-
ing that the parent or the person or persons who may be the
parent of the child have not had a substantial parental relation-
ship with the child.
670. In re Infant Child Skinner, 982 P.2d 670, 678 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). See discus-
sion supra Section 3.3.
671. W. VA. CODE § 48-22-306(b)(2) (Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.).
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(b) In this subsection, “substantial parental relationship”
means the acceptance and exercise of significant responsibil-
ity for the daily supervision, education, protection and care
of the child. In evaluating whether the person has had a sub-
stantial parental relationship with the child, the court may
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, whether
the person has expressed concern for or interest in the sup-
port, care or well-being of the child, whether the person has
neglected or refused to provide care or support for the child
and whether, with respect to a person who is or may be the
father of the child, the person has expressed concern for or
interest in the support, care or well-being of the mother dur-
ing her pregnancy.672
Case Law
In 1975 in State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services., the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of father’s parental
rights holding that the father abandoned the child before birth.673
672. WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)(b) (Westlaw through 2015 Act 392).
673. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Wis. & Upper Mich., 227 N.W.2d 643,
646–47 (Wis. 1975). See discussion supra Section 3.3.
